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Inverse Condemnation: Unintended
Physical Damage*
By Aivo VAN ALsTym**
Introduction
THE law of inverse condemnation liability of public entities for un-
intended physical injuries to private property is entangled in a
complex web of doctrinal threads.1 The stark California constitu-
tional mandate that just compensation be paid when private property
is taken "or damaged" for public use2 has induced courts, for want of
more precise guidance, to invoke analogies drawn from the law of
torts and property as keys to liability.5 The decisional law, therefore,
contains numerous allusions to concepts of "nuisance,' 4 "trespass,"5
and "negligence," as well as to notions of strict liability without
fault.7 Unfortunately, judicial opinions seldom seek to reconcile these
* This article is based on a research study prepared by the author for
the California Law Revision Commission. The opinions, conclusions and rec-
ommendations contained herein are entirely those of the author and do not
necessarily represent or reflect those of the California Law Revision Com-
mission or its individual members.
** B.A. 1943, LL.B. 1948, Yale University. Professor of Law, University
of Utah. Member of the California Bar.
1 See generally Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Con-
cept, 42 CALF. L. REV. 596 (1954); Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The
Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 3.
2 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14. Approximately one-half the states require
just compensation for "damaging" as well as "taking." 2 P. NicuoLs, EnmrENT
Domin § 6.44 (rev. 3d ed. 1963).
s Inverse condemnation has been said to be "in the field of tortious
action." Douglass v. Los Angeles, 5 Cal. 2d 123, 128, 53 P.2d 353, 355 (1935).
See generally Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation:
The Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STA. L. REv. 727, 738-42 (1967).
4 See, e.g., Granone v. Los Angeles County, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 34 (1965). The origin of governmental liability for nuisance, as an
aspect of inverse condemnation liability, is discussed in Van Alstyne, Govern-
mental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 463, 493-
98 (1963).
5 See, e.g., Los Angeles Brick & Clay Prods. Co. v. Los Angeles, 60 Cal.
App. 2d 478, 141 P.2d 146 (1943).
6 See, e.g., House v. Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 153 P.2d 950
(1944).
7 See, e.g., Albers v. Los Angeles County, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129,
42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965).
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divergent approaches. The need for greater uniformity, consistency,
and predictability is particularly pressing in the physical damage
cases, for they comprise the single most significant class of inverse
condemnation claims, whether measured numerically or in terms of
the magnitude of potential liabilities. Clarification also would be
desirable in order to mark the borderline between the presently over-
lapping, and hence confusing, rules governing governmental tort and
inverse condemnation liabilities.8
The purpose of this article, therefore, is to explore and analyze in
depth those areas of inverse condemnation law most in need of legis-
lative clarification and correction, and to point out the theoretical
guidelines needed to formulate a uniform, consistent, and predictable
statutory inverse liability scheme.
I. Preliminary Overview
Before attempting to analyze those typical inverse condemnation
claims based on unintended tangible property damage, it is necessary
to conduct a preliminary review of the four major strands of doctrinal
development most frequently encountered in these cases: (1) inverse
liability without fault; (2) fault as a basis of inverse liability; (3) the
significance of private law in the adjudication of inverse liability
claims; and (4) the doctrine of damnum absque injuria.
A. Inverse Liability Without "Fault"
In 1956, a major landslide occurred in the Portuguese Bend area
of Los Angeles County, triggered by the pressure exerted by sub-
stantial earth fills deposited by the county in the course of extending
a county road through the area. Over five million dollars in resi-
dential and related improvements were destroyed by the slide. Al-
though it was known to the county that the surface area overlay a
prehistoric slide, competent geological studies had concluded that the
land had stabilized and that further slides were not reasonably to be
expected. In a suit against the county for damages, findings were
specifically made to the effect that there was no negligence or other
wrongful conduct or omission on the part of the defendant; plaintiff
property owners, however, were awarded judgment on the basis of
inverse condemnation. This judgment was affirmed on appeal by the
California Supreme Court in Albers v. County of Los Angeles.9
8 Liability for property damage has frequently been sustained in Cali-
fornia cases upon alternative theories of inverse condemnation and tort as
applied to the same facts. See, e.g., Bauer v. Ventura County, 45 Cal. 2d 276,
289 P.2d 1 (1955); Granone v. Los Angeles County, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 42
Cal. Rptr. 34 (1965).
9 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965).
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Albers thus reconfirmed the previously announced, but often for-
gotten, principle that liability may exist on inverse condemnation
grounds in the absence of fault. Reviewing the prior decisions, the
court pointed out that the California courts, from the earliest case °
interpreting the "or damaged" clause added to California's constitu-
tional eminent domain provision in 1879," had repeatedly held public
entities liable for foreseeable12 physical damage caused by a public
improvement project undertaken for public use, whether the work
was done carefully or negligently.13 The problem before the court in
Albers was stated explicitly in these terms:
The issue is how should this court, as a matter of interpretation
and policy, construe article I, section 14, of the Constitution in its ap-
plication to any case where actual physical damage is proximately
caused to real property, neither intentionally nor negligently, but is
the proximate result of the construction of a public work deliberately
planned and carried out by the public agency, where if the damage
had been foreseen it would render the public agency liable.14
The conclusion announced was that, in general, "any actual phys-
ical injury to real property proximately caused by the improvement
as deliberately designed and constructed is compensable under article
I, section 14, of our Constitution whether foreseeable or not."'15
This conclusion was supported, in the Court's view, by relevant
policy considerations:
The following factors are important. First, the damage to this
property, if reasonably foreseeable, would have entitled the property
owners to compensation. Second, the likelihood of public works not
being engaged in because of unseen and unforeseeable possible direct
physical damage to real property is remote. Third, the property own-
ers did suffer direct physical damage to their properties as the prox-
10 Reardon v. San Francisco, 62 Cal. 492, 6 P. 317 (1885).
11 See Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The
Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REv. 727, 771-76 (1967) (historical
background of CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14).
12 The Albers opinion appears to treat foreseeability as an element of
fault. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcoN) OF TORTS § 302 (1965). Foreseeability is
more typically regarded, in the inverse liability decisions, as an element of
proximate cause. See text accompanying notes 33-35 infra.
13 See Clement v. State Reclamation Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628, 220 P.2d 897
(1950); Powers Farms v. Consolidated Irr. Dist., 19 Cal. 2d 123, 119 P.2d 717
(1941); Tyler v. Tehama County, 109 Cal. 618, 42 P. 240 (1895); Reardon v.
San Francisco, 62 Cal. 492, 6 P. 317 (1885); Tormey v. Anderson-Cottonwood
Irr. Dist., 53 Cal. App. 559, 568, 200 P. 814, 818 (1921) (opinion of Supreme
Court en banc denying hearing). These cases, all cited in Albers, do not dis-
cuss directly the matter of foreseeability of the damages claimed; the facts in
each case, however, are consistent with actual or constructive foresight. For
other examples of inverse liability without "fault," see text accompanying
notes 225-31 infra.
14 Albers v. Los Angeles County, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 262, 398 P.2d 129, 136,
42 Cal. Rptr. 89, 96 (1965).
15 Id. at 263-64, 398 P.2d at 137, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
January 1969]
imate result of the work as deliberately planned and carried out.
Fourth, the cost of such damage can better be absorbed, and with in-
finitely less hardship, by the taxpayers as a whole than by the owners
of the individual parcels damaged. Fifth. . . "the owner of the dam-
aged property if uncompensated would contribute more than his
proper share to the public undertaking."' 6
A close reading of the Albers opinion indicates that the rule an-
nounced is not as favorable to inverse liability as might appear at first
glance. It is clearly not a blanket acceptance of strict liability with-
out fault.17 Three important qualifications are indicated. First, Al-
bers supports liability absent foreseeability of injury (i.e., without
fault) only when inverse liability would obtain in a situation involv-
ing the same facts plus foreseeability (i.e., plus fault). Secondly, the
rule is limited to instances of "direct physical damage." Finally, the
damage must be "proximately caused" by the public improvement as
designed and constructed.
The first of these qualifications assumes that inverse liability
ordinarily rests-although not invariablyl'--upon a showing of fault.
Unfortunately, the nature of this "fault," and thus the dimensions of
inverse liability under situations such as Albers where fault is not
present, is rooted in decisional law that is less than crystal clear. It
appears, however, that there are significant types of government pro-
jects which, while ultimately producing unforeseeable-or even fore-
seeable--damage to private property, may nevertheless be undertaken
without risk of inverse liability. The Albers opinion explicitly with-
holds liability, for example, when the public entity's conduct is legally
privileged, either under ordinary property law principles or as a non-
compensable exercise of the police power.19
The second qualification limits the Albers approach to "direct
physical damage," thereby excluding instances of non-physical "con-
sequential" damages.20 The terms, "direct" and "physical," in this
16 Id. The quotation is from-Clement v. Reclamation Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628,
642, 220 P.2d 897, 905 (1950).
17 Efforts to secure judicial approval for the idea that inverse condem-
nation is a form of strict liability have generally failed. See Youngblood v.
Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 56 Cal. 2d 603, 364 P.2d 840, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 904 (1961); Smith v. East 'Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 122 Cal. App. 2d 613, 265
P.2d 610 (1954); Curci v. Palo Verde Irr. Dist., 69 Cal. App. 2d 583, 159 P.2d
674 (1945).
Is Cf. Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation:
Deliberately Inflicted Injury or Destruction, 20 STAN. L. Ruv. 617 (1968).
19 Illustrative decisions cited in Albers include Archer v. Los Angeles, 19
Cal. 2d 19, 119 P.2d 1 (1941) (privilege); Gray v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1500,
174 Cal. 622, 163 P. 1024 (1917) (police power); see text accompany notes
46-87 infra.
20 The ambiguous term "consequential damages" is often employed to
describe generically the kinds of losses for which inverse condemnation lia-
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context connote a "definite physical injury to land or an invasion of
it cognizable to the senses, depreciating its market value."21  The
cases relied on in Albers, for example, involve structural injury to
buildings, 22 erosion of the banks of a stream,23 waterlogging of agri-
cultural land by seepage from a leaking irrigation canal,24 and flood-
ing and deposit of mud and silt by an overflowing river.25  The
opinion indicates that non-physical losses, such as decreased business
profits or diminution of property values due to diversion of traffic or
circuity of travel resulting from a public improvement, are not re-
coverable under this rationale.
26
The third qualification-requiring that the damage be proxi-
mately caused by the public improvement as designed and constructed
-involves a troublesome conceptual premise. When the defendant's
wrongful act or omission does not directly produce the injury com-
bility is denied, where no physical injury to, or appropriation of, tangible
property is involved. See Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546,
554 (1914); 2 P. NIcHOLS, EniNENT DOMAIN § 6.4432, at 503 (rev. 3d ed. 1963).
One of the purposes for which the "or damaged" clause was added to the
constitution was to narrow the categories of injuries previously regarded as
"consequential" and thus noncompensable. E.g., Reardon v. San Francisco, 66
Cal. 492, 6 P. 317 (1885) (recognizing that certain kinds of consequential dam-
ages were made compensable by the 1879 constitution); Eachus v. Los Angeles
Consol. Elec. Ry., 103 Cal. 614, 37 P. 750 (1894) (semble). Thus, although
some kinds of non-tangible damagings (i.e., loss of property values) resulting
from public projects are now compensable, Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal.
2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943) (loss of ingress and access), others are still deemed
consequential and not within the purview of the just compensation clause.
See cases cited note 26 infra. See generally 2 P. NiCHOLS, supra § 6.4432[2],
at 508-19.
21 Albers v. Los Angeles County, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 260, 398 P.2d 129, 135,
42 Cal. Rptr. 89, 95 (1965), quoting 18 Am. JuR. Eminent Domain § 139, at 766
(1939).
22 Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 P. 317 (1885).
23 Tyler v. Tehama County, 109 Cal. 618, 42 P. 240 (1895).
24 Powers Farms v. Consolidated Irr. Dist., 19 Cal. 2d 123, 119 P.2d 717
(1941) (dictum); Tormey v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irr. Dist., 53 Cal. App. 559,
200 P. 814 (1921) (opinion of Supreme Court en banc on denial of hearing).
25 Clement v. Reclamation Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628, 220 P.2d 897 (1950).
26 "Such cases as People v. Symonds, 54 Cal. 2d 855, involving loss of
business and diminution of value by diversion of traffic, circuity of travel, etc.,
do not involve direct physical damage to real property, but only diminution
in its enjoyment." Albers v. Los Angeles County, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 262, 398 P.2d
129, 136, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89, 96 (1965). Accord, People ex rel. Department of
Pub. Works v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 352 P.2d 519, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1960);
People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Russell, 48 Cal. 2d 189, 309 P.2d
10 (1957). For a more detailed discussion concerning recovery of business
profits under inverse liability, see Note, The Unsoundness of California's
Noncompensability Rule as Applied to Business Losses in Condemnation Cases,
20 Hastings L.J. 675 (1969).
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plained of, California tort law generally refers to foreseeability of in-
jury as the test of whether the act or omission is sufficiently "proxi-
mate" that liability may attach.27 Recognizing that "cause-in-fact"
may, in strict logic, be traced in an endless chain of cause and effect
relationships to exceedingly remote events, the reasonable foresee-
ability test is regarded as a useful mechanism for confining tort li-
ability within rational limits. 28 But the premise of the Albers deci-
sion is that neither the harmful consequences of the county's road
building project nor the intervening landslide which produced them
were foreseeable; the landslide damage was compensable even
though wholly unexpected and unforeseeable, and the result of a
reasonably formulated and carefully executed plan of construction.
Manifestly, the term "proximate cause" must have a special meaning
in this context.
Although no decision has been found analyzing in depth the prox-
imate cause concept where inverse liability obtains without fault, the
language of several opinions suggests that it requires a convincing
showing of a "substantial" cause-and-effect relationship which ex-
cludes the probability that other forces alone produced the injury.29
For example, the decisions sometimes speak of the damage in such
cases as being actionable if it is the "necessary or probable result"
of the improvement," or if "the immediate, direct, and necessary ef-
fect" thereof was to produce the damage.3 1 Proof that the injurious
consequences followed in the normal course of subsequent events, and
were produced predominantly by the improvement, seems to be the
focus of the judicial inquiry.3 2
27 See Akins v. Sonoma County, 67 Cal. 2d 185, 199, 430 P.2d 57, 65, 60
Cal. Rptr. 499, 507 (1967); Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal. 2d 213, 157 P.2d
372 (1945); Gibson v. Garcia, 96 Cal. App. 2d 681, 216 P.2d 119 (1950). It is
not necessary that the extent of harm, or the exact manner in which it is
incurred, be foreseeable. E.g., Osborn v. Whittier, 103 Cal. App. 2d 609, 230
P.2d 132 (1951).
28 See Premo v. Grigg, 237 Cal. App. 2d 192, 197, 46 Cal. Rptr. 683, 687
(1965); F. HARPER & F. JAMES, Tn. LAW OF TORTS § 20.5, at 1134-51 (1956);
W. PRossER, TnE LAW OF TORTS § 51, at 320-21 (3d ed. 1964). The same results
are reached in most but not all cases, by using foreseeability to limit the
scope of duty rather than causation. See Green, Foreseeability in Negligence
Law, 61 COLum. L. REV. 1401 (1961).
29 The term "substantial" is part of the vocabulary of tort law. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431, comment a at 433 (1965).
30 Youngblood v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 56 Cal. 2d 603,
607, 364 P.2d 840, 842, 15 Cal. Rptr. 904, 906 (1961); Granone v. Los Angeles
County, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 648, 42 Cal. Rptr. 34, 47 (1965).
31 Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n v. Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461, 470, 37 P. 375,
378 (1894). See also Conger v. Pierce County, 116 Wash. 27, 198 P. 377 (1921).
32 Despite the generality of typical judicial language, see cases cited notes
30 & 31 supra, there appears to be an implication running through the deci-
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The opinion in Albers rejects foreseeability as an element of the
public entity's duty to pay just compensation when its improvement
project directly sets in motion the natural forces (i.e., landslide), which
results in damage to private property. Foreseeability still may be a
significant operative factor in determining liability in other types of
cases, however, such as cases in which independently generated
forces, not induced by the entity's actions, contribute to the injury.
For example, the construction by a public entity of a culvert through
a highway embankment is, by hypothesis, the result of foresight that
flooding is likely to occur in the absence of suitable drainage. If the
culvert proves to be of insufficient capacity during normally fore-
seeable storms, inverse liability obtains because the flooding, as a
foreseeable consequence of the project, was proximately caused by the
inherently defective design of the culvert.33 But if at the same loca-
tion flooding is produced by insufficiency of the culvert to dispose of
the runoff of a storm of unprecedented and extraordinary size beyond
the scope of human foresight, the project is regarded as not the prox-
imate cause of damage that would not have resulted under predictable
conditions.34 In other words, where there is an intervening force
which cuts off and supersedes the original chain of causation, and the
public improvement itself was planned and constructed in a manner
reasonably sufficient to cope with foreseeable conditions without caus-
ing private damage, then the public entity should not be held respon-
sible for damage that results from the independent, intervening
force.35
sions that mere cause-in-fact, under the usual "but for" test, may not be suf-
ficient unless accompanied by a showing that the injurious results were an
inescapable or unavoidable consequence. Great Northern Ry. v. State, 102
Wash. 348, 173 P. 40 (1918); RESTAT1VENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433, comment
d (1965). Cause-in-fact in the usual sense must, of course, be shown. Young-
blood v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 56 Cal. 2d 603, 364 P.2d 840,
15 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1961); Janssen v. Los Angeles County, 50 Cal. App. 2d 45,
123 P.2d 122 (1942).
33 Granone v. Los Angeles County, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 42 Cal. Rptr. 34
(1965).
34 Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n v. Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461, 37 P. 375
(1894); Dick v. Los Angeles, 34 Cal. App. 724, 168 P. 703 (1917) (dictum).
To constitute an unforeseeable "act of God" which cuts off the chain of cau-
sation, however, the storm must be truly unforeseeable. The mere fact that
it may be a heavy storm of unusual intensity or volume, or even set local
records for magnitude, is not enough if heavy storms are expectable in the
area. Southern Pac. Co. v. Los Angeles, 5 Cal. 2d 545, 55 P.2d 847 (1936).
35 RESTATEMIENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 432(1) (1965). The fact that the
storm was unprecedented and unforeseeable, however, does not absolve the
public entity from liability for additional damage which would not have
occurred in the absence of the improvement. Jefferis v. Monterey Park, 14
Cal. App. 2d 113, 57 P.2d 1374 (1936); Nahl v. Alta Irr. Dist., 23 Cal. App. 333,
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Albers, under this analysis, is clearly distinguishable from the
"act of God" cases. In Albers, the county road project was planned
and constructed with reasonable care in light of all foreseeable future
conditions; yet, due to unforeseeable circumstances, the project di-
rectly set in motion, and thereby substantially caused, the property
damage for which compensation was sought. Liability was thus im-
posed, since, for the policy reasons summarized in the court's opinion,
the just compensation clause supports and requires such an imposition
where a direct casual connection between a public project and private
property damage is established. In the "act of God" cases, however,
the direct causal connection is broken by the intervention of an un-
foreseeable force of nature which, of itself, was not set in motion or
produced by the entity's improvement undertaking. Absent such di-
rect, or proximate causation, compensation is not required. On the
other hand, to the extent that the intervention of independent natural
forces is reasonably foreseeable, the entity's failure to incorporate
adequate safeguards for private property into the improvement plan
remains a proximate, although concurrent, cause of the resulting dam-
age, and thus a basis of inverse liability.
B. Fault as a Basis of Inverse Liability
Most of the pre-Albers decisions in California sustaining inverse
liability for unintended physical injury to property are predicated
expressly on a fault rationale grounded upon foreseeability of damage
as a consequence of the construction or operation of the public proj-
ect as deliberately planned.3 6 On the other hand, a substantial num-
ber of contemporaneous decisions seemingly affirm the proposition
that negligence is not a material, consideration if, in fact, a taking or
damaging for public use has occurred. 37 This apparent inconsistency
of basic doctrine, however, appears to be reconcilable.
The key to an understanding of the cases, it is believed, is the
fact that negligence is only a particular kind of fault. What the courts
appear to be saying, although somewhat inexactly perhaps, is that it is
not necessary to inquire into the exact nature or quality of the fault
upon which inverse liability is piedicated where the facts demon-
strate that some form of actionable fault does exist.38 When the
137 P. 1080 (1913) (dictum). See also Stone v. Los Angeles County Flood
Control Dist., 81 Cal. App. 2d 902, 185 P.2d 396 (1947).
36 There are two leading decisions on this point. Bauer v. Ventura
County, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955); House v. Los Angeles County Flood
Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 153 P.2d .950 (1944).
37 See cases cited note 13 supra.
38 See, e.g., Clement v. Reclamation Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628, 641, 220 P.2d 897,
905 (1950), where it is stated that "[tihe construction of the public improve-
ment is a deliberate action of the state or its agency in furtherance of public
[Vol. 20
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probability of resulting damage is reasonably foreseeable, the adop-
tion and non-negligent execution of a risk-prone plan of public im-
provement rationally can be deemed, with certain exceptions to be
discussed, either: (a) negligence in adopting an inherently defective
plan, or in failing to modify it or incorporate reasonable safeguards to
prevent the anticipated damage;39 (b) negligent "failure to appre-
ciate the probability that, functioning as deliberately conceived, the
public improvement ... would result in some damage to private
property; ' 40 (c) "intentional" infliction of the damage by deliberate
adoption of the defective plan with knowledge that damage was a
probable result;41 or (d) inclusion in the plan, whether negligently
or deliberately, of features that violate a recognized legal duty that
the public entity, like private persons similarly situated, owes to
neighboring owners as a matter of property law.42 But, in each in-
stance, it is not materially significant whether the "inherently wrong"
plan48 was the product of inadvertence, negligent conduct, or delib-
purposes. If private property is damaged thereby the state or its agency
must compensate the owner therefor, [citations] whether the damage was
intentional or the result of negligence on the part of the governmental
agency." (Emphasis added). In Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 505, 6
P. 317, 325 (1885), it was stated in conclusion that the California Constitution
requires compensation to the owner "where the damage is directly inflicted,
or inflicted by want of care and skill:" (Emphasis added). Tormey v.
Anderson-Cottonwood Irr. Dist., 53 Cal. App. 559, 568, 200 P. 814, 818 (1921)
(opinion of Supreme Court en banc on denial of hearing) held that negli-
gence was not essential to inverse liability, since "the care that may be taken
in the construction of the public improvement which causes the damage is
wholly immaterial to the right of the plaintiff to recover damage, if the im-
provement causes it."
39 See House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384,
153 P.2d 950 (1944); Granone v. Los Angeles County, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 42
Cal. Rptr. 34 (1965) (alternative holding); Beckley v. Reclamation Bd., 205
Cal. App. 2d 734, 23 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1962) (alternative holding); Ward Con-
crete Co. v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 149 Cal. App. 2d 840,
309 P.2d 546 (1957); of. W. PROSSER, THE LAW Or TORTS § 51 (3d ed. 1964);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) Or TORTS § 302 (1965).
40 Bauer v. Ventura County, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 286, 289 P.2d 1, 7 (1955)
(alternative holding); see Kaufman v. Tomich, 208 Cal. 19, 280 P. 130 (1929);
Ambrosini v. Alisal Sanitary Dist., 154 Cal. App. 2d 720, 317 P.2d 33 (1957)
(alternative holding).
41 Youngblood v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 56 Cal. 2d 603,
364 P.2d 840, 15 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1961) (dictum); Clement v. Reclamation Bd.,
35 Cal. 2d 628, 220 P.2d 897 (1950).
42 Pacific Seaside Home for Children v. Newbert Protection Dist., 190 Cal.
544, 213 P. 967 (1923) (diversion of natural stream); Newman v. City of
Alhambra, 179 Cal. 42, 175 P. 414 (1918) (obstruction of natural drainage);
Steiger v. San Diego, 163 Cal. App. 2d 110, 329 P.2d 94 (1958) (collection and
discharge of surface waters).
43 House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 391,
153 P.2d 950, 954 (1944) (Curtis, J.).
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eration, for the same result-inverse liability-follows unless there is
a sufficient showing of legal justification for infliction of the harm.
Some form of fault is thus a conspicuous characteristic of inverse
liability in most California cases. The Albers decision does not pur-
port to overthrow this general approach or to reject entirely the fre-
quently expressed position that a public entity defendant "is not abso-
lutely liable"44 under the just compensation clause irrespective of its
involvement in the plaintiff's damage. It merely recognizes an addi-
tional occasion for inverse liability by holding that lack of foresee-
ability does not preclude recovery for directly caused physical prop-
erty damage which would have been recoverable under a fault ration-
ale had that damage been foreseeable.45
C. Private Law as a Basis of Inverse Liability
The concept of "fault" supporting inverse liability has been fur-
ther expanded by the absorbtion of principles of private law into the
law of eminent domain. Inverse liability of public entities often has
been sustained on the ground that the entity breached a legal duty
which it owed to the plaintiff, with such duty being determined by
reference to those legal axioms governing private individuals.4 6 For
example, a private person is under a duty to refrain from obstructing
a natural stream so as to divert it upon his neighbor's lands.47 Cor-
respondingly, a public entity that obstructs or diverts a stream may
be liable in inverse condemnation for the resulting damages.4 More-
over, even when the entity is engaged in privileged conduct, such as
the erection of protective works against flood waters, it, like private
persons, must act reasonably and non-negligently.49
The initial use of private legal concepts as a framework for re-
solving inverse condemnation claims was a reflection, in part, of the
judicial expansion of inverse condemnation as a means for avoiding
the discredited doctrine of sovereign tort immunity.50 The constitu-
44 Youngblood v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 56 Cal. 2d 603,
607, 364 P.2d 840, 841, 15 Cal. Rptr. 904, 905 (1961).
45 See text accompanying notes 27-35 supra.
46 See, e.g., Becldey v. Reclamation Bd., 205 Cal. App. 2d 734, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 428 (1962) (alternative holding).
47 Horton v. Goodenough, 184 Cal. 451, 194 P. 34 (1920).
48 Clement v. Reclamation Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628, 220 P.2d 897 (1950); Elliott
v. Los Angeles County, 183 Cal. 472, 191 P. 899 (1920); Smith v. Los Angeles,
66 Cal. App. 2d 562, 153 P.2d 69 (1944).
49 Bauer v. Ventura County, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955); House v.
Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 153 P.2d 950 (1944);
Granone v. Los Angeles County, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 42 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1965)
(alternative holding).
50 See generally Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional
Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 WIs. L. REv. 3.
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tional mandate to pay just compensation when private property was
"damaged for public use" provided a strong and ready peg upon which
to hang a cloak of liability despite a claim of governmental immunity.
But the need to establish rational limits to the apparently unqualified
constitutional mandate suggested the use of rules of law limiting pri-
vate tort liability as analogues for denying inverse liability in similar
situations. Not unexpectedly, then, the constitutional inverse con-
demnation clause came to be thought of as merely a waiver of govern-
mental immunity, and an authorization for a self-executing remedy
which the injured property owner would not otherwise have had
against the state and its agencies.51 Moreover, as the edifice of gov-
ernmental immunity began to crumble beneath the weight of excep-
tions admitted by judicial decisions and occasional legislation, a
considerable degree of overlapping of inverse and non-immune tort
liabilities became commonplace.52 Plaintiffs often sued alternatively
on inverse and tort theories, with considerable success,53 thereby con-
firming the notion that inverse condemnation was merely a remedy
to enforce substantive standards found in the law of private torts.
The Albers decision, of course, qualified this conception by reaf-
firming the original position that inverse liability has an independent
substantive content which obtains even when private tort liability
does not.54 Moreover, even before Albers, the underlying premise of
the remedy approach had been largely removed by the judicial abro-
gation of sovereign immunity.55 Thereafter, in California, as in a
number of other states, the old immunity rule was supplanted by a
comprehensive statutory system of governmental tort liability that
was in certain respects broader and in other respects narrower than
its private counterparts. 56 But while the legislature acted to divorce
51 See Bauer v. Ventura County, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 282-83, 289 P.2d 1, 5
(1955): "Section 14 [of article I], however, is designed not to create new
causes of action but only to give the private property owner a remedy he
would not otherwise have against the state for the unlawful dispossession,
destruction or damage of his property.... The effect of section 14 is to
waive the immunity of the state where property is taken or damaged for
public purposes."
52 See, e.g., Granone v. Los Angeles County, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 34 (1965) where the liability was affirmed on the alternate grounds of
inverse condemnation, nuisance, and statutory liability for dangerous condi-
tion of public property.
53 Bauer v. Ventura County, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955); Granone
v. Los Angeles County, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 42 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1965).
54 Albers v. Los Angeles County, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 260, 398 P.2d 129, 135,
42 Cal. Rptr. 89, 95 (1965).
55 Judicial abrogation of sovereign immunity had taken place only four
years prior to the Albers decision. See Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55
Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
GO California Tort Claims Act of 1963, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-95.8; A.
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governmental tort liability from its inconvenient ties with private
tort liability, no similar changes were made with respect to inverse
liabilities. As a result, to the extent that the legal principles applied
in inverse condemnation litigation remain tied to private tort law
analogies, a significant incongruity and source of confusion can be
observed between the scope of governmental tort and inverse liabili-
ties. One conspicuous illustration is the different consequences flow-
ing from defects in the plan or design of public improvements, which
on private law principles support inverse liability,57 but which, under
present statutory provisions, ordinarily provide no basis for govern-
mental tort liability.58
D. Dannum Absque Injuria
Some mention should also be made here of those situations where,
irrespective of gounds for inverse liability under the above mentioned
theories and principles, the injury suffered by the property owner is
nevertheless held to be damnum absque injuria. In California, two
lines of decisions recognize that public entities are privileged, in cer-
tain situations, to inflict physical damage upon private property for a
public purpose without incurring inverse liability. In effect, these
cases establish two judicially-created exceptions to the otherwise un-
qualified language of the constitutional command that just compen-
sation be paid.
(1) The "Police Power" Cases
In sustaining the liability of Los Angeles County for landslide
damage in the Albers case, the Supreme Court explicitly distinguished
"cases. .. like Gray v. Reclamation District No. 1500 . . .where the
court held the damage noncompensable because inflicted in the proper
exercise of the police power." 5  In Gray,60 plaintiffs' lands were
VA ALsTyNE, CALIOaNIA GOVERNMEN ToRT LIBrLIT (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar
ed. 1964).
5 E.g., Bauer v. Ventura County, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955) (negli-
gent improvement of drainage ditch by raising of bank); Granone v. Los
Angeles County, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 42 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1965) (negligently
designed culverts).
58 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.6, where public entities are exonerated from
tort liability for personal injuries caused by defective plan or design of public
improvements if the design or plan could reasonably have been approved by
responsible public officials. This immunity has been given a broad interpre-
tation. Becker v. Johnston, 67 Cal. 2d 163, 430 P.2d 43, 60 Cal. Rptr. 485
(1967); Cabell v. California, 67 Cal. 2d 150, 430 P.2d 34, 60.Cal. Rptr. 476
(1967); see Note, Sovereign Liability for Defective or Dangerous Plan or
Design--California Government Code Section 830.6, 19 HAsT rs L.J. 584
(1968).
59 Albers v. Los Angeles County, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 262, 398 P.2d 129, 136,
42 Cal. Rptr. 89, 96 (1965).
60 Gray v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1500, 174 Cal. 622, 163 P. 1024 (1917).
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threatened with temporary inundation from Sacramento River flood
waters due to a partially completed system of levees being built by
the defendant reclamation district. In the past, these flood waters
had spread out harmlessly over lower lands, leaving the plaintiffs'
property unharmed. In reversing an injunction against the mainte-
nance of the levees, the court concluded that any damage sustained by
the plaintiffs would be the consequence of a proper exercise of the
police power for which the district was not liable.61 As an independ-
ent alternative ground of decision, it was determined that construction
of the district's levees constituted the exercise of a legal right to pro-
tect the district's lands against the "common enemy" of escaping flood
waters, and for that reason also was noncompensable. 62 The latter
ground alone adequately supported the result on appeal; but the
opinion discusses, at some length, the scope of the "police power"
rationale.
Briefly summarized, Gray reasons that (1) governmental flood
control, navigational improvement, and reclamation work is "refer-
able to the police power"; 63 (2) damage resulting from a legitimate
exercise of the police power is noncompensable, provided the "proper
limits" of that power have not been exceeded; 64 and (3) the balance of
interests relating to the facts at hand required the conclusion that
the damage in question was noncompensable under this test.65 The
factual elements cited as persuasive of this conclusion included the
temporary nature of the flooding complained of; the fact that future
flooding would be eliminated as soon as the balance of the project was
completed; the availability to the plaintiffs of the right of self-protec-
tion under the "common enemy" rule; the "vast magnitude and impor-
tance" of the flood control project to the state as a whole; and the fact
that the plaintiffs, like other landowners within the project area,
61 Similar conclusions had been reached on the basis of facts which
occurred prior to adoption of the "or damaged" clause in the 1879 constitution.
Lamb v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 73 Cal. 125, 14 P. 625 (1887); Green v.
Swift, 47 Cal. 536 (1874).
62 The common enemy doctrine is discussed at text accompanying notes
110-30 infra.
63 Gray v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1500, 174 Cal. 622, 638, 163 P. 1024, 1031
(1917).
64 "[W]hether in any given instance, as in this instance, the proper lim-
its of the police power have been exceeded, with the result that unlawful con-
fiscation or damage is worked, remains still a question for consideration. ...
Always the question in each case is whether the particular act complained of
is without the legitimate purview and scope of the police power. If it be then
the complainant is entitled to injunctive relief or to compensation. If it be
not, then it matters not what may be his loss, it is damnum absque injuria."
Id.
05 Id. at 645-46, 163 P. at 1034.
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would derive substantial long-term benefits from the abatement of
flood damage and the improvement of navigation which completion of
the project would assure.66
Manifestly, Gray does not stand for the proposition that property
damage caused by a public improvement based upon the police power
is necessarily damnum absque injuria. It suggests, at most, that
judicial classification of the project as an exercise of the "police
power" adds persuasiveness to the public interest which must be
weighed against private detriment in adjudicating compensability.
The very term "police power" is inherently undefinable 7 Its seman-
tic role in the present context is to serve only as a shorthand expres-
sion denoting the assertion of governmental power to advance public
health, safety, and welfare in a qualitatively substantial sense. The
interests represented by these public objectives simply outweighed
those asserted by the property owners in Gray. Unfortunately, loose
language in the opinion,68 when taken out of context, fails to convey
a correct impression of the actual holding, a defect also perpetuated
by some later decisions fully reconcilable on their facts.69
The implications of the "police power" exception postulated in
Gray were subjected to thorough reconsideration by the Supreme
66 Id.
67 See Eadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915), where it was
stated that "we are dealing with one of the most essential powers of govern-
ment-one that is the least limitable."; cf. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590, 594 (1962), where it was stated that "[t]he term 'police power' connotes
the time-tested conceptional limit of public encroachment upon private inter-
ests. Except for the substitution of the familiar standard of 'reasonableness'
this Court has generally refrained from announcing any specific criteria." See
generally Havran, Eminent Domain and the Police Power, 5 NoRE DAwmE LAw.
380 (1930); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
66 The court's police power discussion in Gray relies heavily upon deci-
sions involving the noncompensability of losses of value resulting from police
regulations, rather than cases like Gray itself, in which physical damage or
destruction was in issue. The principal cases discussed include Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (decrease in exploitation value due to land-use
regulation); Chicago & Alton Ry. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915) (regu-
lation requiring construction of drainage culverts by railroad at its own
expense); Chicago B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561 (1906) (requirement
that railroad deepen, widen, and bridge any natural watercourse crossing its
right-of-way). The opinion seems to be oblivious to the distinction, clearly
recognized as a significant one in more recent times, between property value
diminution unaccompanied by physical invasion and losses caused by tangible
injury to or interference with use or enjoyment of property. Compare United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) with Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590 (1962).
69 See, e.g., O'Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 19 Cal. 2d
61, 119 P.2d 23 (1941).
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Court some twenty-five years later.70 The factual context was quite
different, however. Property owners were seeking inverse recovery
for losses of property values (i.e., non-physical damage) allegedly
caused by highway improvements. Defendant public entities, relying
upon dicta in Gray and its progeny, sought refuge in the doctrine that
losses caused by an exercise of the police power were damnum absque
injuria. The argument was rejected on the facts before the court, al-
though the continued vitality of the doctrine, as properly conceived,
was reaffirmed. The police power, said the court, "generally ...
operates in the field of regulation, except possibly in some cases of
emergency .... '"71 The constitutional guarantee of the just compen-
sation clause would be vitiated by a broader view; hence, "the police
power doctrine cannot be invoked in the taking or damaging of private
property in the construction of a public improvement where no
emergency exists.172 This verbal equivalency of "emergency" and
"police power" is not inconsistent with the interest-balancing approach
taken in Gray. It treats governmental action to cope with emergen-
cies as entitled to judicial preference, although not necessarily con-
trolling significance, in the interest-balancing process.
This judicial restatement of the police power theory was reaf-
firmed, and directly applied, in the 1944 decision of House v. Los
Angeles County Flood Control District.7 3 Physical damage attrib-
uted to levee improvements along the Los Angeles River, which al-
legedly caused flooding and erosion of the plaintiff's land, was held,
on demurrer, to be recoverable in inverse condemnation. The court
again cautioned that private property damage may be noncompensable
when inflicted by government "under the pressure of public necessity
and to avert impending peril."74 But the plaintiff had alleged that the
improvements in question were constructed negligently, pursuant to a
plan which was contrary to good engineering practice. From the
pleadings, it was apparent that the "defendant district, with time to
exercise a deliberate choice of action in the manner of its installation
of the river improvements, followed a plan 'inherently wrong' and
thereby caused needless damage" to the plaintiff's property.75 Need-
70 Rose v. California, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942). See also People
v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943); Bacich v. Board of Control,
23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943).
71 Rose v. California, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 730, 123 P.2d 505, 515 (1942).
72 Id. at 730-31, 123 P.2d at 516.
73 25 Cal. 2d 384, 153 P.2d 950 (1944); accord, Smith v. Los Angeles, 66
Cal. App. 2d 562, 153 P.2d 69 (1944).
74 House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 391,
153 P.2d 950, 953 (1944). See also Archer v. Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 24,
119 P.2d 1, 4 (1941).
75 House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 392,
153 P.2d 950, 954 (1944). O'Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist.,
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less damage is not damage required by the public necessity that moti-
vates the exercise of the police power. Thus, a cause of action for in-
verse condemnation was stated since "the principles of nonliability
and damnum absque injuria are not applicable when, in the exercise
of the police power, private, personal and property rights are inter-
fered with, injured or impaired in a manner or by a means, or to an
extent that is not reasonably necessary to serve a public purpose for
the general welfare. '76
The House approach has been followed consistently in later deci-
sions. Thus, in the absence of a compelling emergency, the police
power doctrine will not shield a public entity from inverse liability
where physical damage to private property could have been avoided
by proper design, planning, construction and maintenance of the im-
provement.77 The kind of emergency which will preclude inverse
liability is, moreover, narrowly circumscribed. Illustrations given in
the House opinion itself are limited to "the demolition of all or parts
of buildings to prevent the spread of conflagration, or the-destruction
of diseased animals, of rotten fruit, or infected trees where life or
health is jeopardized."78  In the generality of situations within the
19 Cal. 2d 61, 119 P.2d 23 (1941), was distinguished upon the ground that the
plaintiff there had failed to allege negligence.
76 House v. Los Angeles Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 392, 153 P.2d
950, 954 (1944). This position had the explicit concurrence of four members
of the court. Mr. Justice Traynor, with Mr. Justice Edmonds concurring,
wrote a separate opinion reaching the same result, but on the ground that the
plaintiff's complaint adequately alleged a negligent and unprivileged diver-
sion of water flowing in a natural channel. Agreement with the majority
view of the police power, however, was indicated by this statement: "Barring
situations of immediate emergency, 'neither the property law nor the police
power of the state entitles a governmental agency to divert water out of its
natural channel onto private property." Id. at 397-98, 153 P.2d at 957. A
second concurring opinion was written by Mr. Justice Carter. He took the
position that the majority had not gone far enough in recognizing inverse
compensability for property damage resulting from public improvements; but
he agreed in principle with what he regarded as a "commendable step" in the
right direction. Id. at 398, 153 P.2d at 957. On limiting the scope of the
police power doctrine the court was essentially unanimous.
77 Youngblood v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 56 Cal. 2d 603,
364 P.2d 840, 15 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1961) (dictum); Bauer v. Ventura County, 45
Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955); Ward Concrete Co. v. Los Angeles County
Flood Control Dist., 149 Cal. App. 2d 840, 309 P.2d 546 (1957); Veteran's Wel-
fare Bd. v. Oakland, 74 Cal. App. 2d 818, 169 P.2d 1000 (1946). Although
some of the cases intimate that the rule is limited to instances of damage re-
sulting from defective design or construction, the Bauer case squarely holds
that it obtains also with respect to a defectively conceived plan of mainte-
nance and operation as distinguished from routine negligence in carrying out
an otherwise proper plan. 'Bauer v. Ventura County, supra at 285, 289 P.2d
at 7.
7s House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 391,
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purview of the present article, it seems evident that the police power
exception is of negligible significance.
(2) The "Legal Right" Cases
Returning to the aforementioned analogies to private law, a sec-
ond justification for denying compensation for physical damage
caused by public improvements is adduced. When a private person
would be legally privileged to inflict like damage without tort liabil-
ity, a public entity also has a "legal right" to do so without obligation
to pay just compensation39 By hypothesis, such damage does not
constitute the violation of any right possessed by the injured party.80
This rule, which is reaffirmed in Albers,"' has been applied to deny
inverse liability in a variety of situations. Examples include cases
involving damages caused by public improvements designed to accel-
erate the flow of a natural watercourse, 2 control the overflow and
spread of flood waters,8 3 and collect and discharge surface storm
waters through natural drainage channels.8 4
The rationale of these "legal right" cases, however, does not imply
that the absence of a cause of action against a private person neces-
sarily or invariably precludes a claim for inverse compensation against
the state. Broad statements in several decisions, purporting to so de-
clare, were expressly disapproved in the.Albers case as stating the
153 P.2d 950, 953 (1944). The problem of inverse liability for deliberate de-
struction of private property in the kinds of *situations referred to by the
court is discussed in Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condem-
nation: Deliberately Inflicted Injury or Destruction, 20 STAN. L. REV. 617
(1968).
79 See Archer v. Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 119 P.2d 1 (1941); San
Gabriel Valley Country Club v. Los Angeles County, 182 Cal. 392, 188 P. 554
(1920); Kambish v. Santa Clara Valley Water Conservation Dist., 185 Cal.
App. 2d 107, 8 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1960).
80 See, e.g., Youngblood v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 56
Cal. 2d 603, 608, 364 P.2d 840, 842, 15 Cal. Rptr. 904, 906 (1961): "[I]f a
property owner would have no cause of action against a private citizen on
the same facts, he can have no claim for compensation against the state under
section 14 [of article I]." Accord, Bauer v. Ventura County, 45 Cal. 2d 276,
282-83, 289 P.2d 1, 5 (1955).
81 Albers v. Los Angeles County, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 261-62, 398 P.2d 129, 135-
36, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89, 95-96 (1965). For a recent application of the "legal right"
approach, see Joslin v. Main Muni. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889,
60 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967).
82 San Gabriel Valley Country Club v. Los Angeles County, 182 Cal. 392,
188 P. 554 (1920).•
83 Gray v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1500, 174 Cal. 622, 163 P. 1024 (1917)
(alternative ground); Lamb v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 73 Cal. 125, 14 P.
625 (1887) (alternative ground).
84 Archer v. Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 119 P.2d 1 (1941).
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rule "much more broadly than required by the facts. ' 85 The court in
Albers, in fact, expressly "assumed" that a private person in the posi-
tion of the defendant county would not be liable.86 That assumption,
however, was based on findings of fact that denied the existence of
any fault whatsoever, a normal prerequisite to private tort liability in
all but certain exceptional situations.8 7 It was not based on the prem-
ise-which is at the root of the "legal right" cases-that the defend-
ant was legally privileged to inflict the particular injury. The court's
conclusion in Albers thus represents an interpretation of the just
compensation clause of the constitution as imposing a broader range of
public responsibility than the law of private torts.
II. Scope of Inverse Liability in California
The foregoing discussion was intended to be merely a preliminary
introduction to the basic doctrinal threads of inverse liability. The
interweaving of these different theoretical strands into the finished
tapestry that is inverse condemnation law is revealed only by a closer
examination of the entire decisional pattern. For convenience, the
cases in this section are grouped into four categories having similar
factual characteristics. First, the water damage cases, probably the
single most prolific source of inverse litigation, are examined. Sec-
ond are cases dealing with physical disturbance of site stability by
landslides, loss of lateral support, and like causes. The third group of
cases involves the physical deprivation of advantageous conditions as-
sociated with land ownership, such as loss of water supply, annual
accretions, or potability of water (i.e., water pollution). Finally, de-
cisions relating to miscellaneous forms of temporary or "one-time"
physical injury to property are reviewed.
A. Water Damage
A significant feature of the inverse condemnation decisions deal-
ing with property damage caused by water-whether it be damage
due to flooding, soaking, silting, erosion, or hydraulic force-is the
tendency of the courts to rely upon the rules of private water law.
Although the facts do not always lend themselves to this approach,
inverse liability of public agencies is determined in the main by the
peculiarities of private law rules governing interference with "sur-
85 Albers v. Los Angeles County, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 260, 398 P.2d 129, 135, 42
Cal. Rptr. 89, 95 (1965).
86 Id. at 262 n.3, 398 P.2d at 136 n.3, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 96 n.3.
87 See generally W. PROSSEa, TBE LAW OF TORTS 506-44 (3d ed. 1964).
The court in Albers found it unnecessary to consider whether liability with-
out fault could be supported by private law principles as applied to the facts
before it.
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face waters," "flood waters," and "stream waters."88  This judicial
disposition to blend the complex rules of water law with those gov-
erning inverse liability ordinarily is defended on the ground that pub-
lic entities, in the management and control of their property, should
not be subjected to different or more onerous rules of liability than
private persons similarly situated.89 A review of the cases, however,
suggests that treating public agencies as if they were private individ-
uals, for the purpose of applying rules of water law, often has proved
unsatisfactory and confusing. In a number of situations, therefore,
the courts have departed from the strict letter of the private rules
where overriding policy reasons have been perceived for according
special treatment to public agencies.
(1) Surface Water
Water that is "diffused over the surface of the land, or con-
tained in depressions therein, and resulting from rain, snow, or which
rises to the surface in springs" is classified as surface water.90 Private
liability for interference with surface water is governed by a wide
range of diverse rules throughout the United States, each replete with
its own variations.9 1 The so-called common law or "common enemy"
doctrine accepted by many states, under which each landowner is
privileged to fend off surface waters as he sees fit, without regard to
the consequences for his neighbors, generally has been rejected by
California decisions.92 Instead, the "civil law rule," which recognizes
a servitude of natural drainage as between adjoining lands and pos-
tulates liability for interference therewith, has been the traditional
California approach. This has been true not only in cases involving
private litigants93 but also in those dealing with public entities in in-
verse condemnation actions.94 Under this rule, the duty of both upper
88 See generally David, Municipal Tort Liability in California (pt. 4), 7
S. CAL. L. REV. 295 (1934).
89 Womar v. Long Beach, 45 Cal. App. 2d 643, 114 P.2d 704 (1941).
90 Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 400, 412 P.2d 529, 531, 50 Cal. Rptr.
273, 275 (1966); see H. TIFFANY, REAL PRoPERTY, 740 (3d ed. 1939); RESTATE-
MENT oF TORTS § 846 (1939).
91 See Kinyon & McClure, Interferences With Surface Waters, 24 MINN.
L. REV. 891 (1940).
92 See Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273
(1966). But see Lampe v. San Francisco, 124 Cal. 546, 57 P. 461 (1899).
93 LeBrun v. Richards, 210 Cal. 308, 291 P. 825 (1930); Ogburn v. Connor,
46 Cal. 346 (1873).
94 Archer v. Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 119 P.2d 1 (1941); Shaw v.
Sebastopol, 159 Cal. 623, 115 P. 213 (1911) (dictum); Los Angeles Cemetery
Ass'n v. Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461, 37 P. 375 (1894) (dictum); Corcoran v.
Benicia, 96 Cal. 1, 30 P. 798 (1892); Andrew Jergens Co. v. Los Angeles, 103
Cal. App. 2d 232, 229 P.2d 475 (1951).
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and lower landowners is to leave the flow of surface water undis-
turbed.
In the recent important decision in Keys v. Romley,95 the Su-
preme Court, after careful reconsideration of the competing rules and
their supporting policies, reaffirmed California's acceptance of the civil
law rule. This rule, the court observed, was consistent with the nor-
mal expectation that buyers should take land subject to the burdens
of natural drainage. It also had the advantage of greater predict-
ability than the common law rule, and correspondingly diminished
the opportunity for litigation. On the other hand, a rigid application
of the civil law rule might inhibit property development, since im-
provements frequently would cause a change in the drainage pattern
and thus invite potential liability, especially in urban areas. The court
concluded, therefore, that the application of the civil law rule must be
governed by a test of reasonableness, judged in light of the circum-
stances of each case. "No party, whether an upper or a lower land-
owner, may act arbitrarily and unreasonably in his relations with
other landowners and still be immunized from all liability."9
Under this modified civil law rule, the issue of reasonableness is
"a question of fact to be determined in each case upon a consideration
of all the relevant circumstances . . . . "7 Factors to be taken into
account include the extent of the damage, the foreseeability of the
harm, the actor's purpose or motive, and the relative utility of the
actor's conduct as compared with the gravity of the harm caused by
the alteration of surface water flow. In this balancing of interests,
said the court,
[i]f the weight is on the side of him who alters the natural water-
course, then he has acted reasonably and without liability; if the
harm to the lower landowner is unreasonably severe, then the eco-
nomic costs incident to the expulsion of surface waters must be borne
by the upper owner whose development caused the damage. If the
facts should indicate both parties conducted themselves reasonably,
then courts are bound by our well-settled civil law rule [and the
upper landowner who changed the drainage pattern is liable for the
resulting injuries].98
Although the Keys decision involved only private landowners,
presumably it affects public entities as well, since inverse liability
actions based on interference with surface waters generally have been
resolved in the past by a relatively strict application of the civil law
rule. Obstructing the flow of surface waters by a street improvement
95 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966). See also Pagliotti
v. Aquistapace, 64 Cal. 2d 873, 412 P.2d 538, 50 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1966).
96 Keys v. Bomley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 409, 412 P.2d 529, 536, 50 Cal. Rptr.
273, 280 (1966).
97 Id. at 410, 412 P.2d at 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
98 Id.
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and thereby causing flooding of lands that otherwise would not have
been injured has been held actionable on this rationale. 9 A public
entity that gathered surface waters together and discharged them
upon lower lands with increased volume or velocity by a drainage
system which did not conform to the natural drainage pattern was
likewise liable.100 Similarly, public entities have been held not privi-
leged to collect surface waters by the paving of streets and, without
providing adequate drains, by conducting them to a low point where
they are cast in unusual quantities upon private property that other-
wise would not be flooded.' 0 ' But if the gathered waters were dis-
charged into a natural watercourse that was their normal means of
drainage, lower owners injured because the channel was inadequate
to handle the increased flow were held to have no recourse. 10 2
The courts generally applied the civil law rule in a somewhat
mechanical manner, apparently without weighing the competing in-
terests identified as relevant to the new rule of reason. It is possible
that different results might have been reached had the balancing
process been used. For example, the construction of a drainage sys-
tem by an upper improver that discharges surface waters upon ad-
joining property in a concentrated stream, where no other feasible
alternative is available, may be reasonable and, if relatively slight
harm results, noncompensable under the rule in Keys v. Romley.1°0
Conversely, the gathering of surface waters into a system of impervi-
ous storm drains which follow natural drainage routes may result in
greatly increased volume, velocity and concentration of water, and
90 Conniff v. San Francisco, 67 Cal. 45, 7 P. 41 (1885). See also Stanford
v. San Francisco, 111 Cal. 198, 43 P. 605 (1896); Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n
v. Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461, 37 P. 375 (1894) (dictum).
100 Inns v. San Juan Unified School Dist., 222 Cal. App. 2d 174, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 903 (1963); Callens v. Orange County, 129 Cal. App. 2d 255, 276 P.2d 886
(1954).
101 Steiger v. San Diego, 163 Cal. App. 2d 110, 329 P.2d 94 (1958); Andrew
Jergens Co. v. Los Angeles, 103 Cal. App. 2d 232, 229 P.2d 475 (1951); Farrell
v. Ontario, 39 Cal. App. 351, 178 P. 740 (1919).
102 Archer v. Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 119 P.2d 1 (1941). A mere swale
that serves as a natural route for escaping surface waters, but which does
not have fixed banks and channel bed, is not a watercourse under this rule.
See Inns v. San Juan Unified School Dist., 222 Cal. App. 2d 174, 34 Cal. Rptr.
903 (1963); Steiger v. San Diego, 163 Cal. App. 2d 110, 329 P.2d 94 (1958).
108 See Pagliotti v. Aquistapace, 64 Cal. 2d 873, 412 P.2d 538, 50 Cal. Rptr.
282 (1966), where the trial court's judgment enjoining the defendant from
damming off the discharge of surface waters from the plaintiff's paved park-
ing lot, where no other feasible means of disposal existed, was reversed for
reconsideration under the modern "reasonableness" test. The dictum sug-
gested that the same result may be found proper on remand after balancing
the interests. Earlier cases on analogous facts have generally imposed lia-
bility. See notes 100-01 supra.
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thus may constitute an unreasonable method for disposing of such
water when weighed against the seriousness of the resulting harm to
lower landowners whose property is damaged as a result. 0 4
The inverse condemnation cases decided prior to Keys were not
entirely consistent, however; some departed somewhat from the strict
letter of the civil law rule. For example, a few decisions advanced
the view that interferences with the flow of surface waters would not
be a basis of inverse liability where the obstruction was erected in the
exercise of the police power. 05 Other like decisions, reflecting ju-
dicial concern that the development of an adequate system of public
streets and highways not be deterred,'0 6 tended to relieve public
entities from liability when they blocked the ordinary discharge of
104 Compare Archer v. Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 119 P.2d 1 (1941) with
Inns v. San Juan Unified School Dist., 222 Cal. App. 2d 174, 34 Cal. Rptr. 903
(1963). Inns held that the district was inversely liable for the discharge of
surface waters into a swale through a 28-inch concrete pipe. It was stated to
the contrary in Archer that "[a] California landowner ... may discharge
[surface waters] for a reasonable purpose into the stream into which they
naturally drain without incurring liability for damage to lower land caused by
the increased flow of the stream". Archer v. Los Angeles, supra at 26-27, 119
P.2d at 6 (emphasis added). In other states, inverse liability has been im-
posed in similar fact situations without regard for fault. See, e.g., Lucas v.
Carney, 167 Ohio St. 416, 149 N.E.2d 238 (1958); Snyder v. Platte Valley Pub.
Power & Irr. Dist., 144 Neb. 308, 13 N.W.2d 160 (1944).
105 See O'Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 19 Cal. 2d 61,
63-64, 119 P.2d 23, 24 (1941): "In the present case the plaintiffs would ...
have a cause of action against a private person who obstructed the flow of
surface waters from their land [in the manner that has been alleged]. A
governmental agency, however, in constructing public improvements such as
streets and highways, may validly exercise its 'police power' to obstruct the
flow of surface waters not running in a natural channel without making com-
pensation for the resulting damage .... The defendant therefore is under
no obligation to compensate for the damage caused by the obstruction;"
Callens v. Orange County, 129 Cal. App. 2d 255, 276 P.2d 886 (1954) (dictum)
(same effect as O'Hara). As noted above, text accompanying notes 70-78
supra, the police power rationale has been modified substantially by decisions
subsequent to O'Hara.
106 See, e.g., Lampe v. San Francisco, 124 Cal. 546, 57 P. 461, 1001 (1899).
The question whether street improvements represent a sufficiently urgent
public interest to justify inroads upon the constitutional guarantee of just
compensation for "damage" to private property appears not to have been
considered fully in any of the surface water decisions. But see Milhous v.
Highway Dep't, 194 S.C. 33, 8 S.E.2d 852 (1940), where it was said that the
constitutional property interest prevails without regard for private liability
rules. This required a holding of state liability for obstructing surface waters
notwithstanding the "common enemy" rule under which private obstruction
would be nonactionable. Loss of direct access, however-an intangible detri-
ment often far less damaging than flooding-is regarded as compensable
when caused by street improvements. Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d
343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943).
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surface waters and caused flooding of private lands where such action
was necessary for the grading and paving of streets.0 7 These deci-
sions seem to imply a judicial balancing of interests, similar to the
process required by the Keys case, but with the results formulated in
different terminology. 08 The label, "police power," for example, as-
similates value judgments regarding the importance and social merit
of the particular government conduct that would be appropriate
under the Keys test.
It is thus possible to speculate that the Keys decision may not
fully have impaired the authority of all the earlier surface water deci-
sions; but such conjecture is a flimsy basis for prediction. It is prob-
able, however, that future cases in this area will be resolved by a
balancing of interests rather than by the mechanical application of
arbitrary rules. The principal uncertainties appear to revolve around
the degree of weight that will be assigned by the courts to the public
interest objectives behind governmental improvement projects, and
the extent to which a review of the reasonableness of the govern-
mental plan or design that exposed the owner's land to the risk of
surface water damage will be undertaken by these courts. 0 9
107 Corcoran v. Benicia, 96 Cal. 1, 30 P. 798 (1892); Dick v. Los Angeles,
34 Cal. App. 724, 168 P. 703 (1917) (dictum). See also Womar v. Long Beach,
45 Cal. App. 2d 643, 114 P.2d 704 (1941) (semble). Surface waters flowing in
a natural or artificial channel, however, cannot be obstructed with impunity
where the result is to cast them upon lands which normally would not have
received them. Newman v. Alhambra, 179 Cal. 42, 175 P. 414 (1918); Larrabee
v. Cloverdale, 131 Cal. 96, 63 P. 143 (1900); Conniff v. San Francisco, 67 Cal.
45, 7 P. 41 (1885); Weisshand v. Petaluma, 37 Cal. App. 296, 174 P. 955 (1918).
108 The opinion in O'Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 19
Cal. 2d 61, 119 P.2d 23 (1941), for example, intimates that construction of
public improvements along a stream "for purposes of flood control is ...
essential to the public health and safety" and for that reason outweighs the
private property interest at stake. Id. at 63, 119 P.2d at 24. Corcoran v.
Benicia, 96 Cal. 1, 30 P. 798 (1892), suggests that the interest of a landowner
in property below official street grade is subordinate to the public interest in
grading and paving at grade, since any temporary injury due to impounding
of surface waters may be alleviated by bringing the adjoining property up to
grade. Id. at 4, 30 P. at 798. See Dick v. Los Angeles, 34 Cal. App. 724, 168
P. 703 (1917) (to the same effect as Corcoran). See also Stanford v. San
Francisco, 111 Cal. 198, 43 P. 605 (1896), where inverse liability was affirmed
for injury due to the flooding of property above the street grade as a result
of street improvements. Corcoran was distinguished as a case where the
owner of the property assumed the risk of flooding by building below the
grade.
109 See Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273
(1966); text accompanying note 95 supra. The modified civil law rule adopted
in Keys has been treated as applicable to inverse condemnation actions based
on alleged damage from interference with surface waters. Burrows v. State,
260 A.C.A. 29, 66 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1968) (holding, under Keys, that burden of
pleading and proving that plaintiff lower owner unreasonably failed to take
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(2) Flood Water
"It is well established," said Justice Traynor, "that the flood
waters of a natural watercourse are a common enemy against which
the owner of land subject to overflow by those waters may protect
his land by the erection of defensive barriers, and that he is not liable
for damage caused to lower and adjoining lands by the exclusion of
the flood waters from his own property, even though the damage to
other lands is increased thereby."" 0 Governmental entities acting
for landowners in a particular area likewise may provide flood protec-
tion against the common enemy without incurring inverse liability
for resulting damages."' For the purpose of applying this rule, flood
waters are deemed the extraordinary overflow of rivers and
streams." 2 Although the term normally refers to waters overflowing
the natural banks of a river, artificial banks or levees maintained over
a substantial period of time are treated as natural banks where a
community of property owners, in reliance upon their continued exist-
ence, has conformed thereto in its land-use activities and in the con-
struction of improvements."'
The "common enemy" rule reflects judicial apprehension that
property development would be stifled unless an individualistic view
were taken by the law. "Not to permit an upper landowner to protect
his land against the stream would be in many instances to destroy the
possibility of making the land available for improvement or settlement
and condemn it to sterility and vacancy.""n4 The rule, taken literally,
contemplates that each landowner has a reciprocal right to protect his
own land without regard for the consequences which his acts may
visit upon others. However, no landowner may permanently stereo-
precautions to avoid or reduce injury is upon the defendant state as upper
owner).
110 Clement v. Reclamation Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628, 635-36, 220 P.2d 897, 901-02
(1950).
"' Id. See also San Gabriel Valley Country Club v. Los Angeles County,
182 Cal. 392, 188 P. 554 (1920); Lamb v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 73 Cal. 125,
14 P. 625 (1887). The common enemy rule, first announced in California in
Lamb, was originally developed in English cases. E.g., The King v. Commis-
sioners, 8 B. & C. 355, 108 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B. 1828) (construction of groins by
sewer commissioners to prevent erosion from ocean held privileged as protec-
tive measure against the "common enemy").
112 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 740 (3d ed. 1939).
11 Clement v. Reclamation Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628, 220 P.2d 897 (1950); Beck-
ley v. Reclamation Bd., 205 Cal. App. 2d 734, 23 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1962); Weck
v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 80 Cal. App. 2d 182, 181 P.2d 935
(1947). See also Natural Soda Prods. Co. v. Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 2d 193, 143
P.2d 12 (1943); 1 S. WiEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTRNu STATES § 60, at 59
(3d ed. 1911).
114 San Gabriel Valley Country Club v. Los Angeles County, 182 Cal. 392,
401, 188 P. 554, 558 (1920).
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type the condition of the river by erecting flood barriers adequate for
the moment, and later seek to prevent others from putting up levees
of their own that raise the water level and make the former works
insufficient.115 In addition, an important corollary of the rule recog-
nizes that no liability is incurred merely because flood control im-
provements do not provide protection to all property owners. 116 Nor
does the state, in undertaking to control floods, become an insurer of
those lands which are given protection," 7 as there are practical limits
to the degree of protection that can be provided." 8 In effect, the law
recognizes that some degree of flood protection is better than none.
The "common enemy" rule, however, is not applied as an un-
limited rule of privileged self-help. Mindful of the enormous dam-
age-producing potential of defective public flood control projects, the
courts have insisted that public agencies must act reasonably in the
development of construction and operational plans so as to avoid
unnecessary damage to private property." 9 Reasonableness, in this
context, is not entirely a matter of negligence, but represents a balanc-
ing of public need against the gravity of private harm.120 In an im-
minent emergency, for example, a reduction in stream level by the
deliberate flooding of unimproved private lands in order to prevent
substantial and widespread destruction of the entire community by
otherwise uncontrolled flood waters may be regarded as a reasonable,
and thus noncompensable, exercise of the police power.121 But a per-
115 Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S. 1 (1913), cited with approval in Gray
v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1500, 174 Cal. 622, 163 P. 1024 (1917).
116 Weck v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 80 Cal. App. 2d 182,
181 P.2d 935 (1947); Janssen v. Los Angeles County, 50 Cal. App. 2d 45, 123
P.2d 122 (1942); cf. United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256 (1939).
117 Youngblood v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 56 Cal. 2d 603,
364 P.2d 840, 15 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1961).
1s Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n v. Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461, 37 P. 375
(1894) (no liability for damage resulting from inadequacy of culvert to drain
waters from extraordinary and unforeseeable flood).
"9 House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 153
P.2d 950 (1944). The rule as to private owners is similar. See, e.g., Weinberg
Co. v. Bixby, 185 Cal. 87, 97, 196 P. 25, 30 (1921): "If the defendants merely
fend the intruding [flood] waters from their own premises in a reasonable and
prudent manner, they cannot be held responsible for the action of the stream
in depositing more silt and debris either in the channel or on adjacent lands
below than would have been done had it been permitted to spread over defend-
ants' lands." (Emphasis added).
120 Beckley v. Reclamation Bd., 205 Cal. App. 2d 734, 23 Cal. Rptr. 428
(1962); cf. United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256 (1939); Keys v. Romley,
64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966).
121 See Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 730, 123 P.2d 505, 515 (1942) (dictum);
cf. Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: Deliberately
Inflicted Injury or Destruction, 20 STAN. L. REv. 617, 619-23 (1968) ("denial
destruction" to prevent conflagration).
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manent system of flood control that deliberately incorporates a known
substantial risk of overflow of flood waters upon private property
that in the absence of the improvements would not be harmed exceeds
"the humane limits of the police power" and constitutes a compen-
sable taking of an easement for flowage.122 The "common enemy"
rule likewise does not permit a public entity to establish a system of
improvements designed to divert both actual flood waters and natural
stream waters out of their natural channel upon property that other-
wise would not have been inundated. 2 3  It is settled also that flood
control improvements which are designed in accordance with a negli-
gently conceived plan and which cause damage to private property
while functioning as so conceived are a basis of inverse liability even
though their object is to control the "common enemy," flood waters.124
The noticeable judicial tendency to reject an unqualified applica-
tion of the "common enemy" rule may be attributed, in part, to the
difficulty of making a sharp factual distinction between flood waters
and other waters. For example, when a watercourse which has been
improved by flood control measures overflows, it is not always an easy
matter to decide whether the flooding resulted from legally privileged
efforts to repel the "common enemy" or from an unprivileged diver-
sion of natural stream water.125 Another illustration of this diffi-
culty is the well-known case of Archer v. City of Los Angeles,126 in
which the prevailing opinion explicitly predicates denial of liability
for downstrewam flooding upon the privilege of upstream owners to
deposit gathered surface waters into natural watercourses. Later de-
cisions, however, have explained Archer as a case of non-liability un-
122 Beckley v. Reclamation Bd., 205 Cal. App. 2d 734, 752, 23 Cal. Rptr. 428,
440 (1962).
123 Clement v. Reclamation Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628, 220 P.2d 897 (1950).
124 Youngblood v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 56 Cal. 2d 603,
364 P.2d 840, 15 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1961) (dictum); Bauer v. Ventura County, 45
Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955) ; House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist.,
25 Cal. 2d 384, 153 P.2d 950 (1944); Granone v. Los Angeles County, 231 Cal.
App. 2d 629, 42 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1965); Weck v. Los Angeles County Flood Control
Dist., 80 Cal. App. 2d 182, 181 P.2d 935 (1947) (dictum). Although inverse
liability can be based upon a negligently conceived plan of maintenance or
operation of a public improvement, Bauer v. Ventura County, supra, ordinary
negligence in the course of routine operations will support only a possible tort
recovery. See Kambish v. Santa Clara Valley Water Conser. Dist., 185 Cal.
App. 2d 107, 8 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1960) ; Hayashi v. Alameda County Flood Control
& Water Conser. Dist., 167 Cal. App. 2d 584, 334 P.2d 1048 (1959); Smith v. East
Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 122 Cal. App. 2d 613, 265 P.2d 610 (1954).
125 Compare Clement v. Reclamation Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628, 648-51, 220 P.2d
897, 909-11 (1950) (Carter, J.) (dissenting opinion) with San Gabriel Valley
Country Club v. Los Angeles County, 182 Cal. 392, 188 P. 554 (1920). See also
House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 397, 153 P.2d
950, 957 (1944) (Traynor, J.) (concurring opinion).
126 19 Cal. 2d 19, 119 P.2d 1 (1941).
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der the "common enemy" rule governing flood waters.1 27 But, apart
from difficulties of classification, the trend also appears to represent
a judicial conviction that the "common enemy" rule, unmodified by a
test of reasonable conduct, would be an unacceptable basis for arbi-
trary disruption of rationally grounded expectations of private prop-
erty owners. The courts have recognized that the magnitude of gov-
ernmental projects often far exceeds the scope of flood protection
works reasonably to be anticipated at the hands of neighboring pri-
vate landowners. 128 A strict and literal assertion of the rule, there-
fore, if applied to government flood control projects, could well be
disastrous to private interests. Accordingly, it has been said, "No
court has ever so abused the 'common enemy' doctrine as to consti-
tute it the common enemy of the riparian owner."' 29  Finally, the
modern approach appears to accept the fact that a rational ordering of
duties and liabilities with respect to flood waters is better achieved
by the balancing of interests represented in the varying circumstances
of individual cases than by a more rigid and inflexible application of
narrowly defined property rights. 30
(3) Stream Water
The prevalence of natural watercourses' 31 makes it inevitable
that public improvements will affect the flow of stream waters in a
variety of circumstances, causing flooding and erosion to private prop-
erty. While early cases intimated that such consequences did not
amount to a constitutional "taking,"'132 it is now accepted that injuries
127 Compare Archer v. Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 28, 119 P.2d 1, 6 (1941)
("evidence... shows clearly that the storm drains constructed by defendants
either followed the channel of natural streams... or discharged into the creek
surface waters which would naturally drain into it") with Clement v. Reclama-
tion Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628, 642, 220 P.2d 897, 905 (1950) ("applicability of common
enemy doctrine is set forth in Archer") and Beckley v. Reclamation Bd., 205
Cal. App. 2d 734, 747, 23 Cal. Rptr. 428, 437 (1962) ("[i]n ... Archer ... no
one was preventing plaintiff ... from protecting his lands from floods [under
the common enemy doctrine]").
128 See Beckley v. Reclamation Bd., 205 Cal. App. 2d 734, 751-52, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 428, 439-40 (1962).
129 Id.
130 See Comment, California Flood Control Projects and the Common
Enemy Doctrine, 3 STAN. L. REV. 361, 364-66 (1951); cf. Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal.
2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966).
131 "[B]y a watercourse is not meant the gathering of errant water while
passing through a low depression, swale, or gully, but a stream in the real
sense, with a definite channel with bed and banks, within which it flows at
those times when the streams of the region habitually flow." Horton v. Good-
enough, 184 Cal. 451, 453, 194 P. 34, 35 (1920); see Inns v. San Juan Unified
School Dist., 222 Cal. App. 2d 174, 34 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1963) (swale through
which surface water normally drained held not a watercourse).
132 See Green v. Swift, 47 Cal. 536 (1874).
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of this kind, where shown to have been caused by public improve-
ments, 13 can amount to a "damaging" for which just compensation
must be paid. 34 The decisions appear to distinguish between: (a)
governmental improvements that designedly divert stream waters
onto private lands; (b) improvements that obstruct the stream and
thus result in overflow and flooding of private lands; and (c) improve-
ments that merely change the force of direction of the current with
resulting erosion of channel banks.
As a general rule, "when waters are diverted by a public improve-
ment from a natural watercourse onto, adjoining lands the [public]
agency is liable for the damage to or appropriation of such lands
where such diversion was the necessary or probable result even
though no negligence could be attributed to the installation of the
improvement."'13 5 In such cases, the private property "is as much
taken or damaged for a public use for which compensation must be
paid as if it were condemned for the construction of a highway or
school."'136  Permanently established artificial watercourses are
treated like natural ones under this rule, whereby substantial reliance
interests have been generated with the passage of time.13 7
Judicial acceptance of inverse liability without fault in diversion
cases appears to reflect the strength of the interests of property own-
ers who have acquired and developed land in justifiable reliance upon
the continuance of existing watercourses as means of natural drain-
age.' 38 The risk of damage from. disturbance of the established stream
138 Causation often presents difficult problems of proof. See, e.g., Young-
blood v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 56 Cal. 2d 603, 364 P.2d 840,
15 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1961); Stone v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 81
Cal. App. 2d 902, 185 P.2d 396 (1947).
134 See Beckley v. Reclamation Bd., 205 Cal. App. 2d 734, 23 Cal. Rptr. 428
(1962) (review of most of the important California decisions).
135 Youngblood v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 56 Cal. 2d 603,
607, 364 P.2d 840, 841, 15 Cal. Rptr. 904, 905 (1961) (dictum); Pacific Seaside
Home for Children v. Newbert Protection Dist., 190 Cal. 544, 213 P. 967 (1923);
Elliott v. Los Angeles County, 183 Cal. 472, 191 P. 899 (1920). See also Ghiozzi
v. South San Francisco, 72 Cal. App. 2d 472, 164 P.2d 902 (1946) (dictum).
136 Clement v. Reclamation Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628, 637, 220 P.2d 897, 903 (1950).
Cases in other states are generally in accord. See, e.g., Lage v. Pottawattamie
County, 232 Iowa 944, 5 N.W.2d 161 (1942); Armbruster v. Stanton-Pilger
Drainage Dist., 169 Neb. 594, 100 N.W.2d 781 (1960). See aso Smith v. Los
Angeles, 66 Cal. App. 2d 562, 153 P.2d 69 (1944).
137 Clement v. Reclamation Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628, 638, 220 P.2d 897, 903 (1950),
in which it was held that the state may not "without liability tear out a man-
made flood protection that has existed for sixty-two years to the lands of plain-
tiff upon which substantial sums have been expended in reliance upon the con-
tinuance of the protection."
138 See Beckley v. Reclamation Bd., 205 Cal. App. 2d 734, 751-52, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 428, 439-40 (1962).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol 20
UNINTENDED PHYSICAL DAMAGE
pattern is regarded as one that cannot be shifted with impunity to the
property owner, even under a claim of exercise of the police power,
13 9
merely to promote the community welfare. The detrimental impact
of the contrary rule in discouraging private property owners from
making improvements apparently is regarded as too onerous to permit
a withholding of just compensation. Analysis and weighing of the
respective interests in the light of the particular facts before the
court, however, is not characteristic of these decisions; the rule of
liability for diverting stream waters is generally applied in a strictly
formal fashion. 40
Obstructing a natural or artificial' 4' watercourse by the construc-
tion of a public improvement, on the other hand, ordinarily has been
regarded as a basis of inverse liability only when some form of fault is
established.142 For example, the construction of a dam designed to
store water which will foreseeably'flood certain lands not directly
condemned by the constructing agency coistitutes a deliberate taking
of those lands thereby inundated, 43 as well as of downstream watefi
139 This assumes, of course, that nio state of emergency existed. As the
court stated in Smith v. Los Angeles, 66 Cal. App. 2d 562, 578, 153 P.2d 69, 78
(1944): "[S]imply because the district constructed the dikes in question for
the purpose of flood control does not make it immune from liability for damage
inflicted thereby upon the plaintiff. There was here no emergency requiring
split-second action." - If there had'been such air emergency, the result Would
probably have been different. See text accompanying notes 72-78 supra. . -
140 See, e.g., Rudel v. Los Angeles County, 118 Cal. 281, 50 P. 400 (1897);
Guerkink v. Petaluma, 112 Cal. 306, 44 P. 570 (1896). In litigation growing out
of the great Feather River flood of December 1955, the state was adjudged lie-'
ble upon the basis of ambiguous findings of fact that a levee on the west side
of the Feather River, in the planning and design of which the state had "partic-
ipated," had "caused waters of the Feather'River to be diverted onto Plaintiffs'.
property east of the Feather River and thus caused harm to Plaintiffs' prop-
erty." Pedrozo v. State, No. 41265, Findings. of Fact and Conclusions of Law
4 (Butte County Super. Ct., Cal., Jan.:30, 1967).
141 Artificial and natural watercourses are treated alike in the obstruction
cases, apparently without regard for the length of existence of the artificial
channel. See, e.g., Newman y. Alhambra, 179 Cal. 42, 175 P. 414 (1918);
Larrabee v. Cloverdale, 131 Cal. 96, 63 P. 143 (1900); cf. Bauer v. Ventura
County, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955).. See also notes 113 & 137 supra.
142 See, e.g., Youngblood v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 56 Cal.
2d 603, 364 P.2d 840, 15 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1961) (dictum recognized-liability with-
out fault for diversion of stream waters, but intimated that in other cases,
including obstructions of watercourses, fault required); Beckley v. Reclama-
tion Bd., 205 Cal. App. 2d 734, 23 Cal. Rptr. -428 (-1962) (complaint held suffi-
cient to state cause of action on ground of diversion, without fault, and alter-
natively, cause for negligent obstruction of stream waters).
143 United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950); United
States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13
(1933); Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 75F. Supp. 232 (Ct. C1. ,1948); Brazos
River Auth. v. Graham, 163 Tex. 167, 354 S.W.2d 99 (1961).
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rights that are destroyed, 4 4 and is, therefore, a basis for inverse
liability. The "fault" involved in this type of situation arises from
the fact that the agency knew, or should have known, that these lands
and interests would be taken, and yet had failed to provide compen-
sation for these foreseeable "takings" through direct condemnation
proceedings before the construction. Likewise, the construction,
maintenance, or operation of drainage improvements according to a
negligently conceived plan, which exposes private property to a sub-
stantial risk of damage by interfering with the flow of water therein,
is actionable.1 45 Again, the building of a street embankment across a
known watercourse without providing culverts or other means of
drainage, so that foreseeable back-up flooding occurs, requires pay-
ment of compensation. 46 Even if culverts are provided, inverse lia-
bility obtains if their design characteristics, contrary to sound engi-
neering standards, are insufficient to allow the drainage of reasonably
predictable volumes of water flowing in the stream from time to
time.147  Mere routine negligence in maintenance, however, such as
the negligent failure to clear debris from an improved flood control
channel, where the accumulation of such debris is not part of a delib-
erately conceived program for controlling the flow of storm waters, is
not a basis of inverse liability, although it may support liability on a
tort theory.14
8
The necessity for the pleading and proof of fault in the obstruc-
tion cases, while no fault is required for liability in the diversion cases,
has caused a certain amount of confusion in the California case law.
It is obvious that many kinds of stream obstructions may cause a
'44 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); United States v. Gerlach Live
Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950). But see Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67
Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967).
'45 Bauer v. Ventura County, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955), in which a
negligent plan for the maintenance of a drainage ditch which contemplated
deposit and non-removal of stumps, debris, and intersecting pipe which ob-
structed the flow of water, was held actionable on the inverse theory. See
Baum v. Scotts Bluff County, 169 Neb. 816, 101 N.W.2d 455 (1960) (to the same
effect as Bauer).
146 Larrabee v. Cloverdale, 131 Cal. 96, 63 P. 143 (1900); Richardson v.
Eureka, 96 Cal. 443, 31 P. 458 (1892); Jefferis v. Monterey Park, 14 Cal. App.
2d 113, 57 P.2d 1374 (1936); White v. Santa Monica, 114 Cal. App. 330, 299 P.
819 (1931). Cases in other states are generally in agreement. See, e.g., Ren-
ninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170, 213 P.2d 911 (1950).
147 Granone v. Los Angeles County, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 42 Cal. Rptr. 34
(1965); Weisshand v. Petaluma, 37 Cal. App. 296, 174 P. 955 (1918).
148 Compare Hayashi v. Alameda County Flood Control & Water Conser.
Dist., 167 Cal. App. 2d 584, 334 P.2d 1048 (1959) (tort, but not inverse liability,
for routine negligence in failing to clear debris) with Bauer v. Ventura
County, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955) (inverse liability obtained for defec-
tive plan which includes retention of debris).
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diversion of stream waters, and, conversely, diversion normally re-
quires an obstruction of some kind. Whether fault must be shown
by the injured property owner thus depends, to some extent, upon
how the facts are classified. A deliberate program intended to alter
the course of a stream for a public purpose is ordinarily treated under
the "diversion" rubric, while unintended flooding is usually attributed
to a negligently planned project that creates an "obstruction.1' 49 The
distinction, however, is not a sharply defined one, and plaintiffs have
sometimes sought recovery alternatively on both theories while plead-
ing the same facts. 5 0
Regardless of the factual approach employed, inverse liability for
interference with stream waters depends upon a showing of proximate
causation. In the principal litigation against the State arising out of
the virtual destruction of the town of Klamath in the great flood of
December, 1964, for example, the trial court denied liability on the
alternative grounds that any obstruction to the flow of water alleg-
edly created by either an old bridge, or a partially completed new
bridge, located near the townsite "did not constitute a substantial
factor" in causing plaintiffs' damages, 151 and that in any event the
damage was caused by the intervention of a superseding force con-
sisting of an extraordinary and unprecedented storm. 52
A third group of cases dealing with stream waters concerns the
downstream consequences of natural channel improvement. For ex-
ample, the narrowing and deepening of a natural watercourse and
the construction of a concrete stream bed may increase greatly the
total volume, velocity and concentration of water running in the
channel by preventing absorption of stream waters and eliminating
natural impediments to stream flow. This, in turn, would create a
substantial risk of downstream damage due to overflow or intensified
erosion of the stream banks. For policy reasons, centered upon the
fear of discouraging upstream land development, this kind of chan-
nel improvement (at least insofar as downstream damage results from
an increased volume of water) is not regarded as an actionable basis
for inverse liability' 53 unless it is constructed according to an in-
149 See Beckley v. Reclamation Bd., 205 Cal. App. 2d 734, 23 Cal. Rptr. 428
(1962) (both theories held available under facts).
150 Id. See also Granone v. Los Angeles County, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 42
Cal. Rptr. 34 (1965); Pedrozo v. State, No. 41265 (Butte County Super. Ct.,
Cal., Jan. 30, 1967) (ambiguous findings).
15' Crivelli v. State, No. 9142, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
2 (Del Norte County Super. Ct., Cal., Aug. 4, 1966).
152 Id. 5. Public improvement design standards are not required to
provide adequate capacity or strength for storms of unforeseeable magnitude.
Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n v. Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461, 37 P. 375 (1894); see
notes 33-35 supra.
'53 See Archer v. Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 27, 119 P.2d 1, 6 (1941); San
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herently defective or negligently conceived plan. 54 Here again, how-
ever, classification of the facts plays a significant role. If the improve-
ments are regarded as causing an alteration in the direction of force
of the normal current within the channel, they may readily be thought
of as having "diverted" the stream. This approach supports a holding
of inverse liability without fault for resulting downstream erosion of
the banks.'5 5 By describing the channel improvements as measures
to fight off the common enemy of flood waters, however, attention is
focused upon the issue of fault and the alleged defective nature of the
improvement plan.15 6 The result is to make liability vel non turn
ostensibly upon the unarticulated premises that control the classifica-
tion process, rather than upon a conscientious appraisal of the rel-
ativity of public advantage and private harm in the particular factual
situation.
(4) Other Escaping Water Cases
The prevailing ambivalent approach, under which some water
damage situations are exposed to a "liability without fault" rationale,
while others require a showing of intentional or negligent fault, is
observable also in cases that do not fit neatly into the foregoing
categories. Damage resulting from the overflow of sewers, for ex-
ample, is recoverable in inverse condemnation if the plaintiff estab-
lishes that the sewers were deliberately or negligently designed so as
Gabriel Valley Country Club v. Los Angeles County, 182 Cal. 392, 188 P. 554
(1920). Although dictum in San Gabriel Valley Country Club suggests that
nonliability attends an increase in both volume and velocity of downstream
flow, the actual holding in both this case and in Archer is limited to damage
resulting from increased volume only. This result may thus be consistent
with the "common enemy" rule, under which individual efforts to stave off
flood waters may increase downstream volume without incurring liability.
The potential erosive effect of increased velocity, however, creates a hazard
of greater destructive impact and possibly permanent devastation. Neither
decision, it is submitted, should necessarily be taken as authoritative in the
latter type of case.
154 House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 153
P.2d 950 (1944).
'55 See, e.g., Tyler v. Tehama County, 109 Cal. 618, 42 P. 240 (1895)
(diversion of current by bridge abutment resulting in downstream erosion);
cf. Green v. Swift, 47 Cal. 536 (1874) (not a "taking" under pre-1879 consti-
tution). Cases in other states generally sustain inverse liability without fault
in such cases. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Minden, 130 So. 2d 160 (La. 1961);
Tomasek v. State, 196 Ore. 120, 248 P.2d 703 (1952); Morrison v. Clackamas
County, 141 Ore. 564, 18 P.2d 814 (1933); Conger v. Pierce County, 116 Wash.
27, 198 P. 377 (1921).
156 Granone v. Los Angeles County, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 42 Cal. Rptr. 34
(1965); Beckley v. Reclamation Bd., 205 Cal. App. 2d 734, 23 Cal. Rptr. 428
(1962).
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to be inadequate to accommodate the volume of sewage and storm
waters reasonably forieseeable in their service area. 157 The element of
fault as the basis of liability, however, is underscored by a corollary
rule: inadequacy due to an unprecedented volume of water that
could not reasonably be anticipated in the planning process consti-
tutes no basis for inverse liability.5 s
On the other hand, there are also many decisions that flatly ap-
prove inverse liability for property damage caused by the seepage of
water from irrigation canals, "with or without negligence."'159 The
leading case to this effect involves a ruling of the District Court of
Appeal that inverse liability for water seepage may be predicated
upon a showing of negligent construction or maintenance by an irriga-
tion district. On denying the district's petition for hearing, the Su-
preme Court, in a unanimous opinion, expressly disapproved the
court's intimations as to the necessity of negligence. 160 Where the
damage is "caused directly" by seepage from the district's canal, in-
verse liability obtains without any showing of fault: "In such cases
the care that may be taken in the construction of the public improve-
ment which causes the damage is wholly immaterial to the right of the
plaintiff to recover damage, if the improvement causes it."6" The
sudden escape of water from a public entity's irrigation canal, how-
ever, has been held actionable only upon allegations and proof of
defective design or operational plan. 62
Under the cases, then, inverse liability for water that escapes from
irrigation channels or other conduits is based sometimes on fault and
obtains sometimes without fault; the choice of rule appears to be a
function of classification of the facts, rather than the application of a
consistent theoretical rationale. Liability without fault in these situa-
157 Ambrosini v. Alisal Sanitary Dist., 154 Cal. App. 2d 720, 317 P.2d 33
(1957) (alternative ground). See also Mulloy v. Sharp Park Sanitary Dist.,
164 Cal. App. 2d 438, 330 P.2d 441 (1958) (semble).
158 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Los Angeles, 5 Cal. 2d 545, 55 P.2d 847 (1936)
(break in aquaduct-rule recognized but held inapplicable on facts). See also
notes 33-35 supra.
159 Powers Farms v. Consolidated Irr. Dist., 19 Cal. 2d 123, 126, 119 P.2d
717, 720 (1941) (dictum); Lourence v. West Side Irr. Dist., 233 Cal App. 2d
532, 43 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1965); Hume v. Fresno Irr. Dist., 21 Cal. App. 2d 348,
69 P.2d 483 (1937); Ketcham v. Modesto Irr. Dist., 135 Cal. App. 180, 26 P.2d
876 (1933).
160 Tormey v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irr. Dist., 53 Cal. App. 559, 568, 200
P. 814, 818 (1921) (opinion of Supreme Court on denial of hearing).
161 Id. This statement is quoted approvingly in the recent case of Albers
v. Los Angeles County, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 258, 398 P.2d 129, 133, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89,
93 (1965).
162 Curci v. Palo Verde Irr. Dist., 69 Cal. App. 2d 583, 159 P.2d 674 (1945).
See also Southern Pac. Co. v. Los Angeles, 5 Cal. 2d 545, 55 P.2d 847 (1936)
(break in aquaduct caused by storm which was foreseeable).
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tions appears in theory to be an application of the doctrine announced
in the famous English case of Rylands v. Fletcher,1 3 under which a
landowner is strictly liable without fault for damage done to the
property of others by the escape of substances with a mischief-pro-
ducing capacity, such as water, collected and impounded upon his land
for some "non-natural" purpose.16 4 The theory, however, has little
support in California decisional law, for the California courts appear
to have rejected the Rylands doctrine as applied to escaping waters.16 5
The use of water for irrigation purposes in a semi-arid state such as
California, it is said, is not only a "natural" use of land but is useful
and beneficial to a degree that should not be deterred by threat of
strict liability.'66 Yet, as noted above, the same courts have displayed
no reluctance in approving inverse liability for irrigation water seep-
age without regard for negligence, 167 and also, upon similar facts,
regularly have imposed tort liability without fault on a nuisance
theory. 16 8
This seeming inconsistency of approach may possibly be recon-
cilable. An irrigation ditch built and maintained in a careful manner
may, nonetheless, necessarily be located where natural conditions
(e.g., porous subsoil) make percolation or seepage a predictable risk
163 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868); see Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher,
59 U. PA. L. REV. 298, 373, 423 (1911).
164 Water seepage problems have been regarded as within the Rylands
doctrine in certain jurisdictions. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Vale Irr. Dist.,
253 F. Supp. 251 (D. Ore. 1966).
165 Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp., 123 F. Supp.
720 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (collapse of cofferdams); Clark v. DiPrima, 241 Cal. App.
2d 823, 51 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1966) (water escaping from break in irrigation ditch);
Curci v. Palo Verde Irr. Dist., 69 Cal. App. 2d 583, 159 P.2d 674 (1945) (sud-
den escape of water from irrigation ditch). The Rylands doctrine has been
denied application to a case of water escaping from a private reservoir.
Sutliff v. Sweetwater Water Co., 182 Cal. 34, 186 P. 766 (1920). But see
Rozewski v. Simpson, 9 Cal. 2d 515, 71 P.2d 72 (1937), suggesting that the
application of Rylands to some kinds of escaping water cases may be an open
question. Liability without fault has been accepted in California decisions
dealing with certain types of ultrahazardous activities. See, e.g., Luthringer
v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948); Comment, Absolute Liability for
Ultrahazardous Activities: An Appraisal of the Restatement Doctrine, 37
CALIF. L. REv. 269 (1949).
166 See Clark v. DiPrima, 241 Cal. App. 2d 823, 51 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1966).
167 See cases cited note 159 supra.
168 See, e.g., Fredericks v. Fredericks, 108 Cal. App. 2d 242, 238 P.2d 643
(1951); Nelson v. Robinson, 47 Cal. App. 2d 520, 118 P.2d 350 (1941); Kall v.
Carruthers, 59 Cal. App. 555, 211 P. 43 (1922); cf. Nola v. Orlando, 119 Cal.
App. 518, 6 P.2d 984 (1932). Nuisance liability is a long-recognized exception
to the doctrine of governmental tort immunity in California. E.g., Ambrosini
v. Alisal Sanitary Dist., 154 Cal. App. 2d 720, 317 P.2d 333 (1957). It evolved
principally from decisions grounded on inverse condemnation. Van Alstyne,
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of the improvement.169 Proof of fault may then be regarded as im-
material from either an inverse liability or a nuisance law viewpoint,
because the existence of damage caused by the irrigation improvement
supports an inference, as a matter of law, that the defendant either
deliberately exposed the plaintiff to the risk of foreseeable harm or
negligently adopted a defective plan of improvement that incorpo-
rated that risk.170 Moreover, statutory policy supports the view that
seepage damage should be treated as a cost of the water project.' 7 '
On the other hand, when the escaping water is not attributable to
some inherent risk of the project as planned, but results from an un-
expected deficiency in its practical operation, a specific factual show-
ing of fault may be necessary because the basis for the legal in-
ference is no longer present.1
72
B. Interference With Land Stability
As in water damage cases, the judicial process has had little suc-
cess in bringing order and consistency to the law of inverse condemna-
tion for damage caused by a disturbance of soil stability. Here, too, the
California cases exhibit a schizophrenic tendency to vacillate between
A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity, 5 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N,
REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STuDIEs 225-30 (1963). Because of its inherent
ambiguity, it has been relied upon frequently as a convenient basis for impos-
ing liability without regard for fault. Comment, Absolute Liability for Ultra-
hazardous Activities: An Appraisal of the Restatement Doctrine, 37 CALIF. L.
REV. 269, 270 n.7 (1949).
169 See U.S. DEP'T AGRiC., WATER: THE YEARBoox or AGRIcuLTuRE 311
(1955).
170 See Curci v. Palo Verde Irr. Dist., 69 Cal. App. 2d 583, 587, 159 P.2d
674, 676 (1945), where it is said that "[a]n examination of the foregoing cases
[including Powers, Hume, and Ketcham] . . . show[s] that in the majority
of them the landowner sought recovery for damages caused by seepage
from canals constructed through porous soil that did not confine and hold
water .... Although the canal was constructed carefully and according to
specifications this has been referred to as improper designing or improper
planning which would make the irrigation district liable for damage. In some
cases it is pointed out that this seepage of water may be prevented easily by
puddling the canal with clay, by the use of oil on the banks and bottom, or
by other simple means." See also Tormey v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irr. Dist.,
53 Cal. App. 559, 200 P. 814 (1921).
171 See CAL. WATER CODE § 12627.3: "It is declared to be the policy of the
State that the costs of solution of seepage and erosion problems which arise
or will arise by reason of construction and operation of water projects should
be borne by the project."
172 Curci v. Palo Verde Irr. Dist., 69 Cal. App. 2d 583, 159 P.2d 674 (1945).
But see Boitano v. Snohomish County, 11 Wash. 2d 664, 120 P.2d 490 (1941),
where the unexpected opening of an underground spring in the course of
gravel operations created a resultant necessity for drainage in which the
county was held inversely liable without fault when excess waters were
directed over the plaintiff's property.
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a theory of liability based on fault and one that admits liability with-
out fault.
In Reardon v. San Francisco17 (the earliest California decision
interpreting the "or damaged" clause of the 1879 constitution), the
city, in the course of a street grading and sewer installation project,
deposited large quantities of earth and rock upon the street surface to
raise its grade, causing the unstable subsurface to shift and thereby
damage the foundations of the plaintiffs' abutting buildings. Al-
though the damage was both foreseeable and foreseen (the city had
been warned that it was occurring), the city took no steps to protect
the plaintiffs' property. The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for
the plaintiffs, but did not predicate its decision upon fault. On the
contrary, it held that when a landowner is damaged as a consequence
of public work, "whether it is done carefully and with skill or not, he
is still entitled to compensation for such damage" under the command
of the just compensation clause of the constitution. 174 The opinion is
a square holding on this point,175 as the court had concluded prelimi-
narily that the plaintiffs could not recover on common law tort princi-
ples since no breach of a duty owed them was shown. Moreover, they
could not recover inverse damages for a "taking," since no physical
invasion of their land had occurred. Thus, the plaintiffs' judgment
was sustained solely upon the ground that their property had been
constitutionally "damaged."
The approach taken in Reardon, making fault immaterial to in-
verse liability for physical damage directly caused by public improve-
ment projects, was widely accepted in states which, like California,
had expanded the just- compensation clause of the state constitution
to include "damaging" as well as "taking.'176  On almost identical
173 66 Cal. 492, 6 P. 317 (1885).
174 Id. at 505, 6 P. at 325.
175 A recent student work has classified Reardon as "dictum". Note, 13
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 871, 872 (1966). This analysis ignores the reasoning of the
court's unanimous opinion, as summarized in the text. Text accompanying
notes 158-61 supra. Moreover, subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have
explicitly treated Reardon as a holding on the point here being discussed. See,
e.g., Tormey v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irr. Dist., 53 Cal. App. 559, 568, 200
P. 814, 818 (1921) (opinion of Supreme Court on denial of hearing).
176 See, e.g., Atlanta v. Kenny, 83 Ga. App. 823, 64 S.E.2d 912 (1951)
(house collapsed into trench for fire communications); Brewitz v. St. Paul, 256
Minn. 525, 99 N.W.2d 456 (1959) (gullying and erosion due to loss of support
after street grade lowered); Great N. Ry. v. State, 102 Wash. 348, 173 P. 40
(1918) (slides and earth deposits resulting from uphill blasting and road
work). A contrary view is often taken in states limiting inverse compensa-
tion to "takings." Hoene v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 209, 116 N.W.2d 112 (1962)
(damage to foundation of building due to inadequately constructed highway
unable to sustain heavy traffic); Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Columbia
County, 3 Wis. 2d 1, 87 N.W.2d 279 (1958) (displacement of soil as result of
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facts, for example, the Supreme Court of Washington has reached the
same result as in Reardon.'7 7 This approach also has been followed
in subsequent California decisions, 78 but in an uneven pattern. The
collapse of a building due to the construction of a tunnel beneath it,
for example, has been regarded as a basis of inverse liability without
fault.170 Moreover, affirmance of landslide liability in the recent
Albers decision makes it clear that the Reardon doctrine of inverse
liability without fault is part of the current constitutional law of
California.180  Yet, numerous other California decisions exist that
seem to affirm fault as an essential prerequisite, at least in some
circumstances, to inverse liability' l8 '
Even in cases closely analogous to Reardon, dealing with damage
resulting from shifting soil, fault has been emphasized as a criterion of
inverse liability. For example, damage to a house caused by excava-
tion in the street for the installation of a sewer, which removed
lateral support for the plaintiff's land, was held recoverable because
the city's construction plans were "intrinsically dangerous and in-
herently wrong" according to expert engineering testimony adduced
by plaintiff. 8 2 In sustaining inverse liability under similar circum-
deposit of heavy fill material caused twisting and destruction of transmission
tower); cf. Edison Co. v. Campanella & Cardi Constr. Co., 272 F.2d 430 (1st
Cir. 1959), where it was said by way of dictum that damage to transmissiofi
towers due to displacement of soil by a highway embankment was not a
"taking" but possibly subject to statutory liability. See generally 2 P. NICHOLS,
EMIET DomAni § 6.4432[2], at 508-19 (rev. 3d ed. 1963).
177 Hinckley v. Seattle, 74 Wash. 101, 132 P. 855 (1913). See also Depart-
ment of H'ways v. Widner, 388 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1965) (destruction of home in
landslide caused by removal of lateral support during downhill road project
held compensable without proof of negligence); Newport v. Rosing, 319 S.W.
2d 852 (Ky. 1958) (similar facts and holding as in Widner).
178 See, e.g., Tyler v. Tehama County, 109 Cal. 618, 42 P. 240 (1895);
Tormey v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irr. Dist., 53 Cal. App. 559, 200 P. 814 (1921).
See also Powers Farms v. Consolidated Irr. Dist., 19 Cal. 2d 123, 119 P.2d 717
(1941) (dictum).
179 Porter v. Los Angeles, 182 Cal. 515, 189 P. i05 (1920). Although this
opinion is concerned primarily with an issue of the statute of limitations, its
substantive aspects have been regarded in subsequent decisions as authoritative
with respect to issues of liability. See Los Angeles County Flood Control
Dist. v. Southern Cal. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 188 Cal. App. 2d 850, 855, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 811, 813 (1961). See also Main Mun. Water Dist. v. Northwestern Pac.
R.R., 253 Cal. App. 2d 82, 92, 61 Cal. Rptr. 520, 526 (1967).
180 Albers v. Los Angeles County, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr.
89 (1965); see text accompanying notes 9-35 supra.
.81 See, e.g., Bauer v. Ventura County, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955);
House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 153 P.2d 950
(1944).
182 Kaufman v. Tomich, 208 Cal. 19, 280 P. 130 (1929). The court here
observes that it is unnecessary to determine whether liability was based on
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stances, however, an attempted police power justification for destruc-
tion of lateral support was rejected on the ground that "there is no
reason to invoke the doctrine of police power to protect public agencies
in those cases where damage to private parties can be averted by
proper construction and proper precautions in the first instance.' 83
These cases may possibly be explained as a product of unnecessary
judicial preoccupation with private law analogies in the development
of inverse condemnation law.184 The opinions themselves, however,
contain no intimation of a judicial willingness to recognize inverse
liability on any basis other than fault; only by a subtle and sophisti-
tort or inverse condemnation principles, for the same result would obtain in
either event.
183 Veteran's Welfare Bd. v. Oakland, 74 Cal. App. 2d 818, 831, 169 P.2d
1000, 1009 (1946) (emphasis added). See also Wofford Heights Ass'n v. Kern
County, 219 Cal. App. 2d 34, 32 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1963).
184 The common law rule of absolute liability for deprivation of lateral
support, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 817 (1939), has been modified in California.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 832. Under this statutory rule, except in the case of very
deep excavations, the adjoining owner is liable only if loss of lateral support
results from negligence or from failure to notify one's neighbor so that he may
take protective measures. See Wharam v. Investment Underwriters, 58 Cal.
App. 2d 346, 136 P.2d 363 (1943); Conlin v. Coyne, 19 Cal. App. 2d 78, 64 P.2d
1123 (1937). Section 832, however, applies only to lateral support situations;
it does not impair the former rule of strict liability for loss of subjacent sup-
port. Main Mun. Water Dist. v. Northwestern Pac. R.R., 253 Cal. App. 2d 82,
61 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 820 (1939); cf. Porter v.
Los Angeles, 182 Cal. 515, 189 P. 105 (1920). Accordingly, Kaufman v. Tomich,
208 Cal. 19, 280 P. 130 (1929), and Veteran's Welfare Bd. v. Oakland, 74 Cal.
App. 2d 818, 169 P.2d 1000 (1946), may arguably be regarded as consistent with
the fault rationale required in lateral support cases by section 832, while Porter
v. Los Angeles, supra, and Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 P. 318
(1885), may be understood as instances of strict liability for loss of subjacent
support. This explanation, however, is inconsistent with explicit language in
Reardon that "there could be no ... recovery at common law." Id. at 505, 6
P. at 325. It has no formal support or recognition in Kaufman, Veteran's Wel-
fare Board, or Porter.
it is not entirely clear whether section 832 governs excavation work by
public agencies. It has been said to be inapplicable to street excavation work
by a municipal contractor which impairs lateral support of abutting land.
Cassell v. McGuire & Hester, 187 Cal. App. 2d 579, 593, 10 Cal. Rptr. 33, 42
(1960) (dictum); cf. Gazzera v. San Francisco, 70 Cal. App. 2d 833, 161 P.2d
806 (1945) (city held not liable for loss of lateral support in absence of show-
ing that street excavation work caused plaintiff's damage; section 832 neither
cited nor discussed). On the other hand, previous uncertainty whether gen-
eral statutory provisions governing tort liability were applicable to govern-
mental entities has now been resolved, since sovereign immunity has been
abrogated in California, in favor of applicability. E.g., Flournoy v. State, 57
Cal. 2d 497, 370 P.2d 331, 20 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1962) (wrongful death act held
applicable to state). Under the latter view, it seems that section 832 would
be regarded today as apropos in a lateral support case maintained against a
public entity either on an inverse or tort theory.
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cated analysis can they be reconciled with the rationale of the Reardon
and Albers decisions.
C. Loss of Advantageous Conditions
The value of real property is often directly dependent upon ad-
vantageous conditions physically associated with it, such as an ade-
quate supply of potable water. Government activities, however, may
impair or terminate the existence of such physical attributes and
thereby substantially diminish the sum total of the value-enhancing
features that comprise the owner's property interest. In a California
case, for example, the construction of a tunnel as part of a municipal
water supply project diverted an underground stream which fed
natural springs used by a farmer for irrigation purposes. Loss of this
valuable water supply source was held to be a compensable damaging
of property, although there was no evidence that the city had acted
negligently or unreasonably. 1 5 Similarly, upstream improvements,
such as a dam, that divert stream water to governmental purposes in
derogation of established water rights of downstream riparian owners
also may constitute a basis of constitutional liability.1 86 Loss of water
supply, however, is recognized as a basis of inverse liability only so
far as the injured party is recognized to possess a property right
therein.18 7
The crucial significance of private property law concepts in the
185 De Freitas v. Suisun, 170 Cal. 263, 149 P. 553 (1915). A landowner's
interest in spring water located on his premises is recognized, ordinarily, as
being equally protectible with his ownership of the surface. State v. Hansen,
189 Cal. App. 2d 604, 11 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1961). The interest of a surface owner
in percolating underground waters, however, has traditionally been subject to
a rule of correlative reasonable use. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74 P.
766 (1903); cf. Passadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 937 (1950). See generally Hillside Water Co. v. Los Angeles,
10 Cal. 2d 677, 76 P.2d 681 (1938), where the city was held liable for the dimi-
nution of artesian well pressure resulting from extensive pumping and expor-
tation of water from an underground basin.
186 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); United States v. Gerlach Live
Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
187 Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 377 (1967); De Freitas v. Suisun, 170 Cal. 263, 149 P. 553 (1915); Volk-
mann v. Crosby, 120 N.W.2d 18 (N.D. 1963) (city held inversely liable for
impairment of private artesian well supply by drilling of municipal well);
Canada v. Shawnee, 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694 (1936) (similar to facts in Volk-
mann); Griswold v. Weathersfield School Dist., 117 Vt. 224, 88 A.2d 829 (1952)
(school district held inversely liable for diversion of underground stream,
with consequent drying up of plainitff's spring, due to blasting in course of
district improvement project). Judicial enforcement of property rights in
water, however, may be unavailable where conflicting prescriptive rights have
matured. See Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949).
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disposition of cases of this kind is underscored by the recent state
Supreme Court case of Joslin v. Matin Municipal Water District.18 8
This decision denied compensation to downstream riparian owners for
damage caused by loss of accretions of commercial sand and gravel
deposits upon their land, which formerly had been carried in suspen-
sion by the waters of Nicasio Creek. The defendant district, in order
to develop a municipal water supply, had constructed a dam across
the creek which obstructed the normal flow of waters and thus termi-
nated the periodic replenishment of sand and gravel used by the plain-
tiffs in their business. The value of the plaintiffs' land allegedly was
diminished in the amount of $250,000. Inverse liability was denied
under the prevailing California doctrine of reasonable beneficial use
which governs the relative property interests of riparian owners
(such as the plaintiffs) and upstream appropriators (such as the de-
fendant district),189 The plaintiffs' use of the stream waters for
acquisition of commercial sand and gravel-commodities in plentiful
supply for which no significant interest in development and conserva-
tion by stream water usage could be identified-was held to be clearly
unreasonable and therefore subordinate, as a matter of law, when
contrasted with the district's interest in the beneficial use of those
waters for domestic and industrial purposes. In effect, no compen-
sable property right of the plaintiffs had been taken or damaged. 90
In Joslin, the court distinguished two important cases relied upon
by the plaintiffs. The first, a decision of the United States Supreme
Court, declared that loss of natural irrigation through seasonal over-
flow of riparian lands, caused by the construction of an upstream dam,
constituted a compensable "taking" of the landowners' riparian prop-
erty interest.191 Reliance on seasonal flooding of a stream for agri-
cultural irrigation purposes was regarded there as a reasonable bene-
ficial use of river water by a riparian owner, and thus a compensable
188 67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967).
189 See CAL. CoxsT. art. XIV, § 3 (1928), which modified the strict doc-
trine of superiority of riparian to appropriative rights as applied in cases like
Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 607 (1926). By
the 1928 amendment, the rule of reasonable beneficial use became firmly
established as the legal framework for adjudication of competing claims to
water in California. Peabody v. Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935);
Chow v. Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 22 P.2d 5 (1933); CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 100-01.
190 See Peabody v. Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 369, 40 P.2d 486, 492 (1935). But
see Miramar Co. v. Santa Barbara, 23 Cal. 2d 170, 143 P.2d 1 (1943); Note,
Eminent Domain: Damage Without Taking, Damnum Absque Injuria, 32
CALI. L. REv. 91 (1944) (court evenly divided as to existence, as against the
state, of property right in littoral owner to uninterrupted sandy accretions
from natural ocean currents).
191 United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950); see
Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 656 (1951).
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interest. Use by the plaintiffs in Joslin for sand and gravel accretions,
however, was deemed not reasonable under the circumstances. 192
The second case, a California decision, held that loss of accretions
of sand and gravel as the result of the construction of a concrete flood
control channel in the bed of a natural watercourse, thereby prevent-
ing overflow of the waters and deposit of their contents upon the
plaintiffs' land, constituted the taking of a property right the value of
which was required to be included in severance damages in the flood
control district's eminent domain suit to condemn the channel ease-
ment.1' This decision, however, did not involve a clash between a
riparian owner and an upper appropriator in light of the "reasonable
and beneficial use" test, but was concerned only with the question of
the extent to which the land not taken for flood control purposes, on
which plaintiff's long-established gravel business was situated, had
sustained severance damages by reason of the flood control channel
project. The Supreme Court in Joslin expressly disapproved any
language in the earlier case which intimated that the use of stream
flow for replenishment of sand and gravel accretions was a reason-
able one or could be regarded as giving rise to a property right as
against an appropriator who was putting the water itself to reasonable
and beneficial use.194
According to the Joslin opinion, the critical determination
whether a particular use of water is reasonable and beneficial "is a
question of fact to be determined according to the circumstances in
each particular case."' 95  Ample latitude for the weighing of policy
192 Cf. CAL. 'ATER CODE § 106: "It is hereby declared to be the estab-
lished policy of the State that the use of water for domestic purposes is the
highest use of water and that the next highest use is for irrigation." The
Joslin opinion, it should be noted, does not constitute a clear approval of the
Gerlach decision; it may be read, instead, as merely explaining and distin-
guishing Gerlach as based on a determination, which the Joslin court was not
required to reexamine, that the riparian use there in question was in fact
"reasonable" under the circumstances. In any event, Joslin strongly intimates
that "reasonableness" is a relative concept, to be determined by comparing
the relative social utility of the competing water uses before the court. For
example, it would not be inconsistent with Joslin for a court, under some cir-
cumstances, to conclude that agricultural irrigation purposes (a secondary
priority of use under section 106) may be unreasonable when in conflict with
water supply for domestic consumption. Moreover, the hierarchy of priorities
as between other forms of water usage not mentioned in section 106 remains
uncertain and subject to case-by-case elaboration, absent additional legislative
clarification.
193 Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Abbot, 24 Cal. App. 2d 728,
76 P.2d 188 (1938).
194 Joslin v. Main Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 145, 429 P.2d 889, 896,
60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 386 (1967).
195 Id. at 139, 429 P.2d at 894, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 382. Accordingly, a use
factors judicially regarded as relevant to the compensability issue is
thus allowed. For example, in City of Los Angeles v. Aitken,196 the
court's opinion, after emphasizing the importance of natural recrea-
tional facilities both to the state's economic well-being and to the
health and welfare of its citizens, concluded that the use of navigable
lake waters for recreation and as an adjunct to the scenic and recrea-
tional use of littoral lands (whose value for that purpose directly
depended upon the continued existence of the lake) was a reasonable
beneficial use entitled to judicial protection. A secondary factor sup-
porting this conclusion was the virtual unusability of the lake waters
in question for domestic or irrigation purposes, due to excessive im-
pregnation with minerals and alkali. Finally, the Aitken opinion
stresses the fact that substantial investments had been made along the
lake shore in reasonable and good-faith reliance upon the continuance
of the natural lake level. Accordingly, the diversion of the waters of
tributary streams feeding the lake, even though for the concededly
reasonable and beneficial purpose of augmenting a municipal water
supply, was held to constitute the damaging of property rights of
littoral owners for which just compensation was required to be paid.
Although a careful perusal of Aitken suggests that the frustration
of substantial investment-backed expectations, reasonably grounded
in experience, was the pivotal factual element of the decision, Josin
seemingly rejects the view that the magnitude of private loss is of legal
significance. The destruction of a valuable, long-standing, and so-
cially useful business enterprise grounded upon reasonable expecta-
tion that periodic replenishments of sand and gravel would continue
to be supplied by natural river flow, was countenanced as not a com-
pensable damaging because of the general preference shown by Cal-
ifornia law for domestic water use. Unlike Aitken, the Joslin result
seems to reflect a judicial disposition to permit decision in cases of
this kind to turn upon abstract classifications of water use priorities,
thereby making unnecessary the more difficult task of assessing the
weight of the competing interests revealed by the adjudicative facts.
Absent a comprehensive legislative scheme of relative priorities, how-
ever, this approach scarcely improves predictability. In any event, it
appears to disregard significant factual and policy considerations
which, in other contexts (e.g., Albers,) have been regarded as deter-
minative of the public duty to pay just compensation for economic
losses caused by governmental activities.
It could be argued that the inherent uncertainty of the reason-
recognized as beneficial under some circumstances may, under other circum-
stances, be subordinated to more important uses. See Tulare Irr. Dist. v.
Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 45 P.2d 972 (1935); CAL. WATER
CODE § 106.
196 10 Cal. App. 2d 460, 52 P.2d 585 (1935).
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able beneficial use criterion of compensable water rights has been
reduced at least partially by statutory provisions. The result in the
Aitken case, for example, apparently has been codified in somewhat
expanded form. Section 1245 of the California Water Code makes
every municipality that appropriates water from any watershed or its
tributaries fully liable to persons within the watershed area for "in-
jury, damage, destruction or decrease in value of [their] property,
business, trade, profession or occupation" caused by the appropriation.
The Joslin opinion, however, considered the quoted language as indi-
cating only a legislative intent to provide statutory compensation in
those limited situations in which a constitutionally secured right to
just compensation already existed. In holding that the plaintiffs'
business and occupational losses were not compensable under section
1245, the court reasoned that "since there was and is no [constitution-
ally cognizable] property right in the instant unreasonable use, there
has been no taking or damaging of property. Since by constitutional
fiat no property right exists, none is created by statutory provisions
intended to provide compensation for the deprivation of protectible
property interests. '197 This view, which treats the statute as a useless
and redundant exercise of legislative power, wholly ignores clear
language in section 1245 suggesting that the legislature was not at-
tempting to formulate a rule of compensation enmeshed in technical
notions of what is a constitutionally protectible property interest, but
was seeking to protect against economic loss (i.e., "decrease in value")
caused by water appropriation to any previously established "business,
trade, profession or occupation" in the watershed. The Joslin sand
and gravel enterprise may not have been "property" in the constitu-
tional sense, but it is difficult to understand why it was not a "busi-
ness" or "occupation" in the statutory sense. Moreover, the court in
Joslin ignored the possibility that section 1245 is simply another pro-
viso in the extensive array of statutory mandates requiring compen-
sation to be be paid for governmentally caused economic losses despite
the absence of a constitutional compulsion to do so.10 8
197 Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 146, 429 P.2d 889, 898,
60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 386 (1967).
198 See Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation:
Deliberately Inflicted Injury or Destruction, 20 STAN. L. REv. 617, 630-32
(1968), collecting and discussing numerous statutes. The most directly anal-
ogous statutory pattern of required compensation for economic losses caused
by public improvements, absent constitutional compulsion to compensate, re-
lates to the reimbursement of costs incurred by private utility companies in
relocating underground facilities and structures in order to make room for, or
accommodate, public projects (e.g., sewers, water mains, drainage facilities,
street improvements). See Van Alstyne, Government Tort Liability: A Public
Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 463, 501-02 (1963). The constitutional
validity of statutory indemnification in such situations is, of course, well-
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It should be noted that other legislation relating to water re-
sources, from a practical viewpoint, may have an impact upon inverse
liability claims for interferences with water uses, although the nature
and extent of the impact cannot be evaluated on an abstract basis.
Claims of appropriative rights to surplus stream water, for example,
are now subject to an application-permit procedure made applicable
to all appropriators, including municipalities, 199 and designed to allo-
cate such claims on "terms and conditions . . . [which] will best de-
velop, conserve, and utilize in the public interest the water sought to
be appropriated.120 0 The relativity of water uses also has been given
partial definition by statutory declarations that "domestic use is the
highest use and irrigation is the next highest use of water,1201 together
with statutory preferences for appropriations by municipalities for
domestic consumption purposes. 20 2 Finally, provision is made for
administrative adjudication of competing claims to water by the State
Water Rights Board,20 3 as well as for court referral of water rights
controversies to this agency.
Although the statutory framework appears to provide an orderly
basis for the determination of water rights, it leaves the determination
of compensability for governmental "takings" or "damagings" of in-
terests in water in a state of uncertainty. The only explicit legislative
effort to deal with the problem has been nullified by the exceedingly
narrow interpretation of Water Code section 1245 announced by Jos-
7in. The "reasonableness" test (which Joslin indicates applies to all
competing water claims and not merely to disputes between appro-
priators and riparian users) is derived ultimately from the language of
article XIV, section 3 of the California Constitution,20 4 but this fact
settled. Dittus v. Cranston, 53 Cal. 2d 284, 347 P.2d 671, 1 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1959).
See also Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. Los Angeles, 50 Cal. 2d 713, 329 P.2d 289
(1958).
199 CAL. WATER CODE § 1252.5. See generally id. §§ 1200-1801.
200 Id. § 1253. See also id. §§ 10000-507, where the "State Water Plan"
and "California Water Plan" provisions, under which the state has assumed
a primary interest in the orderly and coordinated conservation, development,
and utilization of all water resources in the state, has been codified.
201 Id. §§ 106, 1254.
202 Id. §§ 106.5, 1460-64. But see id. §§ 10505, 11460-63 ("county of origin"
and "watershed of origin" preferences); Note, State Water Development:
Legal Aspects of California's Feather River Project, 12 STAN. L. Rsv. 439, 450-
55 (1960).
203 CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2000-76 (references); id. §§ 2500-2866 (administra-
tive adjudication subject to court review).
204 CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3 (1928), provides in part: "It is hereby de-
clared that because of the conditions prevailing in this State the general welfare
requires that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the
fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable
use or unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, and that the con-
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should not and does not preclude legislative clarification of the criteria
to be used by the courts in applying this test to specific circum-
stances.2 0 5 Indeed, the Joslin decision itself relies heavily upon legis-
lative provisions which declare the predominant importance of domes-
tic water use in the socio-economic environment of California, as well
as the absence of such legislative standards respecting sand and gravel
accretions, as support for its conclusion that the latter interest was not
a reasonable and beneficial use as contrasted with the former. More
explicit and comprehensive legislative clarification, including possible
amendment of Water Code section 1245 in order to make its basic in-
tent indisputably clear, would seem to be a desirable legislative ob-
jective.
The recognition of certain aspects of water rights as compensable
"property" interests has been accompanied in recent years by a grow-
ing body of law likewise giving effect to the landowner's compensable
interest in the purity of both water and air. Pollution, ordinarly
comprised of domestic and industrial wastes, and sometimes of silt,
often is attributable to governmental functions, such as the collection
of waste matter in sanitary sewer systems for concentrated discharge
(ordinarily after some form of treatment) at a relatively few outlets,
or (in the case of silting) public construction projects conducted with-
out adequate erosion controls.2 0 6 Sewage disposal, in addition, some-
times produces pollution of the atmosphere by noxious odors which
drastically impair the usability and value of property subjected there-
to.
207
Governmental liability for environmental pollution often has
been sustained on a tort theory of nuisance.20 1 California case law
servation of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and
beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and for the public welfare.
The right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural
stream or water course in this State is and shall be limited to such water as
shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such
right does not and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or
unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water.
." (Emphasis added).
205 See id.: "This section shall be self-executing, and the Legislature
may also enact laws in furtherance of the policy in this section contained."
Cf. Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The Scope
of Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REV. 727 (1967).
206 See generally Schwob, Pollution-A Growing Problem of a Growing
Nation, in U.S. DEP'T OF AGRic., WATER-THE YEARBOOK OF AGRICU]LTumm 636
(1955); Edelman, Federal Air and Water Control: The Application of the
Commerce Power to Abate Interstate and Intrastate Pollution, 33 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 1067 (1965).
207 E.g., Sewerage Dist. v. Black, 141 Ark. 550, 217 S.W. 813 (1920); Ives-
ter v. Winston-Salem, 215 N.C. 1, 1 S.E.2d 88 (1939).
208 See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1177 (1955) (sewage disposal plants); Annot.,
38 A.L.R.2d 1265 (1954) (pollution of underground waters).
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has provided support for this approach in the past.20 9 However, it is
no longer entirely clear whether governmental nuisance liability will
be recognized in California in light of the legislative decision in 1963
placing all governmental tort liability upon a statutory basis while
omitting to provide explicitly for liability on a nuisance theory.210
Inverse condemnation appears to offer an acceptable alternate remedy
that would survive legislative disapproval.211 Before abrogation of
sovereign immunity from tort liability, the California cases recognized
nuisance liability as an exception to the general rule of tort immunity;
but the exception was largely an evolutionary development rooted in
inverse condemnation liability for property damage.2' 2 To the extent
that nuisance and inverse liability overlap one another, the inverse
remedy still would be available in pollution cases.21 3
Elsewhere, public entities have been held liable on inverse con-
demnation grounds in such diverse situations as sewage contamina-
tion of oyster beds,21 4 pollution of private water resources, 21 5 ocean
salt water intrusion upon agricultural lands riparian to a river be-
cause of upstream diversion of fresh water,216 silting of a private lake
209 See Hassell v. San Francisco, 11 Cal. 2d 168, 78 P.2d 1021 (1938) (in-
junction against maintenance of comfort station in public park on showing
that nuisance would result); Adams v. Modesto, 131 Cal. 501, 63 P. 1083
(1901) (open sewer ditch nuisance); Ingram v. Gridley, 100 Cal. App. 2d 815,
224 P.2d 798 (1950) (sewage pollution of stream).
210 The legislative history of the Tort Claims Act of 1963 indicates a
deliberate legislative decision to preclude governmental tort liability for
damages on a common law nuisance theory. See SENATE Comm. ON Tim Ju-
DiCiARY, REPORT ON S. 42, CAL. S. Jouu. 1887 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1963), quoted
in A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALiFoRNiA GOVERNMENT TORT I ILITY 497-98 (Cal.
Cont. Educ. Bar 1964). However, nuisance liability is not purely a matter
of common law doctrine in California; it is codified. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3479,
3491, 3501. Arguably, therefore, nuisance liability may still obtain under the
last-cited provisions. Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Con-
demnation: The Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REV. 727, 740 n.56
(1967).
211 See Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation: A Legislative
Prospectus, 8 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1, 11 (1967).
212 Van Alstyne, A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity, in 5 CAL. LAw
REvisiON Comm'N, REPORTS, REcOMMWENDATIONS & STUDIEs 225-30 (1963).
213 See County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Averill, 8 Cal. App. 2d 556, 47
P.2d 786 (1935) (dictum); cf. Ambrosini v. Alisal Sanitary Dist., 154 Cal.
App. 2d 720, 317 P.2d 33 (1957).
214 Gibson v. Tampa, 135 Fla. 637, 185 So. 319 (1938).
215 Game & Fish Comm'n v. Farmers Irr. Co., 149 Colo. 318, 426 P.2d 562
(1967) (pollution by waters discharged from fish hatchery); Cunningham v.
Tieton, 60 Wash. 2d 434, 374 P.2d 375 (1962) (percolation from sewage lagoon
to underground wells); Snavely v. Goldendale, 10 Wash. 2d 453, 117 P.2d 221
(1941) (sewage discharge into stream).
216 Early v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 228 S.C. 392, 90 S.E.2d 472
(1955); Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 216 S.C. 500,
59 S.E.2d 132 (1950).
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from erosion of an unstabiized highway embankment, 217 and per-
sistent pollution of the atmosphere by noxious and offensive odors
from a sewage disposal plant.218  Negligence or alternative findings
of fault are not regarded as essential to liability in these cases; regard-
less of the care with which the public improvement is operated, if it in
fact creates a condition that substantially damages property values,
the public entity must absorb the resulting cost.219 In addition, by
grounding these decisions upon the constitutional mandate to pay just
compensation, the courts have blocked municipal contentions that
liability should not attach to the performance of essential "govern-
mental" functions, such as sewage disposal,220 or that liability should
not be recognized for governmental activities expressly authorized by
statute.
221
The persistence of a nuisance rationale at the heart of the inverse
condemnation decisions dealing with environmental pollution damage
introduces into the law of inverse liability the same vagaries, uncer-
tainties, and obscurities of decisional processes that plague ordinary
tort litigation pursued on a nuisance theory.222 In addition, it may
blur significant distinctions between the interests represented by pub-
lic agencies and those which pertain to private persons. For example,
a comparison of public and private defendants may disclose substan-
tial differences of size, legal responsibility, territorial impact, fiscal
resources, and available practical alternatives. All these differences
should be considered in a rational balancing process. On the other
hand, the nuisance analogue does usefully direct attention to the
remedial resources inherent in the powers of equity to abate the source
217 Department of H'ways v. Cochrane, 397 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. App. 1965);
Kendall v. Department of H'ways, 168 So. 2d 840 (La. App. 1964), writ re-
fused, 247 La. 341, 170 So. 2d 864 (1965).
218 Clinard v. Kernersville, 215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939); Gray v.
High Point, 203 N.C. 756, 166 S.E. 911 (1932).
219 See, e.g., Clinard v. Kernersville, 215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939);
Parsons v. Sioux Falls, 65 S.D. 145, 272 N.W. 288 (1937); cf. Pheonix v. John-
son, 51 Ariz. 115, 75 P.2d 30 (1938).
220 See Brewster v. Forney, 223 S.W. 175 (Comm'n App. Tex. 1920); South-
worth v. Seattle, 145 Wash. 138, 259 P. 26 (1927).
221 See Parsons v. Sioux Falls, 65 S.D. 145, 272 N.W. 288 (1937); Aliverti
v. Walla Walla, 162 Wash. 487, 298 P. 698 (1931); cf. Ambrosini v. Alisal Sani-
tary Dist., 154 Cal. App. 2d 720, 317 P.2d 33 (1957).
222 "There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than
that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.' It has meant all things to all
men, and has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming
advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie. There is general agreement
that it is incapable of any exact or comprehensive definition. Few terms have
afforded so excellent an illustration of the familiar tendency of the courts
to seize upon a catchword as a substitute for analysis of a problem .... " W.
PROSSER, THE LAW Or TORTS 592 (3d ed. 1964).
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of harm rather than merely award just compensation and thereby
confirm the permanence of the injury.223
D. Miscellaneous Physical Damage Claims
The factual setting of inverse liability claims is not complete
without at least brief attention to a variety of other circumstances in
which physical injuries to property have been conceptualized as con-
stitutional "damagings."
(1) Concussion and Vibration
Property damage caused by shock waves from blasting and other
activities has resulted in varying judicial views.224 In jurisdictions
that recognize inverse liability only for a "taking," structural damage
as the result of vibrations from heavy equipment (e.g., a pile driver) 225
or from shock waves caused by blasting,226 ordinarily is held to be
noncompensable. Consistent with the widely recognized rule that in-
juries caused by blasting in a populated area are an occasion for abso-
lute tort liability,227 however, California regards such injuries as an
223 See, e.g., Jones v. Sewer Improvement Dist., 119 Ark. 166, 177 S.W. 888
(1915); Lakeland v. State, 143 Fla. 761, '197 So. 470 (1940); Briggson v. Viro-
qua, 264 Wis. 47, 58 N.W.2d 546 (1953). The limited availability of remedies
other than damages, where inverse takings or damagings have occurred, is
surveyed in Note, Eminent Domain-Rights and Remedies of an Uncompen-
sated Landowner, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 210. See also Horrell, Rights and Reme-
dies of Property Owners Not Proceeded Agaiiist, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 113.
224 In private tdrt law,'a division of authority exists as to whether such
damage is actionable without fault. Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1372 (1951); see
notes 227 and 232 and accompanying text infra for the California position.
225 State ex rel. Fejes v. Akron, 5 Ohio St. 2d 47, 213 N.E.2d 353 (1966).
This result is also reached in some "damaging" states by narrow construction.
See, e.g., Klein v. Department of H'ways, 175 So. 2d 454 (La. App. 1965), writ
refused, 248 La. 369, 178 So. 2d 658 (1965) (collapse of roof due to vibration
from pile drivers held noncompensable since not an intentional or purposeful
infliction of damage); Beck v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 72 So. 2d 765 (La. App.
1954) (similar).
226 Bartholomae Corp. v. United States, 253 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1963)
(atomic test detonations); Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 355 Mass. 619, 142
N.E.2d 347 (1957) (non-negligent blasting during aquaduct tunnel project);
Crisafi v. Cleveland, 169 Ohio St. 137, 158 N.E.2d 379 (1959) (single blast
during park improvement project). Some of the holdings of noncompensa-
bility for blast and vibration damage appear to be based on the view that the
resulting injuries were de minimis. See, e.g., Moeller v. Multnomah County,
218 Ore. 413, 345 P.2d 813 (1959); cf. Louden v. Cincinnati, 90 Ohio St. 144,
106 N.E. 970 (1914) (severe and prolonged blast and vibration damage may
amount to a "taking").
227 Colton v. Onderdonk, 69 Cal. 155, 10 P. 395 (1886); Smith v. Lock-
heed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967); Balding
v. D.B. Stutsman, Inc., 246 Cal. App. 2d 559, 54 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1966).
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inversely compensable "damaging" of property regardless of the care
or the negligence of the public entity in causing them. 228 Moreover,
the California decisions have rejected efforts to limit strict liability to
damages from blast-projected missiles, 229 ruling that the plaintiff's
right to recovery does not turn on whether the damage was caused by
atmospheric concussion, vibration of the soil, or throwing of debris,
but upon the extrahazardous nature of the defendant's activities.
23 0
The same conclusions have been reached with respect to subterranean
damage caused by the vibration of a large rocket motor undergoing
testing.231
The rationale of strict inverse liability for concussion and vibra-
tion damage caused by blasting or similar activities has recognized
limits; thus, California requires a showing of negligence as a basis of
liability where the blasting occurred in a remote or unpopulated
area.23 2 Activities of this type undertaken in a residential area are
deemed to create a risk of substantial harm which cannot be elim-
inated entirely even by the use of utmost care. Thus, the policies of
negligence deterrence and loss distribution support a rule imposing
strict liability upon the enterprise which exposes property owners to
that risk and which is ordinarily in a position best able to absorb the
Joss. 23 3 In remote and unsettled areas, however, the risk is minimized
228 Los Angeles County Flood Control'Dist. v. Southern Cal. Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 188 Cal. App. 2d 850, 10 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1961) (vibration damage from
pile driver). Cases in other "damaging" states are in substantial agreement.
See, e.g., Richmond County v. Williams, 109 Ga. App. 670, 137 S.E.2d 343
(1964) (physical damage from pile driver vibration held compensable, while
annoyance from dust, fumes and noise held noncompensable); Muskogee v.
Hancock, 58 Okla. 1, 158 P. 622 (1916) (concussion damage from blasting
during sewer construction); Knoxville v..Peebles, 19 Tenn. App. 340, 87 S.W.
2d 1022 (1935) (vibration and concussion damage from blasting).
229 Inverse liability for damage caused by rocks and debris thrown upon
private property by construction blasting is generally recognized. See, e.g.,
Jefferson County v. Bischoff, 238 Ky. 176, 37 S.W.2d 24 (1931); Adams v.
Sengel, 177 Ky. 535, 197 S.W. 974 (1917).
230 See McGrath v. Basich Bros. Constr. Co., 7 Cal. App. 2d 573, 46 P.2d
981 (1935); McKenna v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 104 Cal. App. 538, 286 P. 445 (1930);
accord, Whiteman Hotel Corp. v. Elliott & Watrous Eng'r Co., 137 Conn. 562,
79 A.2d 591 (1951).
231 Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr.
128 (1967) (loss of underground water supply due to subterranean vibration
and earth shifting caused by test of rocket engine of unusual power and
size). Where inverse liability is limited to a "taking", however, contrary re-
sults have been reached. See, e.g., Leavell v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 734
(E.D.S.C. 1964) (jet engine test).
232 See Alonso v. Hills, 95 Cal. App. 2d 778, 214 P.2d 50 (1950); cf. Hough-
ton v. Loma Prieta Lumber Co., 152 Cal. 500, 93 P. 82 (1907) (personal in-
juries from blasting in unpopulated area); Wilson v. Rancho Sespe, 207 Cal.
App. 2d 10, 24 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1962) (fire caused by blasting in remote area).
233 The strict liability rule, however, has been strongly criticized as in-
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by environmental conditions. The social utility of property develop-
ment overrides the relatively slight risk of damage and justifies the
withholding of liability unless fault is established. 23 4  This dual
rationale incorporates a rough balancing technique of limited scope
that could well achieve equitable results, as well as predictability, in
allocating losses from blasting and like conduct by private individ-
uals.235 The cases, however, indicate a judicial disposition to apply
the same rules that govern private activities to the solution of inverse
liability claims against public entities, without taking into account the
significant differences between private and public undertakings that
may alter the balance of interests.236
(2) Escaping Fire and Chemicals
Claims against public entities for negligently permitting fire to
escape from the control of public employees and damage nearby prop-
erty are deemed to be grounded upon tort theory in California.
23 7
Until recently, such claims ordinarily have withered on the vine of
sovereign immunity.238 However, while the courts generally have
refused to regard escaping fire as a basis for inverse liability when
only mere negligence is involved,23 9 it is clear that in a proper case
the inverse remedy would be fully applicable. For example, it has
been held that a public rubbish disposal dump operated pursuant to a
plan that deliberately keeps fire burning to consume trash deposited
consistent with a rational balancing of the competing interests in the light
of modern technology. See, e.g., Reynolds v. W. H. Hinman Co., 145 Me.
343, 75 A.2d 802 (1950); Smith, Liability for Damage to Land by Blasting
(pts. 1-2), 33 HARv. L. REV. 542, 667 (1920).
234 See Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., 37 N.J. 396, 181 A.2d 487 (1962),
cited in Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 785-86, 56
Cal. Rptr. 128, 137-38 (1967); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938).
235 See Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 786, 56
Cal. Rptr. 128, 138 (1967).
236 Cf. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Southern Cal. Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n, 188 Cal. App. 2d 850, 10 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1961). But see Pumphrey
v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 250 Iowa 559, 94 N.W.2d 737 (1959), where no lia-
bility was incurred for concussion damage caused by non-negligent blasting
by a government waterway project contractor under government supervision
and in accordance with government-approved plans.
237 See Miller v. Palo Alto, 208 Cal. 74, 280 P. 108 (1929); Hanson v. Los
Angeles, 63 Cal. App. 2d 426, 147 P.2d 109 (1944).
238 See Miller v. Palo Alto, 208 Cal. 74, 280 P. 108 (1929); Hanson v. Los
Angeles, 63 Cal. App. 2d 426, 147 P.2d 109 (1944).
239 See Miller v. Palo Alto, 208 Cal. 74, 280 P. 108 (1929), in which the
inverse condemnation theory was held inapplicable where the complaint al-
leged a single act of negligence that permitted escape of fire from the city
dump. See also McNeil v. Montague, 124 Cal. App. 2d 326, 268 P.2d 497 (1954);
Western Assurance Co. v. Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist., 72 Cal.
App. 68, 237 P. 59 (1925).
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therein can expose the public entity to statutory tort liability for
intentionally maintaining a dangerous condition of public property.240
The deliberate adoption of such a plan, however, also clearly supports
inverse condemnation liability where damage results. 241 Fault, in the
form of an inherently defective plan involving the use of fire for a
public purpose, is the conceptual basis of this application of the just
compensation clause. The water seepage cases, which typically impose
inverse liability without fault, are regarded as distinguishable. 242
Water seeping from an irrigation ditch creates a relatively permanent
condition reducing the utility of the affected land as a direct conse-
quence of the functioning ("public use") of the ditch; fire escaping
from control of public employees, however, does not produce such
"direct" consequences unless the plan of use itself includes the risk of
its escape as an inherent feature of the project functioning as con-
ceived.2
43
Judicial disposition of inverse liability claims resulting from the
drifting of chemical sprays employed for such public objectives as
weed or insect control follows the same approach as the escaping fire
cases. Mere routine negligence will not support inverse liability,244
but a deliberately adopted plan of use that includes the prospect of
property damage as a necessary consequence of the application of
chemicals is recognized as actionable. 245 It should be mentioned, how-
240 Osborn v. Whittier, 103 Cal. App. 2d 609, 230 P.2d 132 (1951). See
also Pittam v. Riverside, 128 Cal. App. 57, 16 P.2d 768 (1933) (dictum).
241 See Bauer v. Ventura County, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 284-85, 289 P.2d 1, 7
(1955), expressly distinguishing Miller, McNeil and Western Assurance Co.
as instances of escaping as a result of a single act of negligence in routine
operations, and sustaining the sufficiency of a complaint for inverse con-
denation (for flood damage) based on an inherently defective plan of
construction and maintenance of a governmental project. See text accom-
panying notes 38-43 supra. This distinction was also noted in Western Assur-
ance Co. v. Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist., 72 Cal. App. 68, 77, 237
P. 59, 63 (1925), where the court observed that inverse liability would obtain
if the work that caused the fire had been done "in accordance with specific
directions of . . . plans and specifications" approved by the district and the
damage had resulted "necessarily and directly" therefrom.
242 See McNeil v. Montague, 124 Cal. App. 2d 236, 268 P.2d 497 (1954).
243 See note 241 supra.
244 Neff v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 142 Cal. App. 2d 755, 299 P.2d 359 (1956);
St. Francis Drainage Dist. v. Austin, 227 Ark. 167, 296 S.W.2d 668 (1956);
Dallas County Flood Control Dist. v. Benson, 157 Tex. 617, 306 S.W.2d 350
(1957).
245 See St. Francis Drainage Dist. v. Austin, 227 Ark. 167, 296 S.W.2d 668
(1956) (dictum); Dallas County Flood Control Dist. v. Benson, 157 Tex. 617,
306 S.W.2d 350 (1957) (dictum); cf. Bauer v. Ventura County, 45 Cal. 2d 276,
289 P.2d 1 (1955); Cope v. Live Stock Sanitary Bd., 176 So. 657 (La. App. 1937)
(death of mule by ingestion of arsenic solution during anti-tick dipping op-
eration).
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ever, that the trend of the private law cases involving damage from
chemical sprays appears to be toward imposition of strict liability.
2 6
The tendency of the courts to employ private law analogies in inverse
liability cases suggests that the latter decisions may follow suit.
The escaping fire and chemical drift cases further illustrate the
overlap of tort and inverse remedies against public entities in Califor-
nia. Under current statutory law, however, the overlap is of little
importance because an injured property owner today appears to have
fully adequate remedial weapons in tort litigation with respect to both
escaping fire247 and chemical drift.248 There may be some procedural
advantages, however, in pursuing the inverse remedy in certain situa-
246 See Note, Crop Dusting: Two Theories of Liability?, 19 HASTINGs L.J.
476 (1968). Technical data cited in this note suggest that substantial drift
from chemical applications is an inherent risk of dusting and spraying opera-
tions notwithstanding use of reasonable care.
247 The former doctrine of sovereign immunity has been supplanted by
a statutory rule making public entities liable, except where otherwise pro-
vided by statute, for the tortious acts and omissions of their employees. CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 815.2. Although there is a specific statutory immunity for "any
injury caused in fighting fires," CAL. GOV'T CODE § 850.4, this immunity would
not preclude governmental tort liability for negligently permitting a fire
started or attended by public employees to escape. There are four theories
that are available to supplant immunity. First, negligently permitting the
fire to escape is probably not within the purview of the immunity for "fight-
ing fires." A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALiFoRViu GovRmrENT TORT LIABIITY § 7.29
(Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1964). Secondly, there is an express statutory liabil-
liability for negligently or willfully permitting a fire to escape. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 13007. This section, although framed in general terms, applies
to public entities and their employees. Flournoy v. State, 57 Cal. 497, 370 P.2d
331, 20 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1962). This section supersedes (that is, "otherwise pro-
vides") the immunity provisions of the Government Code. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 815 (introductory exception); A. VAN ALSTYNE, supra §§ 5.11, 5.28. Thirdly,
negligently or deliberately permitting a fire under the control of a public em-
ployee to escape appears to constitute a failure to exercise reasonable dili-
gence to discharge a mandatory duty imposed by statute. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 13000; CAL. PuB. REsoURCEs CODE § 4422. This is a basis of
governmental liability under CAL. GOv'T CODE § 815.6. Fourthly, escaping
fire would, in some cases, be actionable as a dangerous condition of public
property. Osborn v. Whittier, 103 Cal. App. 2d 609, 230 P.2d 132 (1951); CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 835.
248 Although governmental use of dangerous chemicals for pest control
purposes is expressly authorized by statute, CAL. Acrac. CODE §§ 14002, 14063,
14093, such authorization does not relieve the user from liability for property
damage caused thereby. Id. §§ 14003, 14034. Moreover, use of pesticides in
such a manner as to cause "any substantial drift" is a misdemeanor, the
commission of which appears to be an actionable tort. Id. §§ 9, 12972; Note,
Crop Dusting: Two Theories of Liability?, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 476, 486-87 (1968).
However, the applicability of the Agricultural Code provisions to govern-
mental entities, and their interrelationship to the Tort Claims Act of 1963,
are in need of clarification. See note 330 infra.
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(3) Privileged Entry Upon Private Property
In the course of performing their duties, public officers often have
need, and commonly are authorized by statute, to enter private prop-
erty to make inspections and surveys, abate public nuisances, and per-
form other governmental functions.250  These official entries and
other related activities on private property, if restricted to reasonable
performance of public duties, are privileged and do not constitute a
basis of personal tort liability of the public officer.251 If, however,
the privilege is abused by the commission of a tortious act in the course
of the entry, the common law regards the officer as personally liable
ab initio for both the original trespass and all resulting injuries.252
The Tort Claims Act of 1963 rejects the ab initio approach, but does
recognize liability of both the public entity and its employee for tort-
ious injuries inflicted by the latter during an otherwise privileged
entry.25
3
249 Actions to impose statutory tort liability for a dangerous condition of
public property, note 247 supra, are subject to certain defenses not available
in inverse condemnation. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 835.2, 835.4 (lack of
notice and reasonableness of entity's actions after notice). See also id. § 830.6
(immunity for injury resulting from defective plan or design where not
wholly unreasonable at time of adoption); Note, Sovereign Liability for De-
fective or Dangerous Plan or Design-California Government Code Section
830.6, 19 HAsTmGS L.J. 584 (1968).
250 See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1242 (surveys of land required for
public use); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 2270(f) (investigations and nui-
sance abatement work by mosquito abatement district); CAL. WATER CODE §
2229 (surveys for irrigation district purposes). For a comprehensive list of
citations, see Van Alstyne, A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity, in 5
CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 110-19
(1963). Entries into private buildings, unless consent is given by the owner,
must be supported by a valid search warrant. See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Under the cited
decisions, however, the warrant may authorize an "area inspection," and need
not be particularized to individual structures.
251 Giacona v. United States, 257 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1958); Onick v. Long,
154 Cal. App. 2d 381, 316 P.2d 427 (1957); Commonwealth v. Carr, 312 Ky.
393, 227 S.W.2d 904 (1950); Johnson v. Steele County, 240 Minn. 154, 60 N .2d
32 (1953); 1 F. HAPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw or TORTS § 1.20, at 56-57 (1956);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 211 (1934).
252 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 214 (1934), has apparently been approved as
the California rule. Onick v. Long, 154 Cal. App. 2d 381, 316 P.2d 427 (1957);
Reichhold v. Sommarstrom Inv. Co., 83 Cal. App. 2d 173, 256 P. 592 (1927).
See also Heinze v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 24 A.2d 917 (1942); 1 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.21, at 58-59 (1956).
253 The California Tort Claims Act of 1963 declares public entities and
public employees immune from tort liability for authorized official entries
upon private property, but this immunity does not extend to injuries caused
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Freedom from trespass liability, however, does not absolve the
public entity from inverse condemnation liability. For example, al-
though a public entity may be privileged to enter and remove obstruc-
tions from drainage channels running through private property as a
means of promoting flood protection, damage sustained by adjoining
private property as a result of the work performed (e.g., piling of rock
and debris on channel banks) is compensable. 254  Similarly, a public
entity acts fully within its rights in undertaking to install storm
drains within an easement traversing private land, until its operations
substantially obstruct normal use of the land in ways not shown to be
essential to the performance of the work.2 55
The fact that the entry is pursuant to statutory authority does
not alter the result. Statutory authorizations for official entries
upon private lands generally are held to be valid on their face2 56 since
the courts feel constrained to assume that the contemplated interfer-
ence with private property rights ordinarily will be slight in extent,
temporary in duration, and de minimis in amount. As the leading
California case of Jacobsen v. Superior Court257 declares, the privilege
of entry for official purposes is available only for "such innocuous
entry and superficial examination ... as would not in the nature of
things seriously impinge upon or impair the rights of the owner to the
use and enjoyment of his property. '258 Minor and trivial injuries, in
effect, are noncompensable; the public purpose to be served by the
entry requires subordination of private property rights to this limited
by the employee's "own negligent or wrongful act or omission." CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 821.8; see A. VAx ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LvaBLrr
§ 5.62 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1964).
254 Frustuck v. Fairfax, 212 Cal. App. 2d 345, 28 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1963);
Bernard v. State, 127 So. 2d 774 (La. 1961). See also Podesta v. Lindeen Irr.
Dist., 141 Cal. App. 2d 38, 296 P.2d 401 (1956), where the burdening of a
servitude for drainage by widening and deepening a normally dry watercourse
traversing a private ranch, thereby preventing its use for agricultural pur-
poses, was held compensable.
255 There are many examples of actionable interferences. Heimann v.
Los Angeles, 30 Cal. 2d 746, 185 P.2d 597 (1947) (substantial temporary inter-
ference with access to adjoining property by storage of construction mate-
rials and erection of sheds upon and in front of plaintiff's land); O'Dea v.
San Mateo County, 139 Cal. App. 2d 659, 294 P.2d 171 (1956) (obstruction of
surface for over ten months by storing drainage pipes on easement while
awaiting underground installation).
256 Irvine v. Citrus Pest Dist. No. 2, 62 Cal. App. 2d 378, 144 P.2d 857
(1944); Contra Costa County v. Cowell Portland Cement Co., 126 Cal. App. 267,
14 P.2d 606 (1932) (by implication); see Annot., 29 A.L.R. 1409 (1924).
257 192 Cal. 319, 219 P. 986 (1923).
258 Id. at 329, 219 P. at 991. See also Dancy v. Alabama Power Co., 198
Ala. 504, 73 So. 901 (1916); 2 P. NIcHoLs, Emaim a DOMAIN § 6.11, at 379-83
(rev. 3d ed. 1963).
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extent, at least.259
The threatened entry that the owner was seeking to prevent in
Jacobsen contemplated the occupation of parts of the owner's ranch
for two months by municipal water district employees, and the use of
power machinery to make test borings and excavations to determine
the suitability of the premises for use as a possible water reservoir.
Recognizing that the resulting damages could not be a basis of tort
liability, absent negligence, wantonness, or malice, the supreme court
nevertheless concluded that they would constitute a compensable
damaging of the owner's right to possession and enjoyment of his
property. The district's argument of necessity was rejected. The fact
that extensive soil testing, to depths up to 150 feet, was deemed essen-
tial to an intelligent evaluation of the suitability of the site for reser-
voir purposes-a determination that necessarily must precede any de-
cision to institute condemnation proceedings-was held insufficient to
justify an uncompensated interference of this magnitude with private
property.
The specific holding in the Jacobsen case has been obviated by a
special statutory procedure, enacted in 1959, as section 1242.5 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Public entities with power to condemn land
for reservoir purposes are authorized to petition the superior court
for an order permitting an exploratory survey of private lands to
determine their suitability for reservoir use, when the owner's consent
cannot be obtained by agreement. The order, however, must be con-
ditioned upon the deposit with the court of cash security, in an amount
fixed by the court, sufficient to compensate the owner for damage
resulting from the entry, survey, and exploration, plus costs and at-
torneys fees incurred by the owner.
While section 1242.5 is limited to reservoir site investigations,
other types of privileged official entries may also cause substantial
private detriment..2 60  But, as discussed below, this provision con-
stitutes a useful starting point for generalized legislative treatment
of the problem of damage from privileged official entries upon private
property.
259 See Heimann v. Los Angeles, 30 Cal. 2d 746, 185 P.2d 597 (1947) (no
inverse recovery for personal discomfort or annoyance or for insubstantial
interferences with property); cf. People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works
v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 352 P.2d 519, 9 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1960) (semble).
260 See Onorato Bros. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 336 Mass. 54,
142 N.E.2d 389 (1957) (highway route survey); Wood v. Mississippi Power
Co., 245 Miss. 103, 146 So. 2d 546 (1962) (utility line route survey); Vreeland
v. Forest Park Reser. Comm'n, 82 N.J. Eq. 349, 87 A. 435 (Ct. of Err. and
App. 1913) (fire prevention); Litchfield v. Bond, 186 N.Y. 66, 78 N.E. 719
(1906) (county boundary survey); Rhyne v. Mount Holly, 251 N.C. 521, 112
S.E.2d 40 (1960) (weed abatement work); cases cited in notes 254-45 supra.
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(4) Physical Occupation or Destruction by Mistake
It is well settled that, absent an overriding emergency, the inten-
tional seizure or destruction of private property by a governmental
entity acting in furtherance of its statutory powers subjects it to in-
verse condemnation liability.261 De facto appropriations of this type,
however, often represent an erroneous exercise of governmental
power based upon a negligent, or otherwise mistaken, assumption that
the government owns the property taken. In such cases, the view that
the entity's actions are merely tortious (and thus nonactionable as
against the immune sovereign) generally has been rejected where
the dispossession is a permanent one to which a public use has at-
tached.262  For example, inverse liability obtains where the entity
constructs public improvements upon private land which its project
officers negligently assume has been acquired for that purpose.2 63 The
same result has been reached where the mistake was purely one of
law, in that the officers acted in the mistaken belief that under pend-
ing condemnation proceedings an immediate entry was authorized.264
Destruction of buildings and other improvements on a private ranch
by naval personnel engaged in aerial gunnery and bombing practice,
in the erroneous belief that the ranch was included within a naval
gunnery range, has also been held a compensable taking.26 5
Although the cited cases appear to be analogous to private tres-
pass actions, 260 significant differences may be noted. Although the
261 See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); 2 P. NIcHOLs, EMIxr Do-
MAIN § 6.21, at 393 (rev. ed. 1963); Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of
Inverse Condemnation: Deliberately Inflicted Injury or Destruction, 20 STAN.
L. REV. 617 (1968) (emergency exception). See also Wofford Heights Ass'n
v. Kern County, 219 Cal. App. 2d 34, 32 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1963) (unintentional
but foreseeable damage held compensable).
262 See, e.g., Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d 565 (Ct. Cl. 1965);
Department of H'ways v. Gisborne, 391 S.W.2d 714 (Ky. 1965).
263 Napa v. Navoni, 56 Cal. App. 2d 289, 132 P.2d 566 (1942) (water pipe-
line laid in plaintiff's land under mistaken belief that easement had been
acquired); Department of H'ways v. Gisborne, 391 S.W.2d 714 (Ky. 1965)
(contractor in good faith reliance proceeded with improvement work on land
which highway engineer mistakenly staked out); cf. Road Dep't v. Cuyahoga
Wrecking Co., 171 So. 2d 50 (Fla. App. 1965) (highway contractor removed
building from land not yet condemned, apparently by mistake).
264 Bridges v. Alaska Housing Auth., 375 P.2d 696 (Alas. 1962) (owner
awarded value of building, attorneys fees, and damages for mental anguish
when private structure destroyed). See also R.J. Widen Co. v. United States,
357 F.2d 988 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (United States Corps of Engineers mistakenly
commenced flood control work under joint federal-state project three months
before state, pursuant to agreement, "took" the property by condemnation).
265 Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d 565 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
206 Compare Napa v. Navoni, 56 Cal. App. 2d 289, 139 P.2d 566 (1942)
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public trespass may be capable of being discontinued, the injured
party does not have the option, ordinarily open to private litigants, to
seek recovery for past damages together with specific removal of the
offending structure or condition.267  Where a public use has inter-
vened, the courts ordinarily refuse to enjoin continuance of the in-
vasion, and relegate the plaintiff instead to recovery of compensation
for whatever property damage inflicted, both past and future.268 In
addition, the plaintiffs in factually similar private tort litigation may
recover not only for property damage but also for personal discomfort
and annoyance caused by the trespassory invasion,269 while these
elements of damage generally are excluded from the purview of in-
verse condemnation. 270 The overlap of the tort and inverse remedies
under present California law is thus somewhat less than complete
duplication.
2 7 1
I1. Conclusions and Recommendations: A "Risk Analysis"
Approach to Inverse Liability
The foregoing review of California inverse condemnation law, as
applied to claims based on unintentional damaging of private prop-
(inverse condemnation) with Slater v. Shell Oil Co., 58 Cal. App. 2d 864, 137
P.2d 713 (1943) (trespass).
267 Cf. Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Cal. 2d 265, 239 P.2d 625 (1952). See
generally Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265, 288 P.2d 507
(1955); Slater v. Shell Oil Co., 58 Cal. App. 2d 864, 137 P.2d 713 (1943);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 161, comment b (1965). The option is
ordinarily denied, however, when the offending structure is maintained as a
necessary part of a public utility operation. Thompson v. Illinois Central R.R.,
191 Iowa 35, 179 N.W. 191 (1920); McCormick, Damages for Anticipated Injury
to Land, 37 HARv. L. REV. 574, 584-85 (1924).
268 Frustuck v. Fairfax, 212 Cal. App. 2d 345, 28 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1963); cf.
Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d
548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964) (denial of injunction to prevent excessive jet
aircraft noise by commercial planes landing and taking off at public airport
held proper in view of public interest in continuation of air transportation).
269 Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265, 288 P.2d 507
(1955).
270 See People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 352
P.2d 519, 9 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1960); Heimann v. Los Angeles, 30 Cal. 2d 746, 185
P.2d 597 (1947); Brandenburg v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 45
Cal. App. 2d 306, 114 P.2d 14 (1941). Contra, Bridges v. Alaska Housing Auth.,
375 P.2d 696 (Alas. 1962).
271 Although common law governmental immunity is no longer a defense
to trespass as a remedy against California public entities for mistaken occu-
pation or destruction of private property, relief in tort may not always be
available in light of the special defenses included in the California Tort
Claims Act of 1963. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 820.2 (discretionary conduct),
820.4 (non-negligent enforcement of law), 821.8 (trespass within express or
implied authority).
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erty, discloses three major areas of difficulty discussed below to which
legislative reform efforts should be directed.
A. Clarification of the Basis of Inverse Liability
One of the most striking features of California decisional law is
the dual approach to inverse liability. In some types of cases (e.g.,
landslide, water seepage, stream diversion, concussion), present rules
appear to impose inverse liability without regard for fault; in others
(e.g., drainage obstruction, flood control, pollution) an element of
fault is required to be pleaded and proved by the claimant. The con-
fusion produced by this judicial ambivalence has been compounded,
in part, by an understandable tendency of counsel to pursue the "safe"
course of action. Faced by appellate dicta to the effect that an inverse
liability claimant cannot recover against a public entity without the
pleading and proving of a claim actionable against a private person
under analogous circumstances, 272 plaintiffs' lawyers often have pro-
ceeded, it seems, on the erroneous assumption, readily accepted by
defense counsel and thus by the court, that a showing of fault was
indispensable to success. Appellate opinions in such cases, after trial,
briefing, argument, and decision predicated upon that assumption, do
little to dispel the theoretical cleavage. 273  Only occasionally have
reported opinions explicitly noted, ordinarily without attempting to
reconcile, the interchangeability of the "fault" and "no fault"
approaches to inverse liability.274 Even the recent Albers decision,
which at least set the record straight by revitalizing the position that
inverse liability may be imposed without fault, did not undertake a
thorough canvass of the law, but rather left many doctrinal ends
dangling. Uniform statutory standards for invocation of inverse con-
demnation responsibility thus would be a significant improvement in
California law, both as an aid to predictability and counseling of
claimants and as a guide to intelligent planning of public improve-
ment projects.
It already has been suggested above that the concept of fault as a
basis of inverse liability includes a broad range of liability-producing
acts and omissions that, in individual cases, are not required to be
272 See, e.g., Archer v. Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 24, 119 P.2d 1, 4 (1941).
Statements to this effect in Archer and other cases were characterized as
dicta in Albers v. Los Angeles County, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1965).
273 See, e.g., Bauer v. Ventura County, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955);
Ward Concrete Co. v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 149 Cal. App.
2d 840, 309 P.2d 546 (1957).
274 See, e.g., Granone v. Los Angeles County, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 34 (1965); Beckley v. Reclamation Bd., 205 Cal. App. 2d 734, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 428 (1962).
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identified with precision, provided the operative facts are located
within the extremes.275 If private property is damaged by the con-
struction of a public improvement, the cases relate that "the state or
its agency must compensate the owner therefore . . . whether the
damage was intentional or the result of negligence on the part of the
governmental agency." 276 In this typical pre-Albers statement, the
kind of fault becomes immaterial, but fault is assumed to be essential.
Yet the case 277 cited in principal support of the quoted statement is
also the chief authority relied upon in Albers to sustain liability
without fault. Reconciliation of the seeming inconsistency, it is be-
lieved, is possible in a manner consistent with acceptable policy con-
siderations.
Each of the variant kinds of fault that are recognized as a po-
tential basis for inverse liability includes the fundamental notion that
the public entity, by adopting and implementing a plan of improve-
ment or operation, either negligently or deliberately exposed private
property to a risk of substantial but unnecessary loss. Negligence in
this context often appears to be an after-the-fact explanation, couched
in familiar tort terminology, of what originally amounted to the
deliberate taking of a calculated risk.278 Foreseeable damage is not
necessarily inevitable damage. Plan or design characteristics that in-
corporate the probability of property damage under predictable cir-
cumstances may later be judicially described as "negligently" drawn;
yet, in the original planning process, the plan or design with its known
275 See text accompanying notes 38-43 supra.
276 Clement v. Reclamation Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628, 641, 220 P.2d 897, 905
(1950). See also Youngblood v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 56
Cal. 2d 603, 364 P.2d 840, 15 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1961).
277 Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 P. 317 (1885).
278 See Smith v. Los Angeles, 66 Cal. App. 2d 562, 578, 153 P.2d 69, 78
(1944): 'During this [six year] period the district had ample time and
opportunity to make adequate provision for the care of the diverted waters
and for the protection of plaintiffs' property. It was simply a choice of means
deliberately made by the governing board of the district in selecting one
method of controlling possible future floods as against another." (Emphasis
added). See also Lubin v. Iowa City, 257 Iowa 383, 391, 131 N.W.2d 765, 770
(1965), where the court said in affirming an order granting plaintiff a new
trial in an action for damages to a flooded basement caused by a break in an
80 year old water main installed six feet beneath the surface without a rea-
sonable inspection capability that "[a] city ... so operating knows that even-
tually a break will occur, water will escape and in all probability flow onto
the premises of another with resulting damages .... The risk from such a
method of operation should be borne by the water supplier who is in a posi-
tion to spread the cost among the consumers who are in fact the true benefi-
ciaries of this practice and of the resulting savings in inspection and mainte-
nance costs." (Emphasis added). Cf. Broeder, Torts and Just Compensation:
Some Personal Reflections, 17 HAsTGs L.J. 217, 224 (1965).
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inherent risks may have been approved by responsible public officers
as being adequate and acceptable for non-legal reasons. For example,
the damage, although foreseeable, may have been estimated at a low
order of probability, frequency, and magnitude, while the added cost
of incorporating minimal safeguards may have been unacceptably
high in proportion to available manpower, time and budget. 2 9 Again,
additional or supplementary work necessary to avoid or reduce the
risk, although contemplated as part of long-term project plans, may
have been deferred due to more urgent priorities in the commitment of
public resources. The governmental decision (whether made by de-
sign engineers, departmental administrators, budget officers, or
elected policy-makers) to proceed with the project under these condi-
tions thus may have represented a rational (and hence by definition
non-negligent) balancing of risk against practicability of risk avoid-
ance.
2 8 0
279 The legislative approach to governmental tort liability for dangerous
conditions of public property includes directly analogous considerations. There
are several examples. First, tort liability cannot be based upon defects in the
plan or design of a public improvement where reasonable grounds for official
approval thereof existed at 'the time the plan or design was accepted. Cabell
v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 150, 430 P.2d 34, 60 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1967); CAL. Gov'T CODE
§ 830.6; Note, Sovereign Liability for Defective or Dangerous Plan or Design-
California Government Code Section 830.6, 19 HAsTINGs L.J. 584 (1968). Sec-
ondly, a condition of public property which causes injury is not regarded as
"dangerous" if the court determines, as a matter of law, that the risk of harm
thereby created was minor, trivial, or insignificant in light of the surrounding
circumstances. -CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.2; see Barrett v. Claremont, 41 Cal. 2d
70, 256 P:2d 977 (1953). Thirdly, even if the condition is a dangerous one,
liability is not imposed if the public agency establishes that either "(a) ...
the act or omission that created the condition was reasonable ... [as] deter-
mined by weighing the probability and gravity of potential injury... against
the practicability and cost of taking alternative action .... " or "(b) . . .the
action it took to protect against the risk ... or its failure to take such action
was reasonable . .. [as] determined by taking into consideration the time
and opportunity it had to take action and by weighing the probability and
gravity of potential injury .. . against the practicability and cost of protect-
ing against the risk of such injury." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835.4; see A. VAN
ALSTYNE, CALIFoRNm GOVERNMENT TORT ILTABIrTY §§ 6.29, 6.30 (Cal. Cont.
Educ. Bar ed. 1964).
2.80 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302, comment a (1965). Evi-
dence that planners or designers failed to employ sound engineering practices,
e.g., Granone v. Los Angeles County, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 42 Cal. Rptr. 34
(1965) (expert testimony), may thus be explainable on grounds other than
negligence. The deficient culverts in Granone, for example, may have rep-
resented an intermediate or temporary stage of the channel improvement
project; the county may have elected to bridge the stream by a less expensive
technique (earth fill pierced by culverts) within current budget appropria-
tions, rather than the more expensive expedient of a wide-span steel and con-
crete bridge. On the other hand, the decision to culvert rather than bridge
may, in fact, have been due to negligence or incompetence of the responsible
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When the government, acting in furtherance of public objectives,
has thus taken a calculated risk that private property might be dam-
aged, and such damage has eventuated, a decision as to inverse liabil-
ity should be preceded by a discriminating appraisal of the relevant
facts. The usual doctrinal approach surely is consistent with this
view: "The decisive consideration is whether the owner of the dam-
aged property if uncompensated would contribute more than his
proper share to the public undertaking."281  But whether the loss
constitutes more than a "proper" share depends upon a careful bal-
ancing of the public and private interests involved, so far as those in-
terests are identified, accepted as relevant, and exposed to factual
scrutiny.
Assuming foreseeability of damage, the critical factors in the
initial stage of the balancing process relate to the practicability of
preventive measures, including possible changes in design or location.
If prevention is technically and fiscally possible, the infliction of
avoidable damage is not "necessary" to the accomplishment of the
public purpose.28 2 The governmental decision to proceed with the
project without incorporating the essential precautionary modifica-
tions in the plan thus represents more than a mere determination that
effective damage prevention is not expedient. It is also a deliberate
policy decision to shift the risk of future loss to private property
owners rather than to absorb such risk as a. part of the cost of the
improvement paid for by the community at large. In effect, that
decision treats private damage costs, anticipated or anticipatable, but
uncertain in timing or amount or both, as a deferred risk of the proj-
ect. If and when they materialize, however, the present analysis
suggests that those costs should be recognized as planed costs in-
officers. The latter conclusion, if true, would merely move the risk analysis
back an additional step. Employment of engineers, designers, and managers
to develop and execute public improvement projects of substantial size and
complexity entails a calculated risk of human error resulting in defective
plans. An alternate analysis might emphasize the view that standards of per-
sonnel recruitment, methods of qualification investigation, and levels of com-
pensation may not have been pitched at a level reasonably calculated to
exclude the risk of employing untrained, incompetent, and careless designers
and planners.
281 Clement v. Reclamation Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628, 642, 220 P.2d 897, 905
(1950).
282 See House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384,
392, 153 P.2d 950, 954 (1944): "In view of the organic rights to acquire, pos-
sess and protect property and to due process and equal protection of the laws,
the principles of nonliability and damnumrn absque iwjuria are not applicable
when in the exercise of the police power, private, personal and property rights
are interfered with, injured or impaired in a manner or by a means, or to
an extent that is not reasonably necessary to serve a public purpose for the
general welfare."
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flicted in the interest of fulfilling the public purpose of the project,
and thus subject to a duty to pay just compensation. 28 3
On the other hand, if the foreseeable type of damage is deemed
technically impossible or grossly impracticable to prevent within the
limits of the fiscal capability of the public entity, the decision to pro-
ceed with the project despite the known danger represents an official
determination that public necessity overrides the risk of private loss.
The shifting of the risk of loss to private resources is not sought to be
supported on grounds of mere prudence or expedience but on the
view that the public welfare requires the project to move ahead
despite impossibility of more complete loss prevention. In this situa-
tion, an additional variable affects compensation policy. The magni-
tude of the public necessity for the project at the particular location,
with the particular design or plan conceived for it, must be assessed
in comparison to available alternatives for accomplishing the same
underlying governmental objective with lower risk, but presumably
higher costs (i.e., higher construction and/or maintenance expense,
or diminished operational effectiveness).284 Unavoidable damage of
slight or moderate degree, especially where widely shared or offset by
reciprocal benefits, does not always demand compensation under this
approach. Such damage may be reasonably consistent with the
normal expectations of property owners and with community assump-
tions regarding equitable allocation of public improvement costs. But
relevant reliance interests ordinarily do embrace an understanding
that the stability of existing property arrangements will not be dis-
turbed arbitrarily, or in substantial degree, by governmental improve-
ments, and that project plans ordinarily will seek to follow those
courses of action that will minimize unavoidable damage so far as
possible.28 5
283 See Smith v. Los Angeles, 66 Cal. App. 2d 562, 578, 153 P.2d 69, 78
(1944).
284 Cf. Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 359, 144 P.2d 818, 828
(1943) (Edmonds, J.) (concurring opinion): "The factors to be considered
in deciding an inverse condemnation claim are, on the one hand, the magni-
tude of the damage to the owner of the land, and, on the other, the desirability
and necessity for the particular type of improvement and the danger that the
granting of compensation will tend to retard or prevent it .... In addition,
before compensation may be denied, the court must find that the particular
improvement be not unreasonably more drastic or injurious than necessary to
achieve the public objective." (Emphasis added).
285 See Clement v. Reclamation Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628, 220 P.2d 897 (1950)
(reliance on flood protection afforded by existing levees); Podesta v. Linden
Irr. Dist., 141 Cal. App. 2d 38, 296 P.2d 401 (1956) (reliance upon continuance
of drainage channel in natural condition); Los Angeles County Flood Control
Dist. v. Abbot, 24 Cal. App. 2d 728, 76 P.2d 188 (1938) (reliance on accretions
of sand); Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 2d 460, 52 P.2d 585 (1935) (reli-
ance on continued water level of recreational lake).
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The importance of the project to the public health, safety and
welfare, in relation to the degree of unavoidable risk and magnitude
of probable harm to private property, thus constitutes the criterion for
estimating the reasonableness of the decision to proceed. A change in
the location of a highway, for example, may add only slightly to length
and total construction costs, yet may reduce substantially the fre-
quency or the extent of property damage reasonably to be anticipated
from interference by the highway with storm water runoff. Alter-
nately, the change might make it possible to include more adequate
drainage features in the project plans without exceeding budgetary
limits. On the other hand, the erection of a massive water storage
tank at a particular location may entail a relatively low risk of land-
slide under foreseeable conditions, yet be justified by emergency con-
siderations (e.g., impending failure of other facilities), the need for
adequate hydrostatic pressure pecularily available by storage at that
location, or the costs that pumping equipment, together with longer
distribution lines and access roads, would entail if a less suitable loca-
tion were selected. The calculated risk implicit in such governmental
decisions appears capable of rational judicial review, particularly if
aided by statutory standards relevant to compensation policy. The
factual elements deserving consideration, for example, do not appear
unlike those specified in present statutory rules governing the liability
in tort of public entities for dangerous conditions of public property.280
Although the preceding discussion has centered chiefly upon the
concept of fault as a basis of inverse liability, it seems evident that the
risk analysis here advanced also could be applied fruitfully in cases,
like Albers, in which inverse liability obtains notwithstanding un-
foreseeability of injury and absence of fault. Albers may simply
embody an implicit hypothesis that practically every governmental
decision to construct a public improvement involves, however re-
motely, at least some unforeseeable risks that physical damage to prop-
erty may result. In the presumably rare instance where substantial
damage does in fact eventuate "directly" from the project,287 and is
2s See note 279 supra. It is clear, however, that the conditional "plan or
design" immunity, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.6, withholds tort liability in precisely
the same situations in which well settled rules of inverse condemnation law
impose liability. Compare Cabell v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 150, 430 P.2d 34, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 476 (1967) (tort liability withheld) with Granone v. Los Angeles County,
231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 42 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1965) (inverse liability affirmed).
287 Even though the risk may be deemed remote or even unforeseeable,
the damage that eventuates is actionable if it results "directly" from the
improvement. See Albers v. Los Angeles County, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 298 P.2d 129,
42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965); text accompanying notes 27-35 supra. See also House
v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 397, 153 P.2d 950,
957 (1944) (Traynor, J.) (concurring opinion): "It is of no avail to defend-
ant that the invasion of plaintiff's property in the manner in which it hap-
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capable of more equitable absorption by the beneficiaries of the proj-
ect (ordinarily either taxpayers or consumers of service paid for by
fees or charges) than by the injured owner,28 8 absence of fault may
pened was not forseeable .... The public purpose was not the mere con-
struction of the improvement but the protection that it would afford against
floods. The dangers inherent in the improvement would cause injury only
when storms put the flood control system to a test. The injury sustained by
plaintiff was therefore not too remote."
288 The conclusion in Albers that the County of Los Angeles was a better
loss distributor than the plaintiff property owners (the losses in question were
presumably not of a kind ordinarily covered by insurance) is unexceptional.
But many public entities have very limited fiscal resources. See Van Alstyne,
Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Ray.
463, 465 n.7 (1963), where "the tremendous disparities in size, population and
fiscal capacity" of local public entities are pointed out. It is evidenced by
the fact that some counties, cities, and special districts "function on annual
fiscal budgets of less than $50,000, while other cities, counties and districts
have budgets averaging more than that sum per day." See generally [1965-
1966] CAL. CONTROLLER ANN. REP., FnAwcIAL TRANSACTIONS CONCERNING SPE-
ciAL DISTRICTS oF CALIFORNIA; J. VIEG, CALIFORNIA LocAL FINANCE (1960). The
total liability of the defendant in Albers exceeded $5,000,000. Reliance upon
loss distribution capacity as a significant criterion of inverse liability would
thus, upon occasion, result in inequitable and discriminatory treatment of
equally deserving property owners, depending upon the differing fiscal capac-
ities of the defendant public entities.
This difficulty, of course, could be minimized by development of adequate
means for funding of inverse liabilities by even the smallest of public entities.
Even if it is assumed that commercial insurance against such risks is obtain-
able at reasonable premiums, it is not entirely clear that adequate statutory
authority exists for public entities to insure against all inverse liabilities. See
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 989-991.2, 11007.4 (authorizing insurance against "any
injury"). But see id. § 810.8 (defining "injury" to mean losses that would be
actionable if inflicted by a private person). Since inverse liability may obtain
where private tort liability does not, Albers v. Los Angeles County, 62 Cal.
2d 250, 298 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965), comprehensive tort liability
insurance may still be regarded as inapplicable to some inverse claims. Exist-
ing statutory authority to fund judgment liabilities with bond issues, CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 975-78.8, is, however, clearly broad enough to include inversd
liability judgments. A. VAN ALSTNE, CATIFoRNiA GovaiNmENT TORT LIAn nY
§ 9.16 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1964). And although authority for payment
of judgments by installments, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 970.6, is, in terms, limited to
"tort" judgments, A. VAN ALSTYNE, supra, § 9.15, inverse liabilities may pos-
sibly be a form of "tort" for this purpose. See generally Douglass v. Los
Angeles, 5 Cal. 2d 123, 128, 53 P.2d 353, 355 (1935).
In principle, the existing devices for funding tort liabilities appear to
provide ample flexibility for administering inverse liabilities of the great
majority of public entities. The statutes should, however, be clarified to
avoid any doubt as to their applicability to inverse situations. In addition,
the "catastrophe" liability problem should be given appropriate legislative
attention. See Van Alstyne, A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity, in 5
CAL. LAW REvisION CoMnw'N, REPORTS, REcOMMEmNATIONs & STUDIES 308-11
(1963) (similar proposal geared to local "fiscal effort"); Borchard, State and
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be treated as simply an insufficient justification for shifting the un-
foreseeable loss from the project that caused it to be the equally
innocent owners. Absence of foreseeability, like the other factual
elements in the balancing process, is, in effect, merely a mitigating but
not necessarily exonerating circumstance.
The risk analysis here advanced, it is submitted, reconciles most
of the seemingly inconsistent judicial pronouncements as to the need
for fault as a basis of inverse liability. Consistent with the intent of
the framers of the just compensation clause to protect property in-
terests against even the best intentioned exercises of public power,28 9
it avoids as well a fruitless search for the somewhat artificial moral
elements inherent in the tort concepts of negligence and intentional
wrongs. It assumes that in the generality of cases, the governmental
entity with its superior resources is in a better position to evaluate
the nature and extent of the risks of public improvements than are
potentially affected property owners, and ordinarily is the more cap-
able locus of responsibility for striking the best bargain between ef-
ficiency and cost (including inverse liability costs) in the planning of
such improvements. 200 Reduction in total social costs of public im-
provements may also be promoted by this approach, since political
pressure generated by concern for inverse liability costs imposed upon
taxpayers may be expected to produce both a reduction in the number
of risk-prone projects undertaken and an increase in the use of in-
jury-preventing plans and techniques.291
It may be objected, of course, that the risk analysis approach as-
sumes the competence of judges and juries to sit in review upon basic
governmental policy decisions involving a high degree of discretion
and judgment-a competence explicitly denied by prevailing legisla-
tion dealing with governmental liability in tort.292  However meri-
Municipal Liability in Tort-Proposed Statutory Reform, 20 A.B.A.J. 747, 751-
52 (1934) (proposal for state "backup" insurance to supplement insurance
efforts of small local entities). The development of an equitable plan of
state-funded "backup" insurance presupposes the availability of appropriate
and fair tests of local fiscal effort to fund such protection more directly. Such
tests appear to be available. See U.S. ADVIsoRy Coivn'N ON INTERGOVERN-
mNTAL RELATIONS, MEASURES OF STATE AND LoCAL FIscAL CAPACIT AD
EFFORT (1962).
289 See Van Aistyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation:
The Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REV. 727, 771-76 (1967), for a
review of the constitutional convention proceedings which led to adoption of
the "or damaged" clause in section 14 of article I of the California Constitution.
290 Cf. Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents; an Approach to Nonfault
Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965).
291 See generally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, THE LAw OF TORTS § 11.4 (1956);
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499, 500-17 (1961).
292 See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 820.2, 830.6; A. VAr ALS'-rNE, CAmFORiA
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torious the objection may be in considering statutory tort policy,293 it
fails in the face of settled constitutional policy regarding eminent do-
main. The cases are legion that approve inverse condemnation li-
abilities grounded precisely' upon determinations of judges or juries
that the consequences of carefully considered discretionary decisions
of public officials, including decisions relating to the plan or design of
public improvements, amounted to a "taking" or a "damaging" of pri-
vate property for public use.29 4 To deny adjudicability in such cases
would effectively remove from the purview of the just compensation
clause those very situations in which compensation was clearly in-
tended to be available for the protection of property owners.29 5 In
any event, the risk analysis approach does not interfere directly with
official power or discretion to plan or undertake public projects; it
merely determines when resulting private losses must be absorbed as
part of the cost of such projects.
Certainty and predictability also would be improved significantly
by the enactment of general legislative standards for the determina-
tion of inverse liability. The "risk theory" of inverse liability, here
suggested, provides a possible approach to uniform guidelines that
would eliminate arbitrary distinctions based on fault, absence of fault,
and varieties of fault. Moreover, since it seems likely that the prac-
tical impact of the Albers decision will be more frequent imposition of
inverse liability without fault,296 it is noteworthy that the American
GOVERNMENT TORT LIABiLITY §§ 5.51-.57 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1964). See
also California Law Revision Commission, Recommendation Relating ot Sov-
ereign Immunity, in 4 CAL,. LAW REVISION CoMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMNMENDA-
TIONS & STUDIES 807, 810 (1963).
293 See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949); Ne Casek v. Los
Angeles, 233 Cal. App. 2d 131, 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1965). But see Van Alstyne,
Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
463, 473-91 (1963).
294 There are two leading California decisions. Bauer v. Ventura County,
45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955); House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control
Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 153 P.2d 950 (1944).
Cases in other states are discussed in Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation:
The Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 3.
Imposition of inverse liability upon public entities for defectively designed
public structures is consistent with the trend in private tort law toward
imposition of liability upon architects and engineers for defective plans. See
Comment, Architect Tort Liability in Preparation of Plans and Specifications,
55 CALIF. L. REV. 1361 (1967).
295 See Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation:
The Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REV. 727 (1967).
296 See text accompanying notes 9-35 supra. Despite the implications of
the Albers decision, however, subsequent inverse litigation has continued to
revolve principally around the concept of fault. See, e.g., Sutfin v. State, 261
A.C.A. 39, 67 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1968) (flooding caused by highway improvement
and related flood control works).
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Law Institute has under consideration a proposal to restate the law of
strict tort liability for abnormally dangerous activities by reference to
factors not unlike those suggested as appropriate to the "risk theory."
Determination whether an activity is "abnormally dangerous," for ex-
ample, would be determined as a matter of law (i.e., not as a jury ques-
tion) by considering such factors as the degree of risk, gravity of po-
tential harm, availability of methods for avoiding the risk, extent of
common participation in the activity, appropriateness to the locality,
and social and economic importance to the community of the activ-
ity.297  Limitations upon strict liability in tort have been recom-
mended also where the damage was caused by the intervention of an
unforeseeable force of nature (i.e., "act of God") ,298 where the plain-
tiff assumed the risk,299 and where the injury was due to the abnor-
mally sensitive nature of the plaintiff's activities. 00
A somewhat similar approach is suggested as well by the prevail-
ing interpretation of those Massachusetts statutes authorizing com-
pensation for "injury ... caused to ... real estate" by state highway
work.301 Proceeding from the premise that statutory authority for
construction of highways contemplates the use of reasonable care, the
Massachusetts courts have concluded that statutory compensation is
available only when the claimed damage was a "necessary" or "in-
evitable" result of the work when performed in a reasonably proper
manner.302 To recover, the claimant must show that the damage was
297 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 520, at 56 (Tent. Draft No. 10,
1964): "In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the
following factors are to be considered: (a) Whether the activity involves a
high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others;
(b) whether the gravity of the harm which may result from it is likely to
be great; (c) whether the risk cannot be eliminated by the exercise of rea-
sonable care; (d) whether the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) whether the activity is inappropriate to the place where it is carried on;
and (f) the value of the activity of the community." See also id. § 521,
stating that there should be no strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities required or authorized by law; liability should be governed by the
standard of reasonable care appropriate to such activity.
298 Id. § 522(a), at 82 (minority proposal by Reporter, W. Prosser, and
three Advisors).
299 Id. § 523, at 86. See also id. § 524, at 91 (contributory negligence).
300 Id. § 524A, at 93.
301 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 81, § 7 (1964). See, e.g., United States
Gypsum Co. v. Mystic River Bridge Auth., 329 Mass. 130, 106 N.E.2d 677
(1952). Although Massachusetts is a "taking" state, it has enacted an exten-
sive pattern of legislation providing for payment of compensation for damage
inflicted by governmental programs. For citations of Massachusetts cases, see
generally 2 P. NIcHoLLS, EMI:NENT DoMAIN § 6.42-.43, at 464-86 (rev. 3d ed.
1963).
302 The development of the Massachusetts doctrine is reviewed fully in
Boston Edison Co. v. Campanella & Cardi Constr. Co., 272 F.2d 430 (1st Cir.
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either (a) unavoidable by exercise of due care, or (b) economically
impracticable to avoid in fact even if technically avoidable. 30 This
dual approach thus imposes inverse (statutory) liability where the
plan, design, or method of construction of the public improvement
incorporates a deliberately accepted risk of private property injury,
but relegates to tort litigation any injuries caused by mere negligence
in carrying out the public entity's program.
3 0 4
B. De-emphasis of Private Law Analogies
The, existing judicial gloss on the just compensation clause is, to a
considerable degree, a reflection of legal concepts derived from the
private law of property and torts. The analogues, however, are un-
evenly drawn, sometimes disregarded, and occasionally confused.
There is no compelling reason why rules of law designed to adjust
jural relationships between private persons necessarily should control
the rights and duties prevailing between government and its citi-
zenry.80 5 Indeed, the definition of the constitutional term "property"
1959). This case is factually similar to Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492,
6 P. 317 (1885).
303 Boston Edison Co. v. Campanella & Cardi Constr. Co., 272 F.2d 430
(1st Cir. 1959); Murray Realty, Inc. v. Berke Moore Co., 342 Mass. 689, 175
N.E.2d 366 (1961). See also Webster Thomas Co. v. Commonwealth, 336 Mass.
130, 143 N.E.2d 216 (1957). Economic considerations are deemed relevant to
a determination of the practicability of damage avoidance. "In determining
whether the damage was inevitable, the test is not whether the method was
absolutely necessary, but whether in choosing another method so as to avoid
damage 'the expense would be so disproportionate to the end to be reached
as to make [the other method] from a business and common sense point of
view impracticable.'" Murray Realty, Inc. v. Berke Moore Co., supra at 692,
175 N.E.2d at 368. In this case, the use of explosives for demolition work had
been disapproved by the state as too risky, and the "pin and feather" method
(drilling a series of holes and driving wedges to break paving) as too expen-
sive and time-consuming. Adoption of the steel-bal-and-crane technique
was found to be a reasonable decision and, absent negligence in the actual use
of this technique, was thus a basis for statutory liability for "necessary" dam-
age that resulted. In Boston Edison Co. v. Campanella & Cardi Constr. Co.,
supra, the-twisting of the plaintiff's foundation as a result of dumping heavy
fill on unstable soil on an adjoining public improvement site was held to be
foreseeable, but the evidence failed to support a finding that avoidance tech-
niques were practicable.
304 See, e.g.,-Murray Realty, Inc. v. Berke Moore Co., 342 Mass. 689, 175
N.E.2d 366 (1961) (negligent use of steel ball for demolition work); Holbrook
v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 338 Mass. 218, 154 N.E.2d 605 (1958) (flood
damage due to negligently constructed embankment that interfered with
drainage).
305 Cf. Albers v. Los Angeles County, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1965). But see Sutfin v. State, 261 A.C.A. 39, 67 Cal. Rptr. 665
(1968); Burrows v. State, 260 A.C.A. 29, 66 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1968). See also
Milhous v. Highway Dep't, 194 S.C. 33, 8 S.E.2d 852 (1940), where the state
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-a term that merely connotes the aggregate of legal interests to
which courts will accord protection 3 6-often is different, when dam-
age has resulted from governmental conduct, from its definition when
comparable private action caused the injury. For example, the "police
power" may immunize government from liability where private per-
sons would be held responsible;3 7 conversely, public entities may be
required to pay compensation for harms which private persons may
inflict with impunity.308 Yet, in other situations (notably the water
damage cases) private law principles are invoked without hesitation as
suitable resolving formulae for inverse liability claims.309
The present uneasy marriage between private law and inverse
condemnation has none of the indicia of a comprehensively planned or
carefully developed program of legal cohabitation. Its current status
may perhaps best be understood as the product of an episodic judicial
process that often regards factual similarity as more important than
doctrinal consistency. In this process, the doctrinal treatment invoked
in flooding cases tends to beget like handling of other flooding cases,
in seepage cases of other seepage cases, and in pollution cases of other
pollution cases; cross-breeding between these genealogical lines is rel-
atively rare. The interchangeability of private and public precedents
has, of course, some superficially deceptive virtues, including con-
sistency and predictability. These apparent advantages, however,
are obtained at the risk that significant differences between the in-
terests represented by governmental functions and like private func-
tions may be overlooked and the application of legal rules conse-
quently distorted.
The water damage cases provide a useful illustration of the point.
The "common enemy" rule, which California decisions invoke to ab-
solve riparian owners from liability for damage caused by reasonable
flood protection improvements, may arguably possess merit as ap-
plied to individual proprietors. In the interest of promoting useful
land development through individual initiative, the law should not
discourage private efforts to take protective action against the emer-
gency of menacing flood waters even though other owners who act
was held liable for flooding due to the obstruction of surface waters even
though, under private water law rules, a private person would not be liable;
inverse liability for the "taking" of private property was held to be unfettered
by rules of common law.
306 See 2 P. NICHOLS, EAMNT DOmAn § 5.1, at 4-8 (rev. 3d ed. 1963).
307 See text accompanying' notes 59-78 supra. See also Van Alstyne,
Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: Deliberately Inflicted In-
jury or Destruction, 20 STAw. L. R~v. 617 (1968).
308 See text accompanying notes 9-35 supra.
309 See, e.g., Sutfin v. State, 261 A.C.A. 39, 67 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1968)
(stream water diversion); Burrows v. State, 260 A.C.A. 29, 66 Cal. Rptr. 868
(1968) (surface water diversion).
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less diligently or are unable to command the resources to protect
themselves may sustain losses as a result.310 Indeed, during the early
development of the State, prior to the proliferation of governmental
agencies explicitly charged with flood control duties, the owner's
privilege to construct protective works was perhaps indispensable to
the safeguarding of valuable agricultural lands from destruction.311
Moreover, potential damage resulting from the undertakings of indi-
viduals in this regard is not likely to be extensive or severe.
The rationale of the "common enemy" rule, however, is of dubious
validity when considered in the context of governmentally adminis-
tered flood control projects developed for the collective protection of
entire regions. The aggregation of resources involved in most flood
control district developments, as well as the comprehensive nature of
such schemes, imports a quantum jump in damage potential. For
example, a major project may well entail massive outlays of public
funds over an extended period of years for the construction of an
area-wide network of interrelated check dams, catch basins, stream
bed improvements, drainage channels, levees, and storm sewers, all
programmed for completion in a logical order dictated primarily by
engineering considerations. The realities of public finance may, at
the same time, require the cost to be distributed over a substantial
310 See note 114-18 supra.
311 See San Gabriel Valley Country Club v. Los Angeles County, 182 Cal.
392, 188 P. 554 (1920). The first comprehensive legislative approach to
regional flood control involved the creation of the Sacramento & San Joaquin
Drainage District as a state agency to implement, in cooperation with the
federal government, the flood control plans formulated by the California
Debris Commission. Cal. Stats. 1913, ch. 170, at 252; see Gray v. Reclamation
Dist. No. 1500, 174 Cal. 622, 163 P. 1024 (1917). Local flood control organiza-
tions, until recent years, consisted principally of relatively small drainage,
levee, or flood control districts created pursuant to general enabling statutes.
E.g., CAL. WATER CODE App. §§ 6-1 to -29 (1968) (corresponds to Protection
District Act of 1895, Cal. Stats. 1895, ch. 201, §§ 1-29); CAL. WATER CODE App.
§§ 9-1 to -25 (1968) (corresponds to Levee District Act of 1905, Cal. Stats.
1905, ch. 310, §§ 1-16). A few flood control districts of more sweeping geo-
graphical scope had been established by special legislation before 1939. CAL.
WATER CODE App. §§ 28-1 to -23 (1968) (Los Angeles County); CALr. WATER
CODE App. §§ 36-1 to -23 (1968) (Orange County); CAL. WATER CODE APP.
§§ 37-1 to -31 (1968) (American River 'Basin). However, the modern trend
to establishment of such districts in a majority of the counties of California
by carefully tailored special laws began in 1939 with the creation of the San
Bernardino County Flood Control Act. CAL. WATER CODE App. §§ 43-1 to -28
(1968) (corresponds to Cal. Stats. 1939, ch. 73, §§ 1-28). In the 30 years since
then, some 35 major flood control districts have been created by special act.
See CAL. WATER CODE ApP. §§ 46-106 (1968). The validity of such specially
created districts, despite the constitutional prohibition against local and spe-
cial legislation, has been affirmed repeatedly. See American River Flood
Control Dist. v. Sweet, 214 Cal. 778, 7 P.2d 1030 (1932).
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time span, either in the form of accumulations of proceeds from
periodic tax levies for capital outlay purposes or through one or more
bond issues.
Piecemeal construction, often an inescapable feature of such ma-
jor flood control projects, creates the possibility of interim damage to
some lands left exposed to flood waters while others are within the
protection of newly erected works. 31 2 Indeed, the partially completed
works, by preventing escape of waters that previously were uncon-
trolled, actually may increase the volume and velocity of flooding
with its attendant damage to the unprotected lands, often to such a
degree that private action to* repel the onslaught is completely im-
practicable.3 1 3  The prevailing private law doctrine embodied in the
"common enemy" rule, however, imposes no duty upon the public
entity to provide complete protection against flood waters; like pri-
vate riparians, the entity is its own judge of how extensively it will
proceed with its improvements. Increased or even ruinous damage
incurred by the temporarily unprotected owners, due to the inability
of the improvements to provide adequate protection to all, therefore,
is not a basis of inverse liability.314 The constitutional promise of just
compensation for property damage for public use thus yields to the
overriding supremacy of an anomalous rule of private law.
312 See, e.g., Gray v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1500, 174 Cal. 622, 163 P. 1024
(1917).
313 See Beckley v. Reclamation Bd., 205 Cal. App. 2d 734, 23 Cal. Rptr. 428
(1962); Comment, California Flood Control Projects and the Common Enemy
Doctrine, 3 STA. L. REv. 361 (1951). A collateral problem, to which little or
no attention has been given in the case law, is the question of notice. The
physical activity of one farmer in putting up protective levees might well give
adequate notice to his immediate neighbors of the need for similar self-help
to repel the "common enemy"; but it seems unrealistic to expect that lower
landowners will necessarily realize that upstream flood control improvements
being installed by a large public district, possibly many miles distant, will
augment the volume, velocity, and intensity of downstream flow to a degree
that warrants additional protective barriers. To the extent that the "common
enemy" rule assumes that the resulting downstream flood damage is the result
of the injured owner's failure to take self-protective measures, despite absence
of notice of the need to do so, it tends to function as a rule of strict liability
operating in reverse. Cf. Archer v. Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 119 P.2d 1
(1941); San Gabriel Valley Country Club v. Los Angeles County, 182 Cal. 392,
188 P. 554 (1920). The analogous problem of allocating responsibility for
protection against loss of lateral support due to normal excavations for
improvement purposes has been resolved by statutory provision for the giving
of "reasonable notice" by the improver as a condition of non-liability. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 832; see note 184 supra.
314 Gray v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1500, 174 Cal. 622, 163 P. 1024 (1917).
See also United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256 (1939); Kambish v.
Santa Clara Valley Water Conser. Dist., 185 Cal. App. 2d 107, 8 Cal. Rptr. 215
(1960); Weck v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 80 Cal. App. 2d 182,
181 P.2d 935 (1947).
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Assimilation of private concepts into inverse condemnation law
also may produce governmental liability in circumstances of dubious
justification. This result, in part, can be explained by the blurred
definitional lines which distinguish the various categories of factual
circumstances (e.g., "surface water," "stream water," flood water) to
which disparate legal treatment is accorded under private law rules.315
But it is also a consequence of the failure of the private law rules to
accord appropriate weight to the special interests that attend the
activities of governmental agencies. For example, it is arguable that
strict liability for damage resulting from the diversion of water flow-
ing in a natural watercourse may be reasonably sensible as applied to
adjoining riparian owners; a contrary view would expose settled re-
liance interests to the threat of repeated and diverse private inter-
ferences that could discourage natural resource development. Stream
diversions, however, may be integral features of coordinated flood
control, water conservation, land reclamation, or agricultural irriga-
tion projects undertaken on a large scale by public entities organized
for that very purpose.3 16 Where this is so, the community may suffer
more by general fiscal deterrents resulting from indiscriminately im-
posed strict liabilities than by specifically limited liabiites deter-
mined by the reasonableness of. the risk assumptions underlying each
diversion.
Liability in water' damage cases, it is submitted, should not be
reached by mechanical application of private law formulas. Instead,
it should be based upon a conscientious appraisal of the overall public
purposes being served, the degree to which the loss is offset by re-
ciprocal benefits, the availability to the public entity of feasible pre-
ventive measures or of adequate alternatives with lower risk poten-
tial, the severity of damage in relation to risk-bearing capabilities, the
extent to which damage of the kind sustained is generally regarded as
a normal risk of land ownership, the degree to which like damage is
distributed at large over the beneficiaries of the project or is peculiar
to the claimant, and other factors which in particular cases may be
relevant to a rational comparison of interests.317
315 See text accompanying notes 125-30, 149-50, 155-56 supra.
316 See, e.g., Clement v. Reclamation Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628, 220 P.2d 897
(1950); Rudel v. Los Angeles County, -118 Cal. 281, 50 P. 400 (1897).
317 Although most of the California decisions have tended to exemplify a
somewhat mechanical application of doctrinal precepts, e.g., Callens v. Orange
County, 129 Cal. App. 2d 255, 276-P.2d 886 (1954), some notable exceptions
can be found. E.g., Dunbar v. Humboldt Bay Mun. Water Dist., 254 Cal. App.
2d 480, 62 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1967) (damage issues); Beckley v. Reclamation Bd.,
205 Cal. App. 2d 734, 23 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1962) (liability issues); Smith v. Los
Angeles, 66 Cal. App. 2d 562, 153 P.2d 69 (1944) (liability issues). Instruc-
tive examples of explicit balancing of interests are also found in United States
v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950) (feasability of equitable cost
[Vol 20THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
UNINTENDED PHYSrCAL DAMAGE
Recent California Supreme Court decisions indicate that a balanc-
ing approach along these lines henceforth will be taken in cases in-
volving loss of stream water supply and claims of damage resulting
from interference with surface water.318  But it is far from certain
whether, absent legislative standards, the balancing process in such
cases would take into account all the peculiar factors appropriate to
governmental, but irrelevant to private, nonliability. Similarly, it is
arguable that prevailing private law rules governing liability for dam-
age due to concussion and explosion may be unrealistically severe as
applied in an inverse condemnation context.3 19
Conversely, growing national concern over problems of environ-
mental pollution320 necessarily is focused on the continuing expansion
of governmental functions capable of contributing to pollution prob-
lems (e.g., sewage collection and treatment, garbage and rubbish col-
lection) .321 Accordingly, a statutory rule of strict inverse liability
arguably may be regarded as a 'desirable incentive to the development
of intragovernmental anti-pollution programs supported by wide-
spread cost distribution. This certainly would be preferable to an un-
founded adherence to somewhat ambiguous legal concepts developed
in comparable private litigation.322
distribution deemed relevant to compensability for loss of riparian rights due
to seasonal overflowing of agricultural lands); United States v. Willow River
Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945) (appraisal of competing -private and public
interests deemed relevant to compensability for loss of head due to increase
in water level).
318 See Joslin v. Marin 'Mun. Water -Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889, 60
Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967) (stream water); Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412
P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966) (surface water); Burrows v. State, 260
A.C.A. 29, 66 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1968).
319 See text accompanying notes 297-300 supra..:
320 See, e.g., Water Quality Act, 33 U.S.C. § 466 (Supp. I, 1965); Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 466a. (Supp. II, 1966); Clean Air Act, 42,
U.S.C. § 1857 (1964); 1 FED. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADM'N, THE COST OF
CLEAN WATER: SmnvmARY REPORT passim (1968); U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIc., A PLACE
TO LIvE: THE YEARBOOK Or AGRICULTURE 83-132 (1963).
321 It has been estimated authoritatively that "municipal waste, treatment
plant and interceptor sewer construction costs to attain federal water quality
standards in the five-year period, FY 1969-73, will require the expenditure of
$8.0 billion," excluding land costs.* 1 FED. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADm'N,
THE COST OF CLEAN WATER: SumMARY REPORT 10 (1968). See also Bryan,
Water Supply and Pollution Control Aspects of Urbanization, 30 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 176, 188-92 (1965).- -
322 See text accompanying notes 206-23 supra. But see N.J. Rev. Stat.
§ 40:63-129 (1967): "The owner of any land adjacent to any plant, works or
station for the treatment, disposal or rendering of sewage ... who shall sus-
tain any direct injury by reason of the negligence or lack of reasonable care
of the contracting municipalities . . . in the establishment and maintenance
of any such plant, works, or station, may maintain an action at law ... for
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The law of inverse condemnation liability for loss of soil stability
and deprivation of lateral support, as already noted, is also in need of
clarification by legislation.3 23 Here again, because of the vast volume
of construction work undertaken by governmental agencies with
potential damage-producing characteristics, a rational approach-al-
ready adopted, for example, in several states, including Connec-
ticut,324 Massachusetts, 325 Pennsylvania, 326 and Wisconsin327 --might
well substitute a statutory rule of strict inverse liability in place of
rules developed for private controversies and predicated upon fault.328
In connection with damage claims arising from drifting chemical
sprays used in governmental pest abatement work, where current
statutory provisions appear to impose a large measure of strict lia-
bility,329 legislation again would be helpful to clarify applicability of
the relevant provisions to public entities.330
the recovery of all damages sustained by him by reason of such injury."
(Emphasis added). Since the concept of "nuisance" appears to be the prin-
cipal doctrinal basis for tort liability (and possibly for inverse liability) in
pollution cases, there is a need for legislative clarification of the extent of
governmental tort liability for nuisance under the Tort Claims Act of 1963.
Note 210 and accompanying text supra.
323 See text accompanying notes 173-84 supra.
324 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 13a-82 (1966).
325 /lAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 81, § 7 (1964).
326 PA. STAT. tit. 26, § 1-612 (Supp. 1966).
327 WIS. STAT. § 80.47 (1957).
328 To some extent, of course, a form of strict inverse liability is already
required in some cases by the decision in Albers v. Los Angeles County, 62
Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965). The full implications of
this decision, however, remain to be worked out. Cf. Sutfin v. State, 261
A.C.A. 39, 67 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1968) (dictum) (opinion quotes extensively
from pre-Albers opinions).
329 See note 248 supra.
330 For example, the legislature in CAL. AGRIC. CODE §§ 14063, 14093, has
explicitly authorized governmental agencies to use certain dangerous chem-
icals in pest control operations, while the use of 2,4-D and other injurious
herbicides in accordance with administrative regulations is authorized (ap-
parently, but not explicitly, applicable to public entities) by a different sec-
tion. Id. § 14033. Use of these chemicals may, of course, result in damage to
private property. See Comment, Crop Dusting: Two Theories of Liability?,
19 HASTINGS L.J. 476 (1968). Legislative recognition of this risk is implicit
in provisions declaring that authorized and lawful use of pesticides will not
relieve "any person" from liability for damage to others caused by such use.
CAL. AGRIC. CODE §§ 14003, 14034. Furthermore, in the interest of preventing
improper and harmful methods from being employed, the legislature has
delegated extensive authority to the director of agriculture to promulgate
regulations, including a permit procedure, to govern the actual use of injurious
agricultural chemicals. Id. §§ 14005-11, 14033. All users are under a manda-
tory duty to prevent substantial drift of economic poisons employed in the
course of pest control operations and to conform to applicable regulations.
Id. §§ 12972, 14011, 14032, 14063.
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Legislative development of uniform inverse liability guidelines
which avoid reliance upon established private legal rules would im-
prove predictability and rationality of decision-making. Statutory
criteria also would tend to clarify the factors of risk exposure to be
considered by responsible public officials, and might well produce
systematic improvements in preventive procedures associated with the
planning and engineering of public improvements.
A collateral advantage might be the identification of situations,
elucidated in the process of formulating appropriate criteria of public
liability, in which reciprocal private liabilities may also appear worthy
of legislative treatment. For example, a review of water damage prob-
lems in Wisconsin led in 1963 to an abrogation of formerly inflexible
rules and the substitution of a new statutory duty, imposed correl-
atively upon both public entities and private persons, requiring the
It seems probable that the courts would hold governmental agencies sub-
ject to the cited statutory provisions. Flournoy v. State, 57 Cal. 2d 497, 370
P.2d 331, 20 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1962) (general statutory language held applicable
to public entities absent legislative intent to contrary). However, this con-
clusion is open to some doubt. Express reference to public agencies in cer-
tain code sections, CAL. AGaIC. CODE §§ 14063, 14093, suggests the intended non-
applicability of others in which no such reference is included. On the other
hand, the code expressly makes the sections dealing with "Injurious Materials,"
id. §§ 14001-98, inapplicable to public entities while engaged in research
projects. Id. § 14002. This impliedly indicates that it does apply in non-
research situations. Legislation clarifying applicability would, it is submitted,
be helpful.
Assuming applicability of the code provisions, the scope of governmental
tort liability resulting from violations is not entirely clear. In some instances,
such violations, for example, the use of a method of chemical pest control
which caused substantial drift in violation of section 12972 would presumably
constitute a basis for entity liability for breach of a mandatory duty. CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 815.6. In some instances, however, it may be questionable
whether such property damage resulted from actionable negligence in apply-
ing the chemicals or from the immune discretionary determination to apply
them under circumstances in which drift, and resultant damage, was inevitable.
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 820.2, 855.4; A. VAN ALSTYNE, CAiaIomRNA GOVERNMENTAL
TORT LABILITY 639 & n.4 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1964). If no negligence
is found or the discretionary tort immunity obtains, the question remains
whether liability could be predicated upon inverse condemnation or nuisance
theories. See Bright v. East Side Mosquito Abatement Dist., 168 Cal. App.
2d 7, 335 P.2d 527 (1959) (nuisance theory). On the need for legislative
treatment of the scope of nuisance liability of public entities, in conjunction
with inverse condemnation, see notes 168, 208-223 and accompanying text
supra. Finally, it is not clear whether the special "report of loss" procedures,
which may affect the injured party's ability to establish the extent of his
damages from chemical drift, CAL. AGcic. CODE §§ 11761-65, are applicable to
governmental operations or are limited to private commercial pest control ac-
tivities. Clarification of these doubtful areas by legislation would also be
helpful.
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use of "sound engineering practices" in the construction of improve-
ments so that "unreasonable" impediments to flow of surface water
and stream water would be eliminated.331 California statutes, how-
ever, have taken precisely the opposite stance: private landowners
are denied the full benefit of private law rules according upper own-
ers a privilege to discharge surface waters upon lower lying lands, as
well as the "common enemy" privilege to repel flood waters, where
damage to or flooding of state or county highways results.3 2  As
standards are developed for the inverse liability of governmental en-
tities injuring private property, consideration also should be given to
the possible justification if any, for retention of inconsistent stand-
331 Wis. STAT. § 88.87 (Supp. 1967). In this measure, the Wisconsin
legislature explicitly recognizes that some diversions and changes in both
volume and direction of flow of surface and stream waters are the inevitable
consequences of the improvement of property by public and private proprie-
tors. Accordingly, in the interest of eliminating discouragements to the
physical development of land, and to promote responsible drainage engineering
to reduce unnecessary water damage, a statutory test of "reasonableness" was
substituted for the less flexible and more mechanical criteria recognized
under prior law. See Note, Highways-Flood Damage-Proposed Modification
of Common Enemy Doctrine, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 649. Other states have taken
varying approaches. In North Dakota highway construction is required to
be "so designed as to permit the waters ... to drain into coulees, rivers, and
lakes according to the surface and terrain . . . in accordance with scientific
highway construction and engineering so as to avoid the waters flowing into
and accumulating in the ditches to overflow adjacent and adjoining lands."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-03-06 (1960). Also when a highway has been con-
structed over a watercourse into which surface waters from farmlands flow
and discharge, the state conservation commission, on petition, "shall determine
as nearly as practicable the maximum quantity of water, in terms of second
feet, which such watercourse or draw may be required to carry," after which
the responsible authority is required to install a culvert or bridge of sufficient
capacity to permit "such maximum quantity of water to flow freely and unim-
peded through the culvert or under silch bridge." Id. § 24-03-08 (1960). In
Ohio, an administrative procedure exists for adjusting claims for private dam-
age resulting from the overflow or leakage of a public reservoir, canal or
dam, or the insufficiency of a public culvert. An appointed board of com-
missioners is required to award "such damages as they may deem just" upon a
finding that the injury resulted from "defective construction of any part of
the public work which might have been avoided by the use of ordinary skill
or care, or resulted from the want of proper care on the part of the officers
or agents of the state in maintaining or repairing" the improvement. OHio
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 123.39-.42 (Page 1953).
332 CAL. STREETS & H'wAYs CODE §§ 725, 1487, 1488; People ex Tel. Dep't of
Pub. Works v. Lindskog, 195 Cal. App. 2d 582, 16 Cal. Rpr. 58 (1961); cf. Colusa
County v. Strain, 215 Cal. App. 2d 472, 30 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1963) (sustaining
validity of county ordinance requiring permit for land leveling or excavation
work that changes drainage pattern, even though such work may be privi-
leged under common law rules governing water damage). But see People v.
Stowell, 139 Cal. App. 2d 728, 294 P.2d 474 (1956).
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ards such as these governing the liability of private persons for dam-
age to public property.
Complete displacement of existing private rules may not be es-
sential to an effective legislative program; indeed, in certain respects
those rules may be worthy of retention.3 3 Improvement also could
take the form of statutory presumptions tied to existing liability cri-
teria. This is essentially the approach now taken in private litigation
involving interferences with surface water drainage. Where both
parties are shown to have acted reasonably in disposing of and pro-
tecting against surface waters, liability ordinarily falls upon the upper
owner who altered the drainage pattern unless he can establish that
the social and economic utility of his conduct outweighs the detriment
sustained as a result.3 3 4 A comparable legislative approach, for ex-
ample, might provide that property damage newly caused by a public
improvement is presumptively compensable in inverse condemnation
if private tort liability would follow on like facts, but is subject to a
defense by the public entity grounded upon the existence of over-
riding justification. Conversely, property damage which public im-
provements (e.g., flood control works) were intended, but failed, to
prevent could be declared presumptively non-recoverable if that same
result would obtain under private law. The result would be con-
trary, however, if the claimant could bring forth persuasive evidence
that the inadequacy of the improvement was attributable to the un-
reasonable taking of a calculated risk by the entity that such damage
would not result.
Constitutional protections for property rights, it should be noted,
333 For example, present statutory provisions relating to liability for es-
caping fire, note 247 supra, and for damage to drifting of injurious chemicals
used in past abatement work, note 248 supra, may be reasonably appropriate
for retention as part of the tort-inverse liability framework. Modification
of the existing statutes in the interest of clarification may, however, be neces-
sary. See the suggestions relating to the chemical drift problem in note 330
supra.
334 Burrows v. State, 260 A.C.A. 29, 66 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1968). Care should
be taken, of course, to appraise the validity of the suggested approach in
varying kinds of situations. For example, the problem of flooding of ad-
joining property as the result of inadequate drainage of public streets is
marked, in the California cases, by excessive confusion and uncertainty. See
text accompanying notes 106-08 supra. Consideration should be given to the
question whether, in this type of case, damages should be administered under
a rule of strict liability. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-224 (1962), by which
municipalities are under a mandatory duty to provide "sufficient drainage"
for surface water collected in streets, after demand by property owners, and
are liable for failure or refusal to do so. Hall v. Greenville, 227 S.C. 375, 88
S.E.2d (1955). On the other hand, in this type of case, consideration should
be given to the question whether there is need for a rule of reasonableness
geared to standard engineering expertise. See note 331 supra.
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do not preclude the fashioning of reasonable inverse liability rules
which differ from the rules of liability applied between private prop-
erty owners. Over half a century ago, the California Supreme Court
declared the existence of legislative power to alter the rules of private
property law to the extent necessary to carry out the beneficent pub-
lic purpose of government 35 Moreover, the United States Supreme
Court has indicated that the basic content of the "property" rights
protected by the just compensation clause is governed by state law,336
and that "no person has a vested right in any general rule of law or
policy of legislation entitling him to insist that it shall remain un-
changed for his benefit. 3 37 Significant changes in settled rules of
law, of course, have repeatedly been given effect by the courts in
actions against public entities, both in inverse condemnation 3 s and in
tort actions. 339
C. Statutory Dissolution of Inconsistencies Caused by the Overlap
of Tort and Inverse Condemnation Law
It is widely recognized that inverse condemnation liabilities de-
veloped, in part, as limited exceptions to the governmental immunity
doctrine.340 The abrogation of that doctrine in California, and its re-
placement by a statutory regime of governmental tort liability and
immunity has produced inconsistencies between tort and inverse lia-
bilities of governmental entities which are a source of confusion, and
occasional injustice.341
335 Gray v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1500, 174 Cal. 622, 653, 163 P. 1024, 1037
(1917).
336 See Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation:
The Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REV. 727, 758-59 (1967).
337 Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 68, 76 (1915), where
a statute which imposed a duty on railroads to construct culverts for drainage
of surface water across a right-of-way, contrary to state common law rules
of property law, was held not a compensable "taking" of a property right.
338 See, e.g., Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d
889, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967), discussing the historical changes in California
law relating to riparian water rights.
339 There are many cases sustaining the retroactive application of statutory
provisions destroying previously accrued tort causes of action against govern-
mental agencies. E.g., Los Angeles County v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. 2d
839, 402 P.2d 868, 44 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1965); Flournoy v. State, 230 Cal. App.
2d 520, 41 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1964).
340 Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The
Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STAx. L. REV. 727, 758-59 (1967).
341 See, e.g., Burbank v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 675, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 23 (1965) (mandamus granted to compel trial court to sustain demurrer
to complaint for interference with surface water drainage so that plaintiff
would be required to set out tort and inverse theories of liability in separate
counts). See also text accompanying notes 46-58 supra.
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The precise status of nuisance as a source of inverse liability, not-
withstanding its omission from the purview of statutory tort liabilities
recognized by the California Tort Claims Act, is a prime example of
law in need of legislative clarification.3 42 In addition, the frequent
interchangeability of tort and inverse condemnation theories, where
property damage has resulted from a dangerous condition of public
property, may result in inverse liability notwithstanding a clearly
applicable statutory tort immunity.34 3 Lack of conceptual symmetry
also is seen in the fact that damages for personal injuries or death
often are wholly unrecoverable (due to a tort immunity) even though
full recovery for property losses is assured by inverse condemnation
law upon precisely the same facts.344
The overlap of trespass and inverse condemnation is reflected
presently in section 1242.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure,
under which public entities with power to condemn land for reser-
voirs, on petition and deposit of security for damages, may obtain a
court order authorizing reservoir site investigations upon private land.
Ordinarily, official entries upon private land are a privileged exercise
342 See notes 168, 208-23 and accompanying text supra.
343 See, e.g., Granone v. Los Angeles County, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 42
Cal. Rptr. 34 (1965) (defective plan of culvert design held actionable for
inverse condemnation purposes; court does not, however, discuss possible
application of immunity provision of CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.6). Cf. Burbank
v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 675, 42 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1965) (newly created
defenses to "dangerous property condition" liability, as provided in CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 835.4, held retroactively applicable; such defenses, however, impliedly
deemed not a limitation upon inverse condemnation). The need for legislative
reconsideration of the present tort immunity for public improvements which
are dangerous because of their plan or design, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 830.6, is un-
derscored by the Supreme Court's position that the reasonableness of the plan
must be judged solely as of its origin, without regard for latent dangers
inherent therein which became apparent in the course of use and experience.
Cabell v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 150, 430 P.2d 34, 60 Cal. Rptr. 476, (1967); Note,
Sovereign Liability for Defective or Dangerous Plan or Design--California
Government Code Section 830.6, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 584 (1968). Inverse lia-
bility thus serves as a "loophole" to the tort immunity conferred for initial
bad planning; but neither tort nor inverse remedies are available for govern-
mental failure to correct known dangers that later develop. Any incentive
for accident prevention or for upgrading public facilities for safety purposes
is not conspicuous here.
344 Although inverse condemnation liability is not limited to real property
but extends also to personalty, see Sutfin v. State, 261 A.C.A. 39, 67 Cal. Rptr.
665 (1968), it has never been deemed applicable to personal injuries or
death claims. Brandenburg v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 45
Cal. App. 2d 306, 114 P.2d 14 (1941); note 270 supra. However, if the factual
basis for inverse liability also constitutes a nuisance, damages for personal
injuries are recoverable. See Murphy v. Tacoma, 60 Wash. 2d 603, 374 P.2d
976 (1962); cf. Bright v. East Side Mosquito Abatement Dist., 168 Cal. App.
2d 7, 335 P.2d 527 (1959).
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of governmental authority. 45 Section 1242.5 was designed to meet
the special problem of substantial property damage likely to occur
from the kinds of technical operations, including soil tests, trenching,
and drilling operations, often necessitated by reservoir investiga-
tions.346 It appears, however, that section 1242.5 is both too broad and
too narrow. By requiring a preliminary court proceeding in all cases,
without regard for the degree of improbability that substantial dam-
age will result from the entity's proposed investigatory methods, it
imposes a requirement that often is unduly burdensome, time-con-
suming, and constitutionally unnecessary.3 47 At the same time, since
other kinds of privileged entries also may result in substantial prop-
erty damage,3 48 section 1242.5 is more restricted in scope than its
policy rationale warrants.
What is required are general statutory criteria based upon section
1242.5, but limited to those cases in which its safeguards are required
most urgently. It would be desirable, for instance, to make the pro-
cedure mandatory only when the owner's consent is not obtainable
through negotiations,349 and the planned survey (regardless of pur-
pose) includes the digging of excavations, drilling of test holes or
borings, extensive cutting of trees, clearing of land areas, moving of
large quantities of earth, use 'of explosives, oi employment of vehicles
or mechanized equipment. Bypassilnig the formal statutory procedure
by voluntary agreement with the owner .could be promoted by a
statutory requirement that, in any event, the entity at its sole expense
must repair and restore the property, so far as possible, after the sur-
vey is concluded.350 In addition, the entity could be required to com-
345 CAL. CODE CI. PROC. § 1242; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 821.8; A. VAw ALsT rE,
CALIFORNIA GOVERMENT TORT LiABmrry § 5.62 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1964).
346 See Jacobsen v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. 319, 219 P. 986 (1923); text
accompanying note 257 supra.
347 See 2 P. NICHOLS, -EMINENT DOMAwN § 6.11 (rev. 3d ed. 1963); Annot.,
29 A.L.R. 1409 (1924). Disproportionate costs of administering a system for
settlement of nominal inverse condemnation claims is a rational basis for
withholding compensation for -trivial injuries., See Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Com-
pensation" Law, 80 HAuv. L. REV., 1165, 1214 (1967); cf. Bacich v. Board of
Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818, 839 (1943) (Traynor,. J.) (dissenting
opinion).
348 See note 260 supra;
349 The petition and, deposit procedure need be employed only "in the
event ... [the public] agency is unable by negotiations to obtain the consent
of the owner." CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1242.5.
350 Precedent for imposition of a duty to restore the previous condition
of the premises is found in numerous statutes providing, in connection with
authorization for the construction of -public improvements in or across streets,
rivers, railroad lines, and the-like, that -the public entity "shall restore" the
intersection, street, or other location to its former state. See, e.g., CAL.
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pensate the owner for his damages if for any reason the entity is un-
able fully to restore the premises to their previous condition. 351
Other minor defects in section 1242.5, while not discussed in this arti-
cle, should also be abrogated.8 52
HEALTH & SAFETy CODE § 6518 (sanitary districts); CAL. PuB. UTm. CODE §
16466 (public utility districts); CAL. WATER CODE § 71695 (municipal water
districts). Statutory provisions to this effect are collected in Van Alstyne,
A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity, in 5 CAL. LAW REVIsION COvmM'N,
REPORTS, RECOMMTENDATIONS & STuDiEs 91-96 (1963).
351 Statutes of other states, which authorize official entries upon private
property for survey and investigational purposes, typically require the entity
to reimburse the owner for "any actual damage" resulting therefrom. Kansas
allows entry by the turnpike authority to make authorized "surveys, sound-
ings, driflings and examinations." The authority is required to make reim-
bursement for "any actual damages." KANs. STAT. ANN. § 68-2005 (1964).
Massachusetts permits entry by the highway department for authorized "sur-
veys, soundings, drillings or examination." The department is required to
restore lands to previous condition, and to reimburse owner for "any injury
or actual damage .... " MAss. GEN.'Iws A . ch. 81, 9 7F (1964). Ohio
authorizes the condemning public agencies, pior to instituting eminent domain
proceedings, to enter to make "surveys, soundings, drillings, appraisals, and
examinations" after notice to the property owner. The agency is required to
"make restitution or reimbursement for any actual damage resulting" to the
premises or improvements and personal property located thereon. OnIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 163.03 (Supp. 1966). Oklahoma also allows entry by the de-
partment of highways to make "surveys, souiidings and drillings, and examina-
tions" with'the department required to make 'reimbur ement for "any actual
damages resulting" to the premises: 'OKLA.' STAT. tit. 69, § 46.1-.2 (Supp.
1966). In Pennsylvania the condemning agencies are authorized to enter
property, prior to filing a declaration'of taking, to make "studies, surveys,
tests, soundings and appraisals." Agencies are required to pay "any actual
damages sustained" by the owner. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § .1-409 (Supp. 1966).
The courts have generally construed statutes of this type as limited to
reimbursement for substantial physical damages only. See e.g., Onorato Bros.
v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 336 Mass. 54, 142 N.E.2d 389 (1957), where
recovery was denied for "trivial" damage caused by the setting of surveyors'
stakes, and for temporairy loss of inarketability due to apprehension by pros-
pective buyers that the property being surveyed'would be condemned in the
near future; cf. Wood v. Mississippi Power Co., 245 Miss. 103, 146 So. 2d 546
(1962). Since the owner may fear-that some injuries will occur despite the
entity's assurances to the contrary, authority for the entity to pay the owner
a reasonable amount within stated limits as compensation for prospective
apprehension and annoyance (in addition to assurance of payment of actual
damages) could also usefully assist in promoting owner cooperation through
negotiation.
352 Defects deserving consideration include:
(1) It is not entirely clear uhder section 1242.5 whether the court pro-
ceedings preliminary to the orde for'the survey are ex parte or on notice
to the owner. See Los Angeles v. Schweitzer, 200 Cal. App. 2d 448, 19 Cal.
Rptr. 429 (1962) (on appeal from order'for reservoir survey made under
section 1242.5 in which report fails to indicate whether owner received notice
and hearing; interlocutory order held nonappealable). -Since no elements of
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Procedural disparities also deserve legislative treatment. The
remedy in inverse condemnation generally contemplates the recovery
of monetary damages,353 although in special circumstances the courts
emergency justify summary entries for survey and testing purposes, it is
doubtful that ex parte proceedings would meet the requirement of procedural
due process. Cf. People v. Broad, 216 Cal. 1, 12 P.2d 941 (1932) (notice and
hearing required before narcotics forfeiture of vehicle effective); Thain v.
Palo Alto, 207 Cal. App. 2d 173, 24 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1962) (notice and hearing
required, absent emergency, before weed abatement action taken on private
property). Assurance of a fully informed decision with respect to the amount
of security to be required would be promoted by a noticed hearing with op-
portunity for presentation of evidence by the owner. If in the course of the
survey, the deposit becomes inadequate because of unforeseen injuries in-
flicted, the court should also be authorized to require deposit of additional
security and the statute should indicate the procedures open to the owner to
obtain such an order.
(2) Section 1242.5 is silent on the scope of the court's authority to in-
quire into the techniques of exploration and survey that are contemplated,
and as to the extent of its power to impose limitations and restrictions upon
their use in the interest of reducing the prospective damages or of requiring
utilization of the least detrimental techniques where alternatives are tech-
nologically feasible. See Los Angeles v. Schweitzer, supra (appeal from
trial court order imposing specific limitations upon investigatory methods,
under section 1242.5, dismissed without consideration of merits).
(3) Section 1242.5 fails to provide for remedies available to the owner
when a public entity fails to invoke the statutory procedure, whether inad-
vertently or by design.
(4) Although section 1242.5 expressly authorizes the landowner to re-
cover, out of the deposited security, compensation for the damages caused by
the survey, plus court costs and a reasonable attorney fee "incurred in the
proceedings before the court," it is not clear what "proceeding" is referred
to-the initial proceeding leading to the order permitting the survey, or the
subsequent proceeding to obtain compensation for the damages incurred, or
both.
353 Legislative clarification of the rules of damages applicable in inverse
condemnation proceedings would be appropriate, since present statutory pro-
visions governing eminent domain awards are geared solely to affirmative
condemnation proceedings. See CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 1248-55b. Considera-
tion should be given to the following aspects of inverse damages rules:
(a) Should a "before-and-after" test, as a measure of loss of value, be
established by statute as the basic rule of damages, in accordance with the
decisional law? See Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 737, 123 P.2d 505, 519 (1942).
It is clear that loss of value is not the only constitutionally permissible meas-
ure of just compensation. United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365
U.S. 624 (1961); Citizens Util. Co. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 2d 805, 382 P.2d
356, 31 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1963). If this standard is adopted, however, it should
be recognized that exceptions may be needed to deal equitably with situations
in which damage to improvements may not be reflected in diminished land
value. See, e.g., Kane v. Chicago, 392 Ill. 172, 64 N.E.2d 506 (1946) (no in-
verse damage recognized where, after destruction of building, land was more
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sometimes have developed a "physical solution" where successive fu-
valuable than before); Evans v. Wheeler, 209 Tenn. 40, 348 S.W.2d 500 (1951)
(detriment to operation of riding academy, caused by diversion of river, held
noncompensable since no loss was established when property values were
judged by "before-and-after" method in light of fact that highest and best
use was for residential subdivision); Note, Compensation For a Partial Taking
of Property: Balancing Factors in Eminent Domain, 72 YALE L.J. 392 (1962).
Furthermore, the method of computing loss of value should exclude increased
values attributable to general inflationary trends, especially where the damage
was inflicted over an extended period of time. See Steiger v. San Diego,
163 Cal. App. 2d 110, 329 P.2d 94 (1958).
(b) Should "special" benefits be set off against inverse damages, in
accordance with the case law? See Dunbar v. Humboldt Bay. Mun. Water
Dist., 254 Cal. App. 2d 480, 62 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1967). In affirmative eminent
domain proceedings, special benefits may only be set off against severance
damages, not against the value of what is taken. CAL. CODE Civ. Paoc. § 1248;
see Gleaves, Special Benefits: Phantom of the Opera, 40 CAL=s. ST. B.J. 245
(1965); Comment, The Offset of Benefits Against Losses in Eminent Domain
Cases in Texas: A Critical Appraisal, 44 Tmx. L. Rzv. 1564 (1966). Inverse
litigation, however, ordinarily does not involve issues of severance damages;
hence, to allow a complete offset against inverse damages might, in some cases,
reduce the plaintiff's recovery to zero. Cf. United States ex Tel. TVA v.
Land in Hamilton County, 259 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Tenn. 1966), even though,
had the identical facts been the subject of an affirmative condemnation suit,
no offset would have been permissible. But see CAL. CODE: CIv. Psoc. §§ 534,
1248. Section 1248 provides for an offset of specifically defined benefits
against damages for appropriation of water. This section is incorporated by
reference in section 534 which provides for an inverse damage award as al-
ternative relief in a suit to enjoin appropriation of water
(c) To what extent should expenses incurred by the plaintiff in an
effort to mitigate inverse damages be recoverable? Such mitigation expenses
are presently recoverable under the decisional law, when incurred in good
faith and in reasonable amount, even though the mitigation efforts were
unsuccessful. Albers v. Los Angeles County, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 269-72, 398 P.2d
129, 140-42, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89, 100-02 (1965). Such mitigation expenses are
recoverable in addition to loss of market value. Id. See also Game & Fish
Comm'n v. Farmers Irr. Co., - Colo. -- , 426 P.2d 562 (1967); Kane v. Chicago,
392 Ill. 172, 64 N.E.2d 506 (1945).
(d) When "cost-to-cure" is less than loss of market value, should this
measure of damages be authorized or required in lieu of loss-of-value? See
Dunbar v. Humboldt Bay Mun. Water Dist., 254 Cal. App. 2d 480, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 358 (1967) (cost of remedial measures held relevant to damage issues);
Steiger v. San Diego, 163 Cal. App. 2d 110, 329 P.2d 94 (1958) (cost of con-
structing adequate drainage to alleviate erosion held relevant to loss of
value); Bernard v. State, 127 So. 2d 774 (La. 1961) (cost of construction of
new bridge to restore access destroyed by enlargement of drainage canal);
Brewitz v. St. Paul, 256 Minn. 525, 99 N.W.2d 456 (1959) (cost of retaining
wall to control erosion caused by lowering of street grade). Should the cost
of available remedial measures limit inverse damages where the owner, by
unreasonably failing to take such measures in mitigation of damages, in-
creased the physical injuries and loss of value sustained? See United States
v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751 (1947) (fair to measure erosion damage by
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ture damaging to an uncertain or speculative degree is anticipated. 54
Ordinarily, however, injunctive or other equitable relief is not avail-
able in an inverse condemnation action where a public use of the
property has attached.355 Accordingly, equitable powers to mold de-
cost of reasonable protective measures which plaintiffs could have under-
taken). See generally Note, Compensation for a Partial Taking of Property:
Balancing Factors in Eminent Domain, 72 YALE L.J. 392 (1962).
(e) Should removal and relocation costs be authorized in inverse con-
demnation proceedings? Cf. Albers v. Los Angeles County, 62 Cal. 2d 250,
267-68, 398 P.2d 129, 139, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89, 98 (1965) (removal and relocation
costs held not allowable in addition to loss of value). See generally HousE
CoMm'N ON PUB. WORKS, 88T CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY OF COMPENSATION AND
ASSISTANCE FOR PERSONS AFFECTED BY REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION IN FEDERAL
AND FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAIVIS 194-237 (Comm. Print 1964) (collection of
statutory provisions for relocation and removal costs); U.S. ADVISORY COmim'N
OF INTERGOVERNmENTAL RELATIONS, RELOCATION: UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF PEO-
PLE AND BUSINESS DISPLACED BY GOVERNiENTS (1965).
(f) Should attorney fees and expert witness fees be recoverable in
inverse condemnation proceedings? Ordinarily, such losses are not presently
recoverable in inverse suits. See Frustuck v. Fairfax, 230 Cal. App. 2d 412, 41
Cal. Rptr. 56 (1964), in which the abandonment of the project causing in-
verse damages was held not a basis for a statutory award of attorneys fees
and expert witness fees under CAL. CODE- CIw. PROC. § 1255a. But see id. § 532
(attorneys fees authorized in water appropriation suit where defendant posts
bond on obtaining modification of injunction).
354 See Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949) (alloca-
tion of water rights in underground basin); Hillside Water Co. v. Los Angeles,
10 Cal. 2d 677, 76 P.2d 681 (1938) -(replacement of public school water supply
depleted by municipal exportation). Unconditional mandatory orders for
physical correction of a cause of recurrent damaging have sometimes been
approved. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Irrigation Dist., 253 F. Supp. 251 (D.
Ore. 1966) (mandatory correction of seepage from irrigation canal); Weiss-
hand v. Petaluma, 37 Cal. App. 296, 174 P. 955 (1918) (mandatory installation
of culvert); Colella v. King County, - Wash. 2d -, 433 P.2d 154 (1967) (man-
datory injunction to county to provide drainage for plaintiff's lands). It is
submitted, however, that the public entity preferably should be given a choice,
in the form of a conditional judgment, whether to undertake physical correc-
tion of the difficulty or to pay just compensation and thereby acquire the right
to continuation of the injurious condition in the future. See, e.g., Gibson v.
Tampa, 135 Fla. 637, 185 So. 319 (1938) (city could not be compelled to erect
expensive sewage treatment plant in lieu of just compensation for pollution
damage); Buxel v. King County, 60 Wash. 2d 404, 374 P.2d 250 (1962) (city
given alternative between construction of drainage facilities or payment of
damages); cf. Harrisonville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 339-41
(1933) (Brandeis, J.) (injunction against sewage nuisance conditioned upon
city's failure to pay damages). The latter view would reduce the danger of
judicial interference with the discretionary determinations of elected public
officials in matters relating to fiscal and budget policy, scope of improvement
projects, and arrangement of priorities in allocation of public resources.
355 Peabody v. Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935); Frustuck v.
Fairfax, 212 Cal. App. 2d 345, 28 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1963). However, there are
cases to the contrary. Note 354 supra. Injunctive relief has been recognized
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crees to fit the practical situations presented in inverse litigation sel-
dom have been exploited in California inverse condemnation litigation,
perhaps on the assumption that "just compensation" contemplates
pecuniary relief only.356 If, by statute, inverse condemnation actions
were treated as tort actions, greater flexibility of remedial resources
could become available to adjust the relations between the parties in
an equitable fashion. 57 Moreover, alternative ways to redress the
property owner's grievance could be provided, perhaps subject to the
public entity's option. In water damage cases, for example, a Wis-
consin statute permits the entity to choose whether to pay damages,
correct the deficiency, or condemn the rights necessary to allow a
continuation of the damage.8 58 Qualified judgments, under which a
reduction in the amount of the inverse damage award is conditioned
upon correction of the cause of the damage, also might be author-
ized.359
It appears reasonably probable that much of the artificiality of
inverse condemnation law, derived largely from its use as a device to
evade sovereign immunity, can be eliminated by the codification of
statutory standards. Moreover, in cases where unintended physical
property damage is the basis of the claim, it is now both possible (due
to the demise of sovereign immunity) and desirable (in the interest of
greater certainty and predictability,) to develop a single legislative
as generally appropriate to prevent a threatened taking or damaging of pri-
vate property if a public use has not yet materialized. Beals v. Los Angeles,
23 Cal. 2d 381, 144 P.2d 839 (1944); cf. Hassell v. San Francisco, 11 Cal. 2d 168,
78 P.2d 1021 (1938) (nuisance).
350 For a good review of the flexible inverse remedies which could be
made available, see Note, Eminent Domain-Rights and Remedies of an
Uncompensated Landowner, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 210. See also Horrell, Rights
and Remedies of Property Owners Not Proceeded Against, 1966 U. ILL. L.
FoRum 113; Oberst & Lewis, Claims Against the State of Kentucky-Reverse
Eminent Domain, 42 Ky. L.J. 163 (1953); Note, Compensation for a Partial
Taking of Property: Balancing Factors in Eminent Domain, 72 YALE L.J. 392
(1962).
357 See, e.g., Enos v. Harmon, 157 Cal. App. 2d 746, 321 P.2d 810 (1958)
(mandatory injunction, plus damages, awarded in private tort suit to compel
removal of obstruction to flow of irrigation water). See also CAL. CODE CIV.
PROC. § 1251 (authorization for condemning agency to elect to build fences,
in lieu of paying damages, when property is taken for highway purposes).
358 Wis. STAT. § 88.87, -. 89 (Supp. 1967).
359 See note 354 supra. In appropriate cases, the court could be author-
ized to award just compensation for damages accrued in the past, plus a man-
datory order to undertake corrective measures to prevent damage in the
future, unless the defendant public entity formally asserts its desire to acquire
title to a permanent easement or servitude and pay compensation therefor.
See Game & Fish Comnm'n v. Farmers Irr. Co., - Colo. -, 426 P.2d 562 (1967)
(stream pollution); Armbruster v. Stanton-Pilger Drainage Dist., 169 Neb.
594, 100 N.W.2d 781 (1960) (stream diversion and erosion).
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remedy with adequate scope and flexibility to supplant the uncertain
and inconsistent inverse condemnation action developed by the courts.
The prospect is a worthy challenge for modern law reform.
